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SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND MECHANISMS OF COLLECTIVE PRODUCTION:  
EVIDENCE FROM WIKIPEDIA 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
In my dissertation I propose three counterintuitive social mechanisms to alleviate the risk that 
collective production will fail to maintain participant involvement and respond to demand. My 
first study, based on a panel dataset of edits and views of articles in the English Wikipedia, 
shows that, although collective production lacks a price-like mechanism to estimate demand for 
the goods it produces, consumers’ contributions act as such a signal to expert producers. In the 
second paper I examine the theory that collective production participation is greatest when social 
norms of collaboration are obeyed. Using a large panel dataset of production networks and norm-
related behavior in Wikipedia, I show that social norm infringement is not completely 
detrimental to participation because norm enforcement increases the likelihood that the 
beneficiary producer continues participating. In my third paper, I rely on interviews with 
experienced Wikipedia producers to examine whether producers’ ties to non-participants in 
collective production increase the likelihood of turnover, and whether producers’ embeddedness 
in collective production reduces turnover risk. Surprisingly, I find that producers with networks 
rich in ties to non-producers and with a task-oriented approach to collective production are those 
least likely to stop participating.    
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INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the consequences of social structure is a problem of central concern for 
sociologists (Borgatti and Foster 2003; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). Research indicates that 
individual position in the social web of work and personal connections is highly consequential 
for individual effectiveness, gains, and even well-being. In my dissertation I examine the 
consequences of social structure for the success of collective production, where collective 
production is defined as a form of collective action in which a set of actors collaborate in 
producing collective goods or services. Collective production is a pervasive and consequential 
form of production in economic and social life. For example, social actors in a town may 
participate in the creation of collective goods such as a healthy community or a public park. 
Within organizations, actors may produce collective goods for the benefit of their peers such as a 
knowledge-sharing database or a communications network, a template to facilitate routine tasks 
or a recreational space. Organizations themselves may act collectively to produce changes to 
industry regulations and laws that affect other industry stakeholders. This dissertation proposes 
and tests three social mechanisms which alleviate the risk that collective production will fail to 
address demand for collective goods or retain contributors, and in doing so, tackles several 
puzzling assumptions and findings regarding markets and social networks.  
The sociological literature on collective action has been largely centered on theoretical 
and experimental work (Chwe 1999; Gould 1993; Kollock 1998; Macy 1991; Marwell and 
Oliver 1984; Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl 1988; Oliver, Marwell, and Teixeira 1985; Pfaff and 
Kim 2003; Simpson and Macy 2004). So far, empirical research on collective action has focused 
on two main research questions regarding the success of collective production. The first question 
revolves around the success of collective production at attracting participants – asking who  
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participates, when, or why – and under what conditions. Research in this area either aims to 
solve the free rider problem directly or examines the social mechanisms through which actors 
join various forms of collective action, such as volunteer work or social movements. A second 
vein of research examines the success of collective action from the perspective of goal 
attainment, asking if the collective action succeeded in its purposes and whether the collective 
goods it aimed to create were produced. 
I propose that even when these two conditions are met, collective production may still 
fail. The three risks of failure that I describe and address in my dissertation are the following: 
First, collective production may produce goods, but not those goods that are in most demand. 
Second, participants in collective production may exit as a result of suffering from norm 
infringement if their peer contributors are not respectful of collaboration norms. And lastly, 
participants may leave collective production if they are not satisfactorily embedded in their 
social networks, either because of inter-role conflicts between collective production participation 
and other roles – such as friend, employee or family member – or simply because their non-
collective production social network may take priority over their collaborators in collective 
production. 
In my first dissertation paper I propose a social mechanism that alleviates the risk that 
collective production fails to create goods that meet existing demand. Given that individuals who 
become involved in collective production are not a random sample of the population benefiting 
from collective goods (Wilson 2000) and that individual interest and social structure affect what 
goods are produced (Baldassarri 2009; Gronbjerg 1989; McAdam 1985; Shah 2000; Tarrow 
1994), we would indeed expect that collective production is not well aligned with collective 
demand.   
3 
I begin by focusing on the puzzling fact that some goods in demand are created despite 
the absence of a price-like mechanism. We know that in economic markets price mechanisms 
serve to help align production and consumption of goods by signaling to producers how much 
consumers are willing to pay in exchange for a good or service (White 1981; White 2002). 
However, even if they were interested in producing goods that address existing demand, 
collective producers often have no direct information about what the beneficiaries of their work 
would like to consume. This is in contrast to economic producers who benefit from aggregate 
information in the form of prices (Hayek 2008) and a clear incentive to produce for material 
(exchange) purposes. Hence, the lack of information about existing demand could result in the 
production of goods that are not wanted by customers, while goods that consumers want are not 
produced. In my work, I examine the conditions under which collective production generates 
useful goods despite the absence of a price-like mechanism. I also show that consumer 
contributions play a critical role in signaling demand to producers. This leads to the 
counterintuitive conclusion that a production system that allows and even encourages potentially 
low-quality consumer contributions is better at addressing demand compared against production 
systems in which consumers do not – or cannot – contribute to production. 
The second paper in my dissertation tackles the taken-for-granted sociological 
assumption that social network density (Granovetter 1985; Uehara 1990) plays a role in 
generating benefits for actors through reducing norm infringement and increasing social support 
and individual rewards (Coleman 1988a; Coleman 1988b; Coleman 1990). This study makes an 
important contribution because social norms that specify prohibited or prescribed actions are 
central to understanding social behavior (Macy 1991) and predicting the existence or breakdown 
of social order (Durkheim 1984). Different social science disciplines have proposed various  
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factors that can explain why people enforce social norms (Axelrod 1986; Bendor and Swistak 
2001; Goode 1978). 
Among the various factors which account for norm enforcement, sociologists have 
proposed social networks (Burt 1992; Simmel 1902). In his work James Coleman (1990) 
theorized a specific social mechanism through which social networks facilitate norm 
enforcement. He proposed that high network density structures offer more incentive for 
individuals to punish others for norm infringement because such actions are more likely to be 
observed and rewarded by third parties than in the case of sparser networks. In turn, Coleman 
reasoned, the knowledge that actors are more likely to punish norm infringers leads the latter to 
refrain from such activities, which reduces the incidence of norm infringements. This mechanism 
has been widely cited and used as a foundation for further sociological scholarship (Horne 2007). 
The correlation between network density and social norms has been demonstrated across a wide 
range of settings, from informal support groups (Uehara 1990) to banking (Uzzi 1999). However, 
these studies have not established the existence of a causal mechanism between social networks 
and norm-related behaviors, which raises questions regarding whether this relationship is 
sometimes spurious in nature (Elster 1989).  
My research offers a test of this causal relationship by examining the relationship 
between network density and social norms in a longitudinal dataset, and by showing that the 
frequencies of norm infringement and enforcement vary with changes in social network density 
and that social norm enforcement elicits compensation from other actors. I use a longitudinal 
dataset from Wikipedia containing information about contributions to articles and participants’ 
norm-related behaviors to empirically demonstrate the effects of social networks on reducing 
norm infringement and increasing norm enforcement. Although a priori, one would expect that  
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social norm infringement leads participants to exit a social network, I show that a moderate level 
of norm infringement actually benefits actors in the social network because this action gives 
participants the opportunity to bestow social rewards on each other through norm enforcement.  
A third research paper focuses on the role that social networks within organizations and 
of those outside organizational life play in individual turnover decisions. One would expect that 
higher embeddedness and multiplexity of relationships that an individual has within an 
organization (such as both friendship and work-related ties) lead to lower turnover, and that 
multiple external roles and commitments are antecedents of turnover because multiple roles 
expand one’s repertoire of behaviors and set of obligations – which may lead to conflicts 
(Goffman 1959). The idea of “role strain” and conflict is an important object of study in 
organizational behavior literature, particularly in regards to the work-family balance (Bielby and 
Bielby 1989; Greenhaus and Beutell 1985). Although it is frequently recognized that a person's 
work life needs to “be viewed in the context of family and personal concerns” (Kopelman, 
Greenhaus, and Connolly 1983), there is little research integrating these findings through the 
examination of social network participation at work or through the study of organizational exit 
decisions.  
Predicated on the belief that individual turnover or continuance of collaborative 
production can be understood through one’s narrative of participation, I use semi-structured 
interviews based on Atkinson’s “life story” interview method (1998) to elicit information about 
interviewees’ participation in the collective production of Wikipedia articles, with particular 
attention given to interpersonal dynamics. I then analyze the retrospective accounts of 
participation and triangulate them with objective participation information retrieved from 
archival data. My decision to adopt this methodological approach has been influenced by the  
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research question and by the desire to investigate previously unidentified mechanisms linking 
turnover and social network embeddedness within and outside organizations. I show that 
contributors whose involvement is oriented towards task completion instead of socialization with 
other producers, and whose other social networks (i.e., family, friendship and employment 
networks) are better developed are the contributors who are least likely to abandon collective 
production. I propose that high dependence on the social network of producers increases the risk 
of exiting the collective production as a result of power balancing operations (Emerson 1962). 
This unexpected finding addresses the increasing research interest regarding the impact of social 
networks outside organizations or industries on individual participation (Hardin 1982) and 
regarding the relationship between participant and non-participant social networks, and 
individual roles and identities (Hardin 1971; Marwell and Oliver 1984; Oliver 1993). 
Overall this dissertation provides strong theoretical and empirical support for three social 
mechanisms that can alleviate the risk of collective production failures, hereby contributing to a 
number of research areas. First, despite excellent research work, especially in the area of social 
movements, the collective action literature has neither examined whether collective production is 
aligned with demand for collective goods nor proposed any demand revelation and satisfaction 
mechanisms. This work provides an answer to a previously unaddressed puzzle in this area: 
Under what circumstances is collective production aligned with existing demand for collective 
goods? The identification of the social mechanism through which participants can signal their 
demand for goods to producers and producers can observe the aggregate signal and respond 
represents a first step in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of collective production 
from the perspective of demand satisfaction. Future work in this area will examine the  
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circumstances under which this mechanism may fail to produce useful goods by studying the 
patterns of failure at each step in the identified mechanism. 
Second, this work contributes to an existing stream of research on the importance of 
social networks for norm enforcement and restitution by offering quantitative evidence of a 
causal relationship between social networks and norms, and by highlighting the delicate 
equilibrium between the breakdown of social order due to norm infringement and the benefits of 
norm infringement as an opportunity to bestow rewards through enforcement, and also onto 
enforcing actors. Third, my work adds to the growing area of work / non-work research by 
proposing an application of power-dependence theory to the study of social mechanisms through 
which collective production participants who are deeply embedded may choose to abandon 
production. Based on Wikipedia data, the two latter contributions answer a scholarly demand for 
further investigation of minimal social capital and social structures that enable the functioning of 
technology-mediated social and economic transactions (Ibarra, Kilduff, and Tsai 2005). 
Last, this dissertation builds on recent research (Burt 2011) that proposes online 
environments as a new research “context for familiar social processes.” In my work I highlight 
the advantage of using an online collective production setting as a research site for studying the 
role that social structures of collective production play in production outcomes, and for 
identifying social mechanisms of production based on detailed information about individual 
actions and interactions, because such information is more difficult to capture in offline settings. 
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CHAPTER 1 
ALIGNING COLLECTIVE PRODUCTION WITH DEMAND: 
EVIDENCE FROM WIKIPEDIA 
INTRODUCTION 
Social scientists have long studied mechanisms that align production with demand (Swedberg 
2005). Economic theory suggests that resources are allocated most efficiently through the price 
mechanism (Coase 1937; Eckstein and Fromm 1968). Failures of this mechanism due to 
information asymmetries, externalities, or market power may lead to the under-provision of 
important goods (Akerlof 1970). In such circumstances, firms (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975), 
the government, or embeddedness in social networks (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1996) can help 
improve resource allocation (Fligstein 2001; Weisbrod 1986). 
Although social scientists have examined the alignment of production and consumption 
in economic markets (White 1981, 2002), less is known about the alignment of the demand for 
and the provision of collective goods, defined as goods made available for consumption by all 
members of a group whenever they are made available for consumption by any one of them 
(Olson 1971). For example, the literature on collective action has studied the conditions under 
which social movements come into being, but has not examined whether the social movements 
most demanded by the people come into being (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 
1994). Similarly, literature on volunteer work rarely examines whether the most-needed causes 
receive the most attention (Wilson 2000). If anything, research leads us to believe that 
participation in collective good production is driven by internal motivation or selective 
incentives offered by peers and rarely by demand for various volunteer actions (Knoke 1988; 
Kyriacou 2010; McAdam 1985; Oliver 1984; Shah 2000; Tarrow 1994; Whitmeyer 2007;  
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Baldassarri 2009; Willer 2009). In addition, even if contributors wished to provide collective 
goods to meet demand, they may lack clear and timely information about existing demand. Both 
of these mechanisms suggest that individuals may fail to produce the collective goods that satisfy 
existing demand. This could translate in misallocation of resources and in invisible and 
unanticipated inequalities in individual satisfaction with collective good provision, despite the 
fact that certain collective goods were successfully produced. 
In this study I identify a previously overlooked mechanism for aligning collective action 
with demand for collective goods where no price mechanism exists. Specifically, I theorize that 
collective production can be brought in line with consumer demand for collective goods when 
three necessary conditions are met: i) consumers become involved as occasional producers of 
certain goods, ii) consumers’ involvement is observed by producers who interpret their 
participation as unsatisfied demand, and iii) producers are willing and able to improve these 
collective goods. 
To test this mechanism linking consumer demand with improved collective goods 
provision, I rely on one well-known example of collective production: the free online 
encyclopedia Wikipedia. I employ a unique panel dataset created by merging five different data 
sources to examine the conditions under which the volume and quality of over three million 
Wikipedia articles produced through 185 million contributions is related to revealed demand for 
these articles, as measured by article page views across time.
1 This dataset is uniquely suited to 
address the research question because it contains longitudinal data on demand for collective 
goods that is available to the researcher but not to the producers of these goods—article 
                                                            
1 In this particular situation searches for an article, as reflected in Wikipedia’s server logs, represent a good 
approximation of interest in the topic of the article, given that Wikipedia articles are easily accessible online, so 
interest can quickly and almost costlessly translate in search behavior. 
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contributors cannot observe article page views
2 —such that we can examine the social 
mechanisms which lead to appropriate goods provision when producers lack direct information 
about demand. This dataset also contains information on collective good (article) quality, which 
is often difficult to procure in offline settings and difficult to assess objectively when comparing 
other collective goods (e.g., different amenities of a public area or different political demands). 
In addition to information on article production, demand, and quality, I include data about the 
knowledge category of each article and about the number of producers monitoring each article 
for changes in order to control for inherent differences in the type of good and in the likelihood 
that producers would observe changes to a good. Before discussing my dataset and empirical 
findings, I review sociological theories of economic production and markets, and propose to test 
the existence of a mechanism that connects consumers and producers of collective goods. 
THEORY: ALIGNMENT MECHANISMS  
The Alignment of Economic Production to Demand  
Economists and sociologists have devoted considerable attention to the question of how good 
production aligns with consumption across various market settings (for a review, see Aspers 
2009). Most of this research assumes that “the most fundamental feature of the economic system 
[is] production for [the] market” (Knight 1971;White 2002) - the end consumer or market 
intermediaries who can affect the ends desired by the organization. Central to the functioning of 
this system are the rules of exchange and resource scarcity, which represents the basis for 
valuation. Material goods, human resources, and financial capital are all characterized by 
scarcity because employing them in one setting entails opportunity costs. When a certain 
                                                            
2 As of mid-2009, after my data collection process had ended, Wikipedia introduced a feature that allows an editor 
on the Article History page to click through and examine pages views for the article. I do not have information on 
the usage of this feature but, based on informal conversations with expert Wikipedia contributors at WikiSym 2010 
and Wikimania 2010, I believe that this feature has not altered the editing patterns of expert producers.  
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resource is scarce in a market, it will be priced at a premium relative to other resources and will 
play a more important role in market processes and structure. Specifically, goods commanding 
excess prices will attract new producers to the market, who will then bargain down the price until 
no producer finds it profitable to enter. At this point, the structure of production reflects the 
structure of underlying demand and no improvements to welfare can occur (Arrow 1977). 
  This idealized image of a well-functioning market has been subject to scrutiny by social 
scientists (Baker 1984; Beckert 1996; Granovetter 2005). Theorists have identified at least three 
conditions that prevent market prices from adequately representing demand, leading to market 
failures: the presence of externalities, market power, and information asymmetries (Weisbrod 
1986).
3 For example, studies of economic markets have shown that status acts as a signal 
affecting firms’ costs and revenues independent of product quality (Podolny 1993), and that 
firms with personal contacts to a banker benefit from lower interest rates (Uzzi 1999). The 
identification of such failures led to efforts to address them, by supplanting market mechanisms 
with hierarchies, hybrid organizations, or government regulations, all of which were intended to 
alter the production function (Weisbrod 1986). Sociologists have contributed to this literature by 
examining the role of hybrid organizations and networks (Gulati 1998; Gulati and Gargiulo 
1999; Uzzi 1999) and also by studying producer organizations and regulating activity (Fligstein 
2001; Zuckerman 1999).  
The Alignment of Collective Production to Demand  
Sociologists have paid relatively little attention so far to the alignment of production and 
consumption in collective action settings compared against alignment in economic markets, 
                                                            
3 One could argue that a market failure could occur not only because the market price fails to represent demand but 
also because marginal social benefit is lower than demand, or marginal social cost is higher than supply of goods. In 
such cases, supply might meet demand and lead to efficiency from a private perspective but not from a social 
perspective. In the case of common goods discussed here this is not a concern.  
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mainly because data on demand for collective action are difficult to procure. Consider, for 
example, the arena of collective action, which is defined as the pursuit of common goals by a set 
of persons who overcome incentives to free ride (Marwell and Oliver 1993; Olson 1971; 
Schelling 1973). A substantial body of sociological work either examines these phenomena from 
a theoretical collective action perspective (Marwell and Oliver 1993; Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl 
1988; Oliver, Marwell, and Teixeira 1985) or focuses on the particularities of resource 
mobilization, opportunity structures, and political processes in the context of social movements 
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1994). Research explains how the production of a 
social movement takes place in relationship to other movements, to those in power, and to the 
broader public potentially interested in the goals of the movement (Giugni 1998), but does not 
address how the needs of beneficiaries are communicated to social movement participants, or 
whether those needs are represented among the social movement’s goals.  
Similar concerns abound with collective production endeavors, defined as collective 
action oriented towards the production of collective goods. When collective action succeeds at 
producing goods such as software (the open source movement), political or regulatory changes 
(social movements), or public spaces (neighborhood initiatives), the efforts are widely praised. 
However, little work has been done to assess to what extent, and through what means, these 
collectively produced goods meet actual demand.
4 Making this assessment is challenging 
                                                            
4 This theory applies only to heterogeneous public good production where no actors can be excluded from accessing 
and using the goods, and actors may be interested in different parts of the good, such as political platforms or public 
garden features (Marwell & Oliver, 1993). For homogeneous public goods such as clean air or safe water, the needs 
of consumers and producers coincide by definition; many of these goods are often produced by governmental 
organizations because they are of general interest. For collective action resulting in club goods, the issue of 
mechanisms regulating the production and distribution of benefits has been examined in the literature on commons 
and common pool resources (Ostrom, Walker and Gardner 1992; Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 1994). Additionally, 
this theory is concerned with the production of public goods by non-governmental organizations. While it may be 
useful for governmental organizations to think whether they respond to citizens’ demand for certain public goods, 
government production of these goods is subjected to many other economic or political considerations that fall 
outside the scope of this article.   
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because in the absence of aggregate information such as pricing it is difficult for producers
5 to 
know what consumers want to consume and whether their demands are satisfied. 
  A priori, there are a number of theoretical reasons to believe that there is significant 
misalignment between what is in demand and what is provided. Since it is difficult for producers 
to respond directly to consumer demand, they may produce goods that are not useful while 
failing to produce others that are. While emergent economic markets reach a stabilization stage 
where the attributes of goods exchanged and the rules of the exchange are clear to all parties 
(Aspers 2009), collective production rarely progresses to a stage where participants converge on 
these factors, primarily because it does not take place for exchange purposes between producers 
and consumers. Collective producers may participate for intrinsic reasons, such as enjoyment in 
the process or creating something they want or need, or for altruistic reasons they value 
independent of personal benefits. For example, a collective producer may be motivated to help 
create a neighborhood park because she believes it is important to have a green recreational area 
even if local inhabitants do not express interest in such a space; a musician may play in public 
spaces without expecting financial reward simply because she wants to share her love of music; 
and a cook may share a healthy recipe for free because she believes it will benefit public health. 
As peer producer relations emerge or as members of one’s personal network join a cause, the 
social structure of collaboration among producers motivates additional contributions through 
identity, status rewards and other social incentives (Coleman 1988b; Zhang and Zhu 2011) that 
promote collective production and make participants feel that they belong and are socially valued 
                                                            
5 Throughout this study, participant, producer, and contributor are used interchangeably to refer to individuals 
contributing to collective production activities.  
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(Grant and Gino 2010).
6 This logic suggests that collective production participants may be 
unaware of consumer wants and desires beyond their peer producers’ and may fail to produce 
certain goods unless certain conditions are met.
7 This is in contrast to economic markets where 
the price mechanism and profit motive ensure that production aligns to consumer demand. 
Identifying a Collective Production Mechanism  
To explore the mechanism through which collective production participants may become aware 
of consumer demand for specific goods, I start with a simple model. I assume there are two types 
of actors, actor-producers in the collective production process, that I label ‘expert producers,’ 
and actor-consumers who stand to benefit from collective production outcomes but are not 
involved in production, that I label ‘consumers.’ While in practice expert producers are 
consumers of collective production outcomes as well, I assume that they represent a small 
percentage of a much larger population of consumers and are not necessarily a representative 
sample of consumers. This assumption is consistent with the literature on collective action that 
finds that not all potential beneficiaries of a cause contribute to it (Marwell and Oliver 1993), 
and parallels the distinction made in the social movements literature between activists who “care 
enough about some issue that they are prepared to incur significant costs and act to achieve their 
goals” (Oliver and Marwell 1992) and non-producers who may make small efforts or material 
contributions if asked directly by an activist/producer or “implicitly” provide support through an 
                                                            
6 Even in situations where collective action contributors receive social rewards from consumers, such rewards are 
unlikely to be bestowed for producing a particular good rather than contributing to the group effort, as it is often 
difficult to differentiate specific contributions. In this situation, an individual who identifies with the collective 
production project may feel rewarded by consumers. This reward may alter how much effort an individual puts into 
contributing to collective production, but not the choices he or she makes regarding which goods to produce. 
7 Good overproduction is not necessarily an issue as long as the goods that are necessary are produced as well. For 
example, artists or craftsmen who produce goods because of intrinsic interest in their creation may also cater to 
external audiences as a result of these choices. However, since resources such as time are limited and since multiple 
outcomes may compete for the same producers, as in the case of some social movements, (over-) production of one 
outcome may happen at the cost of investment in another.  
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event that presents an occasion for decision-making at an individual level (Collins 1981). I also 
assume that the collective production system is open to participation, such that anyone can join; 
however, new participants will lack knowledge about how to effectively contribute to the 
collective production process. I assume that the collective production process enables expert 
producers to observe novice participants’ attempts to participate but not the act of consuming the 
collective good itself. In practice, these observations may occur through various mechanisms, 
depending on the nature of the collaborative environment and of the contribution. Lastly, I 
assume that expert producers have a range of potential contributions they are capable and 
interested in making, but they are confronted with a scarcity of resources (time and effort 
dedicated to article writing) and do not have a stable set of preferences over which ones to 
produce first. One can think for example of an engineer building a small remote controlled plane: 
he may know how to make the internal mechanism of the plane but may not be aware of what 
particular features kids would enjoy. If he makes a plane for his two kids he could ask them what 
features to add, but if the makes a plane for their school trip, he may learn about features that 
kids like by observing the modifications that kids, while playing with the collective good he 
produced, have attempted to make to the plane, like adding a ribbon to the tail or particular 
colors on the wings. 
The proposed mechanism works as follows. First, under certain conditions, consumers 
who seek insufficiently provided goods express their demand through an attempt to contribute as 
novice producers. When experts observe the novices’ participation in the production of a good, 
they interpret novice participation as a sign of unsatisfied demand and respond by increasing 
contributions towards the creation of the good in question. In order for the alignment between 
collectively produced goods and demand to take place, experts need to be able to increase the  
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quality of goods in demand (see Figure 1.1). While it may be intuitive that, given the 
opportunity, some consumers may attempt to participate in production and tautological that 
expert production would improve the quality of a good, it is necessary to assert that both these 
conditions have to be satisfied in order for existing demand to be met with a high-quality good. I 
explain this mechanism in more detail in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Collective Production Mechanism  
Notes: Expert production is also fueled by intrinsic motivation and by peer (expert co-participant) rewards, 
which are not represented in this figure and are outside the scope of this study. 
Consumer demand and novice participation. When collectively produced goods are not 
good enough to satisfy demand, consumers may choose one of several alternatives. They may 
consume a substitute good or service, or continue using the collectively produced goods. In the 
latter alternative, they may also contribute to collective production in an attempt to improve the 
goods. For example, a consumer of a travel information site may notice a lack of visual 
information about a location and contribute a photograph of her trip there, but she may not know 
how to label it such that it easily benefits others. A consumer of pre-1950s mathematical tables 
may notice an inconsistency in the natural logarithms table and point it out to the human 
computers despite not knowing exactly how to correct it (Robson, Campbell-Kelly, Croarken and 
Flood 2003). A user of the R free software for statistical computing may attempt to use the R 
Extension Package manual to create or improve, then share updates to missing or incomplete 
statistical procedures. An individual who is marginally involved in neighborhood affairs may 
report a negative situation to a neighborhood committee or local newspaper with the expectation 
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that the appropriate authorities will look into it (Smith 1976). Although collective action 
beneficiaries may be interested in a certain outcome, many still fail to deeply engage in 
production for a variety of reasons cited in the literature on free riding (Olson 1971) and social 
movement participation (Fernandez and McAdam 1988; Klandermans 2004; Passy and Giugni 
2001).  
However, assuming that potential consumers do not act to substitute the missing good for 
another product, and that they are allowed to contribute to collective production, I propose that: 
Hypothesis 1: An increase in demand for a collective good is correlated with an increase 
in consumer attempts to improve the good. 
In other words, the more individuals seek to consume a good, the more likely it is that 
some will have the knowledge and motivation to attempt to improve it. The propensity of 
consumers to contribute may of course vary across goods with factors such as the initial quality 
and the complexity of the good, the contribution cost (to the consumer) and also on the 
consumer’s willingness to use a substitute good, if any exist. However, deeply engaged 
participants’ contributions are driven by different mechanisms than the occasional, novice 
contributions of consumers. 
Novice participation as signaling to experts.
8 Research on how contributions are 
distributed among participants in online collective production settings reveals a pattern whereby 
a small number of contributors are prolific producers, while large numbers of consumers never 
produce or are occasional, novice producers (Wilkinson 2008; Wu, Wilkinson, and Huberman 
2009). The fact that only a few participants are deeply engaged and many are superficially 
                                                            
8 The signal is a by-product of novice attempts to improve collectively produced goods and not an intentional, 
deliberate request for help from expert producers. It is irrelevant here whether novices are aware of this signaling 
effect; this differs from the meaning of “signaling” in other research (Bacharach and Gambetta 2001; Spence 1973).  
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involved resonates with broader findings regarding reasons for involvement and non-
involvement in collective action and social movements. First, “perceived effectiveness of one’s 
own potential contribution” (Passy and Giugni 2001) and beliefs about the likelihood that others 
would participate (Oliver 1984) generate differential participation in collective action. 
Individuals who believe that their contributions are apt to make a difference, and those who do 
not expect that others will contribute to the production of useful goods are more likely to 
contribute to good production. Second, they may be motivated by selective incentives (Olson 
1971) such as social rewards bestowed on them by their peers during the production process such 
as awards or deference.  
Additionally, frequent contributors to collective production learn how to make effective 
contributions and coordinate with others to improve production processes and outcomes. 
Communication with peers is important for successful participation in collective action because 
it “enables a person to find out about others’ choices, to make explicit commitments, to appeal to 
what is the moral thing to do, and most importantly, to create or reinforce a sense of group 
identity” and shared purpose (Kollock 1998).  
When individuals dedicate substantial time and effort to furthering the goal of the 
collective production project, they become expert producers, cognizant of collaboration norms 
and contribution processes as are for example social activists in social movements. These experts 
employ various collaboration channels and tools to monitor and improve the collective goods 
produced. In many collective production settings, experts have a set of limited resources at their 
disposal such as time, information, and skills, and a set of independent and interdependent 
possible contributions. For example, experts working on a neighborhood park may have 
expertise in growing flowers, but the area does not have a garden in the plans. However, should  
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they decide to include a garden, flower experts have an array of possible flowers to plant and 
they may not know which of these flowers would be of more interest to the community 
benefiting from the park. Similarly, a social activist may be knowledgeable about social 
protection measures, but not be informed about the demand for social protection in a given 
community that is potentially affected by her social activism. Lastly, an IT department that 
creates a public good such as an intranet infrastructure for a large organization may have 
information about a wide range of designs, but not know precisely what features the large 
number of beneficiaries who are not involved in the production of the infrastructure would want 
to consume. 
What I propose is that, while expert producers may not know what the beneficiaries of 
collective goods would consume, they may often observe if the latter attempt to contribute to 
collective production. For example, garden consumers may plant some flowers they would like 
to see, intranet users may attempt to install applications that fulfill a need not addressed by the IT 
producers. From such observations, experts who are deeply engaged in the production process 
may infer a latent, unsatisfied demand for a particular good or feature. As long as that good or 
feature is within their sphere of expertise and interest, experts may act to improve the good based 
on their own knowledge or by inferring from novice contributors what particular changes are 
desired by consumers. I predict therefore: 
Hypothesis 2a: An increase in production by occasional, novice producers will lead to an 
increased number of contributions by expert producers. 
While expert producers may interpret novice producers’ contributions as a signal of 
unsatisfied demand, in the case of many collective goods, it is virtually impossible for them to 
directly aggregate consumer demand in the same manner in which prices aggregate information  
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on markets.
9 For example, one cannot know whether people would react to political goods that 
are not on a movement’s agenda, or whether people are dissatisfied with the state of a nature 
preserve or a park. Hence I propose:  
Hypothesis 2b: The effect of an increase in demand on contributions by expert producers 
is fully mediated by novice contributors. 
Collective production outcomes. Increasing the volume of a collectively produced good is 
likely to be easier than increasing its quality. Contributing to collective goods by adding or 
removing features entails work that can be easily performed by novices and experts alike. For 
example, it is relatively easy to make contributions such as removing an unnecessary line from 
software code documentation, sending a message or signature of support, offering a financial 
donation to a cause, or participating in a peaceful street protest. While it may be easy for both 
novices and experts to modify the goods, what is important for aligning collective production 
with demand is increasing the quality of the useful goods. 
Compared against increasing good volume, more complex work is required to increase 
the quality of a collectively produced good. Production of higher-quality outcomes requires not 
only that producers add new information, but also that they meet production standards, respect 
collaboration norms, and seek and accept feedback and even contestation from peers (Okhuysen 
and Eisenhardt 2002). These actions require skills such as negotiating, synthesizing, or 
integrating new information with existing features by smoothing out contradictions, reducing 
redundancies, and/or communicating and coordinating with other producers (Okhuysen and 
                                                            
9 One could arguably aggregate demand by surveying a representative sample of the consumer population. However 
this survey would have to include a large number of possible goods, features or demands that consumers may be 
interested in, some of which may not even be known (a priori) to producers. In many cases, this wide-scale project 
may be prohibitively expensive and /or not feasible. 
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Eisenhardt 2002). In contrast to novices, collective production experts are by definition much 
more apt to achieve these complex tasks in the context of a particular collective production 
project. I expect therefore that the alignment of collective production to demand happens through 
this mechanism on condition that experts are capable of increasing good quality while novices 
are unable to directly improve good quality and may unintentionally lower it:  
Hypothesis 3a: An increase in the number of contributions by expert producers will lead 
to an increase in the quality of the goods produced. 
Hypothesis 3b: An increase in the number of contributions by novice producers will lead 
to reduced quality of the goods produced.  
TESTING THE THEORY WITH ENGLISH WIKIPEDIA DATA 
I test these hypotheses in the context of Wikipedia, a free online volunteer-contributed 
encyclopedia and a salient example of the collective production process. Because individual 
contributions are not censored or screened before being included in the encyclopedia,
10 
Wikipedia has attracted over six million registered contributors who produced over 3.5 million 
articles in English and over 16 million articles total in over 260 languages by September 2010. 
As of this date, Wikipedia also registered approximately 477 million views per day, half of 
which were to English-language pages, making it the seventh most visited website in the world.
11 
Many consumers of Wikipedia’s content are not aware that they can contribute, and many of 
those who contribute do not create participant accounts, choosing instead to edit anonymously. 
                                                            
10 During the period spanned by my dataset, January 2001 to May 2009. 
11 Data retrieved on October 25, 2010 from Alexa Traffic Rank 2010. http://www.alexa.com/topsites and 
http://stats.wikimedia.org/EN/TablesPageViewsMonthly.htm  
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Of those who create accounts, most do not make more than two or three contributions (ever) to 
articles; less than one in five registered editors contributes more than ten times.
12  
  The success of Wikipedia relies on a technology called wiki software, which enables 
people to interact with formerly static website pages. Individuals can modify any existing page 
for everyone else to see, while previous versions of the page remain accessible on a history page 
(for a description of the relation between main pages and history pages, Table 1.1).
13 
Participants disagreeing with changes made on a page may immediately alter or erase these 
changes. Since the contributions of various participants are meshed together in the article text, 
authorship is obscured from consumers who read the final product. This lack of individual 
ownership and control is common in collective action phenomena.  
Table 1.1. Wikipedia – Page Structure 
Page Type   History  Discussion   Discussion History 
Article   Article History  Article Discussion   Discussion History 
User Page  User Page History  User Discussion (Messages)  Discussion History 
Policy /Infrastructure  Policy History  Policy Discussion  Discussion History 
Notes: The production data is this study comes from the article history. 
 
Collective Production Rules and Expertise 
Large-scale reciprocal interdependence requires a large coordination effort. The increase in the 
number of articles in the English Wikipedia from 100,000 by the end of 2003 to over 3 million 
by 2009, coupled with the increase in the number of registered editors to 1,824,439 as of 
December 2007, led to the proliferation and increased complexity of Wikipedia’s structure and 
contribution policies and norms (see Table 1.2 for the evolution of policies and norms in 
                                                            
12 More than 80% contributed less than 10 times, and only about 3% edited articles more than 100 times. About 1% 
of registered contributors made more than 500 edits to articles. For more information, see Ortega (2009). 
13 The description of wiki software here is largely based on the software produced by the Wikimedia Foundation, the 
non-profit legal entity behind Wikipedia. Different types of wiki software vary in their feature set.  
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Wikipedia).
14 Even simple policies such as “Wikipedia is not a place for original research” or 
“Always strive for a neutral point of view” have been subject to debate and increasingly refined 
or expanded in scope (Butler, Joyce, and Pike 2008). 
Table 1.2. Escalation in Norms and Policies on the English Wikipedia 
GENERATION 1 (2001-2002)  GENERATION 2 (2002-2005)  GENERATION 3 (2005+) 
Ignore All Rules (IAR) 
Neutral Point of View (NPOV) 
Assume Good Faith (AGF) 
 
NPOV 
AGF 
Dispute resolution 
Semi-protection 
Three Revert Rule (3RR) 
Criteria for Speedy Deletion 
(CSD) 
 
NPOV 
 
Dispute resolution 
Semi-protection 
3RR 
CSD G1-12* 
CSD R1-3* 
CSD 11-8* 
CSD C,U,T,P* 
Biographies of Living People 
(BLP) 
Unsourced 
Nontagged 
Fair use images 
No spoiler tags 
Anon. article creation 
Reliable sources 
Notes: Based on WikiSym 2010 keynote address by Andrew Lih. Each line represents a detailed policy or norm to 
be followed by Wikipedia participants in making their contributions.*Third generation of CSD policy is invoked 
together with the reason for proposed deletion, which varies by type of page. 
 
Although Wikipedia remains in principle an encyclopedia that anyone can edit, its 
increasing complexity means that becoming an expert contributor requires an increasing amount 
of effort and dedication to understanding the rules by which the community functions and the 
types of legitimate and appreciated work (Kriplean, Beschastnikh, and McDonald 2008). 
Features such as the fragmentation of the same discussion across multiple pages, the use of 
notice boards located in hard-to-find locations, and intricate user policy systems create “private 
spaces for [expert producers] to act away from the eyes of new, [novice producers],” keeping 
novices away in the same manner that the “law in action” makes it difficult for ordinary citizens 
to execute their rights despite the fact that “the law in the books” is publicly available (Oz 2008). 
                                                            
14 The English Wikipedia had 11,405,052 pages by the time it had 2,183,496 articles (Ortega 2009). Less than a fifth 
of pages are articles because Discussion, Editor and rule pages are included in the page count.  
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Researchers have argued that such spaces enable Wikipedia expert members to selectively 
engage in certain discussions and help increase the speed and efficiency of information exchange 
among experts at the expense of broader, novice participation (Oz 2008).  
 “Experts” are therefore not necessarily knowledge experts but individuals who 
understand the contribution process and are privy to and often involved in Wikipedia’s “private 
sphere.” In contrast, for most consumers and novice editors—who do not know about 
Wikipedia’s social processes of collaboration—Wikipedia is not a community or a site of 
collective production but rather a collection of pages and a source of information. Other forms of 
collective actions are similarly structured around a core, or a set of foci of intense activity, with 
consumers who “never initiate action, but only [occasionally] respond to the opportunities 
created by [experienced participants]. [Moreover], it is not certain that they will contribute, even 
if they are asked” (Oliver and Marwell 1992).  
Mapping the Proposed Mechanism 
To explore the mechanism through which collective production participants may become aware 
of consumer demand for specific goods, I first engaged in participant observation of contribution 
to Wikipedia by performing Wikipedia edits and observing other contributors’ editing work and 
discussion threads regarding both general policies and coordination in article writing. My 
observations were conducted between December 2006 and May 2011, during which time I also 
interviewed a random sample of 35 expert contributors to Wikipedia.
15 Analyzing my expert 
                                                            
15 To select my interviewees I started with a theoretical sample of 50 registered contributors who had contributed 
between once and 100 times to article writing (novices), and 94 who had participated over 100 times (experts).
 All 
of the novices either failed to reply or politely declined to be interviewed; approximately one-third of the experts 
were successfully interviewed. Interviews were semi-structured, based on an interview guide which touched upon 
the participants’ first contributions, their current contribution practices, and, if applicable, their departure from 
Wikipedia. Interviews were conducted live via VoIP and IM, with the exception of three contributors who preferred 
e-mail.   
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producer interview data, I located qualitative evidence for the proposed social mechanism 
connecting expert producers to latent demand as a result of novice production.  
Consumer demand and novice participation. According to my interviewees, the majority 
of Wikipedia contributors started by chance, when they encountered missing or erroneous 
information in an article they were reading which they could easily correct. Hence, contributors 
come to collective production as novices by way of articles they consume;
16 this supports the 
first hypothesis that the more demand for an article, the more likely it is the article will receive 
contributions from novice producers. According to my interviewees, their first contributions 
were either content that involved minimal effort, such as adding or correcting information about 
one’s favorite band, native town, or alma mater (ten interviewees), or minor copy edits (ten 
interviewees).  
Consistent with other collective production participation theories, many interviewees 
stated that initially they did not know how to communicate with others, contribute useful work, 
or even retrieve their own contributions.
17 Overall, as novice editors they were not aware of the 
collaborative process through which article writing took place; they could not decipher the 
history of articles by examining auxiliary pages; and they were not cognizant of the many ways 
in which they could contribute to Wikipedia or of the rules and policies governing these 
contributions. Evidence from Wikipedia indicates that many of the novice editors who register 
                                                            
16 Informal discussions with other Wikipedia contributors, both experts and novices, suggest that most of the initial 
contributions are generated as a by-product of consuming (reading) articles. Individuals benefiting from collective 
action may similarly lend a hand if they are accidentally exposed to the opportunity to produce, or recruited by more 
active participants. 
17 Some novice contributors are anonymous, while others may have registered and use a username. While registered 
contributors can easily retrieve their past contributions based on their unique username, anonymous contributors can 
rarely do so, because the IP addresses used automatically as substitutes for their usernames are often impermanent 
(dynamically allocated to Internet users). Even when the possibility to retrieve one’s contributions exists, lack of 
interest or skill may still preempt novice contributors from receiving feedback and learning from their work.  
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contribute only a few times (other novices contribute anonymously), and never become engaged 
in the collaboration process. Given that repeated contribution leads to learning and socialization, 
I assume a positive relationship between the number of contributions to Wikipedia articles and 
expertise. 
Novice participation as a signal to experts. Wikipedia expert producers have two means 
of observing changes to articles they are interested in. First, they can periodically revisit articles 
and examine the history page, which contains a reverse-chronological index of all modifications 
to that specific article. “I look at [articles I edited] a little bit ... I go back and I check maybe once 
every few weeks or so just to see what’s happened. I look at the history and see what, you 
know—what’s going on with that page,” explained one interviewee. Another one explained: 
“Because anyone can edit what you wrote, you have to go back and see if [your work] has been 
vandalized, or if someone added some anything interesting to what you wrote. So when I come 
back, I [may] add more [in response to the latter edits] and then come back to check it later.” 
Second, to facilitate collaboration in production, Wikipedia offers contributors the option 
to monitor changes to articles they are interested in through a dashboard page called the “watch 
list.” Many interviewees reported actively monitoring anywhere from hundreds to thousands of 
articles.
18 In particular, they frequently visit articles that were modified by novices to check on 
their work, amend these contributions, respond to suggestions, or remove malicious or damaging 
work. One interviewee explained his strategy in dealing with the large volume of article 
contributions:  
When I log on to Wikipedia, ... I log onto my watch list as the very first thing [and] there 
[are] hundreds of things that have changed [on monitored articles], and what do I 
concentrate on? … I look for articles that have been changed by occasional editors 
                                                            
18 As the interview data suggest, experts are monitoring articles for changes with the primary purpose of preserving 
the quality of the article. However, if experts respond to a substantive change in the article by better integrating it in 
the original text, or by improving the writing, they could incidentally improve the quality of the article as well.  
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because … some add good content, but many, many do not. And there [are] editors 
whose names I recognize, and … I might ignore [their changes] completely even if I 
don’t agree [with them because] I think, “Okay, this editor isn’t a bad person…I don’t 
know what they did, and … I won’t look at it.” 
 
 The interviewees clearly stated that novice contributions to articles act as a signal that 
readers were interested enough to have read the article attentively and find ways to improve it: 
I’m a fast writer, so I’ll often miss punctuation or spelling errors, which other people will 
fix...It’s neat seeing that [p]eople are reading [what I write], and I can tell it’s not 
someone using an automatic checker for typos. It is great knowing people are reading it 
and paying close enough attention to [see] typos.  
Some kinds of [anonymous novice] edits are good in themselves but do not conform to 
the encyclopedic style or to the coherence of the article. [Regardless, things] like fixing 
my typo shows someone is reading and paying attention—that is motivating. Sometimes 
[anonymous novices] will post … “This aspect of the article needs more coverage” and 
sometimes they are completely right and that makes me … add the content they suggest. 
These interviews suggest that although novice contributions to collective action may 
consist in small, inconsequential changes, their participation signals to expert producers that 
certain goods are of interest to consumers. In addition to signaling interest, novice contributions 
may create the opportunity for innovative and unexpected associations between the existing 
information and new information provided by the novice (Brown and Duguid 1991). An example 
of information that benefits from novice contributions is provided by a Wikipedia expert editor 
who explained his work improving foreign speakers’ contributions to the English Wikipedia: 
“My focus changed gradually … to the history of Hong Kong … because … more and more 
scientists came in to write, but not as many Hongkongers who write well in English [so I help 
with editing their contributions].”  
 Collective production: Process and outcomes. My expert producer interviewees 
explained that as they continued to participate they started to gain expertise in making productive 
contributions to articles and gradually became aware of the presence of other contributors,  
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learning to locate and communicate with them and to receive feedback on their work.
19 Some 
experts explicitly collaborate: “I'm interested in are taxation issues, and there are a lot of us 
interested in this topic. When you edit, and re-edit, each other’s work, you start to build a 
community, even if it’s just a virtual one. I must say this community keeps me coming back.” 
However expert contributors agreed that even when they do not explicitly collaborate with each 
other, they are aware of other experts in their knowledge areas and consult each other on specific 
issues. Several interviewees explained: 
If I’m editing Chinese cuisine articles, there are two editors that are very knowledgeable 
about that. And one, I think [he’s] Chinese-Canadian [is] really knowledgeable about 
Chinese esoteric ingredients, particularly … sauces … so if I’m interested in something 
and I don’t know about it, he can read Chinese, so then I’ll [leave a message], “You 
know, I’m working on this article—[can you] look up this term?” 
 
I am one of ten editors who work extensively on [weather] articles. Occasionally I ask for 
help, but more often I work alone. However, we regularly provide each other help when it 
comes to copyediting/final touches.” 
 
I took the lead in improving [certain articles] because I had the necessary expertise and 
the articles were extremely deficient [but] then if someone else with expertise shows up it 
does entail a dialogue… I did most of the writing [on these articles] and [others] worked 
more as reviewers improving writing and my use of linguistic terminology etc.” 
 
The experts interviewed suggested that, aside from periodic consultations, they do not 
significantly interfere with articles that someone else has taken the lead on, out of respect for 
their expert peers. One interviewee explained: “One thing I try to do [when I contribute to an 
existing article is that] I never change the structure that … is there, I will try to keep it … not to 
be too arrogant. A contributor is obligated to those before to maintain the work and add to it.” 
Another explained that his work with other experts mainly consists in discussing the wider 
knowledge topic and reviewing each other’s writing, but otherwise not interfering because his 
                                                            
19 This process mirrors the learning through legitimate peripheral participation described by Lave and Wenger 
(1991).   
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peers “know how to write and get it good on the first attempt.” In the next section, I briefly 
summarize why Wikipedia represents an ideal setting for testing the proposed mechanism. 
The Fit between Theory and Empirical Setting 
Wikipedia offers a number of advantages as a research setting for testing the theory that demand 
for goods influences production through novice involvement. First, by the nature of its online 
platform, Wikipedia collects an unprecedented amount of longitudinal data on both the 
production and views (consumption) of encyclopedic articles, while collective producers are 
unable to directly observe article views. Second, we can assume that a Wikipedia article’s page 
views reflect consumer demand, given that as of 2007 more than 96% of Wikipedia article links 
were ranked on the first page of Google search results, such that anyone with an Internet 
connection can retrieve an article that she is interested in by performing a simple search, which 
means the cost of expressing demand in the form of a page view is very low for consumers. 
Third, encyclopedic articles are a type of good that requires minimal skills (i.e., literacy) to 
consume, such that I can assume that an individual who views a page has “consumed” the 
existing information.
20 Given that articles are easy to find and consume I can reasonably assume 
that article views approximate reading, which in turn approximates expressed preferences for a 
free good.  
Lastly, Wikipedia’s technological platform and collective production norms evolved in 
such a manner that it is relatively easy for consumers to make basic contributions but difficult for 
                                                            
20 For any type of collective good there may be individuals who do not benefit from it. For example, individuals who 
live in Chicago may not benefit from a public good like free air that is available to people in Boston unless they visit 
Boston. Since Wikipedia exists online, individuals without online access would not be able to consume this good, 
and some individuals consuming Wikipedia articles may be unable to assess their quality, or may be satisfied with a 
lower good quality than others (same as asthmatics may need a higher air quality than other individuals).This study 
proposes and identifies a social mechanism for alignment between demand and production of collective goods using 
online encyclopedic article production as a setting. It is therefore not concerned with issues such as online literacy, 
or digital divide or inequality in access to the internet and in internet skills which have been extensively discussed in 
the sociological literature (Carr 2007, Norris 2001, Schradie 2011).  
30 
them to take advantage of the full array of options for contributing and collaborating. Moreover, 
those who become experts are not a random sample of consumers, and this affects the likelihood 
that different topics are well-covered. One expert stated: “As with most tech things, my fellow 
editors tend to be web-savvy people from Western societies. Definitely more male than female, I 
would say by factor of 10 to 1. So the articles on developing countries are generally inferior to 
articles on developed countries, and there is a lot more stuff on Linux than there is on ballet, for 
instance. The arts in general are fairly under-represented compared to mechanical things, things 
that move.” Another expert said: “I think contributors are mainly guys who are over-educated 
and under-employed. They have a lot of mental brainpower from all their years of schooling but 
are then doing really boring jobs. That I think is the core group of people who [work on] 
hundreds of articles a day.” The non-representativeness of contributors is not unique to volunteer 
work Wikipedia; however, in this case, the digital traces of novice contributions are easier for 
researchers to identify than in other settings. Taken together, all these characteristics recommend 
Wikipedia as an ideal research setting for the proposed collective production theory. Relying on 
my access to data on article modification history, views, quality, length, and monitoring, I set out 
to test the proposed mechanism.  
DATA AND METHODS 
The comprehensive panel dataset employed in this study was created through the merger of 
several unique data streams provided by volunteer Wikipedia participants at the author’s request 
and public data made available by the Wikimedia Foundation. The final article-interval level 
dataset was created using five separate data streams which include (1) the complete history of 
over 185 million contributions to over 3.5 million English Wikipedia articles between January 
2001 and May 2009, (2) a record of 2,592 hourly intervals of all Wikipedia article requests  
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received by Wikimedia servers between October 1, 2008 and January 31, 2009, (3) a dataset 
indicating the number of contributors monitoring each article as of October 2009, (4) article 
length and quality ratings as of May 2010, and (5) knowledge categories for each article as of 
October 2010 (see Table 1.3).
21 For computational reasons, my analyses use a one-percent 
random sample of articles from this dataset, which contains 168,739 article-interval records for 
21,986 articles,
22 where an interval represents a half-month period for the production (article 
edits) and consumption (article views) data between October 2008 and January 2009.  
Table 1.3. Dataset Description 
Datasets Timespan  Level  Records 
Article Edits   01/2001- 05/2009  Time-stamped edit  186,875,177 
Article Views  10/2008 – 01/2009  Article, views/half month  8,339,418 
Quality & Length  05/2010  Article  2,752,543 
Monitoring 10/2009  Article  3,139,636 
Category 10/2011  Article  2,002,826 
Notes: Page Views data included other types of pages beside articles, such as disambiguations, redirects, and 
discussion pages. 
  As I have argued above, expert contributors on Wikipedia are those who have experience 
collaborating in the article production process. Given the nature of article writing in Wikipedia, 
which consists of synthesizing information from published materials, these contributors are not 
necessarily content experts, but process experts who possess knowledge of Wikipedia policies 
and norms regarding contributing and collaborating. While no absolute cutoff point exists 
between novice and expert contributors, I have chosen 100 contributions as a cutoff point to 
                                                            
21 Due to data shortcomings, only 3,712,980 (20%) of the total article-interval records contained data on demand 
(article views), and 1,273,143 (53%) of articles had cross-sectional information about monitoring patterns. Missing 
data problems arose randomly with respect to the mechanism of interest, from formatting problems with article titles 
and data collection issues (server failures).  
22 Only about 90% of these articles were started before October 1, 2008, such that we have data for all eight 
intervals; the rest of the articles have fewer than eight time intervals of data.  
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separate expert from novice contributors, where novices have a registered account or contribute 
anonymously.
23 
Models and Dependent Variables  
I employ an article-interval analysis for the first two hypotheses, followed by a cross-sectional 
analysis of article quality and length, given that my dataset contains longitudinal data on article 
production and consumption, and cross-sectional data for article quality and length. Three of my 
four dependent variables—novice contributions, expert contributions, and article length—are 
count variables taking only non-negative integer values. Since linear regression models assume 
homoskedastic, normally distributed errors, and these assumptions are violated when using count 
data, I employ a Poisson regression approach for the first three of my four models (Hausman, 
Hall, and Griliches 1984). The variances of the first three dependent variables—novice 
contributions, expert contributions, and page length—are much greater than their means, which 
is indicative of overdispersion, so I assume a negative binomial distribution. The general log-
likelihood function for binomial models is: 
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where µ, the expected value of the distribution, and α, the over-dispersion parameter, are the 
negative binomial distribution parameters; X is a vector of independent variables; and y is the 
dependent variable. I use both the fixed-effects and random-effects estimator proposed by 
Hausman et al. (1984), where the latter estimator assumes that over-dispersion due to unobserved 
                                                            
23 I tested the sensitivity of the results to this restriction and found that coefficient estimates on the variables we use 
to test my hypotheses are still statistically significant in the expected direction for a cutoff of 50 edits. Note that 
expertise as defined here is time-varying in the sense that one may become an expert during the time interval 
analyzed, but more than half of registered participants edit less than three times. About one percent of the experts in 
the dataset became experts during each time interval analyzed.  
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heterogeneity is randomly distributed across articles, in order to use my time-invariant data.
24 I 
verify the robustness of my findings by examining consistency across these estimates. I also 
check these results against a quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson (PQML) estimator, which 
makes no assumptions about the distribution of the data and yields consistent coefficient 
estimates as long as the mean of the data is correctly specified, and consistent robust standard 
errors even if the mean is incorrectly specified (Silva and Tenreyro 2006; Wooldridge 2006). 
Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b. In order to test Hypothesis 1, I model the number of 
contributions by novice editors to article k during time interval t as a function of article 
consumption during time interval t, as well as time-variant and invariant article characteristics. In 
order to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, I model the number of edits by expert editors to article k 
during time interval (t+1) as a function of article consumption and novice editing during time 
interval t, the state of article completion as of time t, and time-variant and invariant 
characteristics of the article. 
I first estimate within-group, fixed-effects negative binomial regression models, such that 
any possible source of variation across articles is controlled for. This strategy has the advantage 
of considering only within-article variance in the estimation of regression coefficients, so that the 
measured effect of consumption is independent of any stable unobserved attributes of the article. 
Fixed-effects estimators are often preferred because of the likelihood that the stronger 
assumptions behind the GLS estimator are not satisfied, implying poor finite sample properties 
(Angrist and Pischke 2009). The fixed-effects negative binomial model for panel data is a 
                                                            
24 I acknowledge criticism levied (Allison and Waterman 2002) against the conditional negative binominal fixed-
effects model proposed by Hausman et al. (1989) and implemented in STATA as xtnbreg (StataCorp 2007), 
according to which this is not a “true” fixed- effects method because it does not control for all time-invariant 
covariates. I do not, however, employ the estimator proposed by Allison and Waterman (2002) for an unconditional 
negative binomial model because their use of dummy variables to represent fixed effects raises estimation problems 
in a dataset such as my own with large N.   
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generalized form of the Poisson model where an individual unobserved effect χk in equation(2) 
and, respectively, δk in equation (3) is introduced in the conditional mean (Greene 2000):  
                  |      e x p                     ∗          ∗                     (1.2) 
                    |   	   e x p 	         
 	         ∗                       ∗          ∗              		           (1.3) 
                    |   	    
 e x p 	                          ∗          ∗              	                          (1.3’) 
where φ0, φ1, α0, α1, α2, γ0, and γ1 are coefficients, and φ, α and γ are vectors of coefficients to be 
estimated. 
However, because fixed-effects models ignore between-groups differences, this estimator 
is less efficient and does not use time-invariant data (Greene 2000). I check the robustness of my 
results using random-effects estimators, under the assumption that unobserved heterogeneity is 
uncorrelated with the regressors. Because the Hausman (1978) test for choosing between the two 
types of effects models was inconclusive—the difference in coefficients was not systematic—I 
present both types. Standard errors are based on the observed information matrix. 
The choice of testing Hypothesis 1 by estimating novice contributions during the period 
of measured article consumption is informed both by collective action theory about novice 
participation and by qualitative information about Wikipedia contributors. Non-participant actors 
are more likely to become involved in collective action when they are presented with the 
opportunity to contribute (e.g. requests to donate money or time or to endorse a cause); 
Wikipedia interviewees reported that their first contributions were similarly opportunistic (i.e. 
they were often the result of consuming an article and observing an opportunity to make a low-
cost contribution). The choice of testing Hypotheses 2a and 2b by estimating expert contributions  
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in the period following novice contribution is based on the rationale that contributions which 
closely follow those of novices may simply erase the latter’s work without stimulating additional 
contributions. Given that the majority of erased edits on Wikipedia occur soon after a 
contribution was made, the half-month interval seems sufficient to capture the long-term effects 
of novice participation on expert contributions.  
Hypotheses 3a and 3b. I test Hypotheses 3a and 3b using a logistic regression model to 
evaluate the extent to which expert and novice contributions, log-transformed, predict the quality 
of the good produced. On Wikipedia the categories of article quality are, in decreasing order: 
Featured (exemplary) article (FA), A-class article, Good article (GA), B-class article, C-class 
article, Start, and Stub, where Start articles are usually only about one paragraph long, and Stub 
articles contain at most a few sentences. Article assessment for factual completeness takes place 
after an article is classified as belonging to a WikiProject,
25 in which a set of participants 
interested in a broader subject related to the article’s topic evaluate existing articles on that topic 
and coordinate plans to improve them. Although Wikipedia employs a 1-7 scale to evaluate 
article quality, I use the definition of this scale to create a binary variable to reflect the extent to 
which the article is likely to satisfy consumer need, where articles with quality of one meet a 
minimum requirement (B-class or more) that “readers are not left wanting, although the content 
may not be complete enough to satisfy a serious student or researcher” (Wikipedia 2011), and 
articles graded zero fall short of this criterion.
26 The last equation takes the form 
                                                            
25 According to Wikipedia, “a WikiProject is a project to manage a specific topic or family of topics within 
Wikipedia. It is composed of a collection of pages and a group of editors who use those pages to collaborate on 
encyclopedic work.” WikiProjects help coordinate and organize the writing of those articles. More than half of 
Wikipedia articles were rated for quality by at least one WikiProject. Since the number of topics an article relates to 
could affect the length and the quality of the article, I control for the number of WikiProjects an article belongs to in 
testing both Hypothesis 3 and 4. 
26 Article quality standards are clearly defined, both in terms of objective criteria and subjective reader experience. 
Quality is evaluated internally, by Wikipedia experts according to community standards, and it is open to  
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Quality  	
            .       ∗        .       ∗     ∗     
              .       ∗        .       ∗     ∗     	             (1.4) 
where coefficients γ0, γ1, γ2 and the vector of coefficients γ are to be estimated. 
In order to evaluate the robustness of these results and make use of the entire range of 
quality evaluations, I also test these hypotheses using the raw quality measures that range 
between 1 and 7 as dependent variables in an ordered logit regression. Additionally, I test the 
relationship between article length at the end of the last interval and prior expert and novice 
contributions, both log-transformed. Length measured as the number of characters represents a 
reasonable metric of the volume of information a consumer receives on a particular subject, 
although it may be difficult to determine the comprehensiveness of the information based on 
length alone. This would ascertain that both experts and novices positively contribute to adding 
information to the articles, while only experts increase article quality. The cross-sectional 
negative binomial model employed in testing the effect of expert and novice contributions on 
article length is: 
         |     e x p 	                      ∗      
 	     .        ∗           .        ∗         ∗                          (1.5)                                
where εk represents the error term, and β0, β1, β2, and β3 are coefficients and β vector of 
coefficients to be estimated. 
 In the next section I explain my independent variable definitions, and then examine the 
results of the estimations, followed by a discussion on the limitations and contributions of my 
research.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
contestation by anyone concerned. Kittur and Kraut (2008) tested and confirmed the external validity of quality 
evaluations using ratings by non-Wikipedia participant readers.  
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Independent Variables 
Having described the models and the operationalization of the dependent variables, I now turn to 
describing the independent variables. Revealed demand for a collective good, measured here as 
consumption (reading) of article pages, is a key variable in this study. Although we do not have a 
direct measure of demand for Wikipedia articles, I argue that article views provide a good 
estimate of this because (1) articles are mainly text, such that most online visitors who locate 
them should be able to “consume” them; (2) articles are free; and (3) about 90% of Google 
search engine queries returned a Wikipedia article as a top link, and about 96% of searches 
returned a Wikipedia article in Top10 (first page) results as of late 2008 which means that 
demand for a particular knowledge topic coming from Internet users is likely to be reflected in 
Wikipedia page views.
27 Because the distribution of views is highly skewed, with a few widely-
read articles and many more that are rarely read, this independent variable was log-transformed. 
The other two important variables, the number of novice edits and of expert edits, were log-
transformed for the same reasons when used as regressors. 
Time Variant Control Variables 
Given that we would expect the number of contributions, as well as article quality and length, to 
vary with the current state of an article, I include several control variables to account for the past 
history of the article in terms of the number and types of previous contributions. In some models, 
controls are employed for the cumulative number of previous edits (cumul.edits), while in others 
I control separately for edits by expert editors (cumul.experts), and edits by novice editors 
(cumul.novices).  
                                                            
27 As of 2008, more than 60% of article readers arrived at an article from a search engine, and the rest from links in 
other Wikipedia articles, Wikipedia’s internal search engine, or links in other texts.  
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When articles are not protected, they are at risk of unintended damage or outright 
vandalism by other editors. The protected variable accounts for the extent to which the article 
has been protected in response to malevolent attempts to damage it, especially those coming 
from anonymous contributors.
28 When an article is protected, it cannot be modified by 
anonymous contributors or by editors with accounts created in the previous two days. Removing 
damage from an article and restoring the article to its previous state is called undo. A control for 
undo’s was included in some models; undo edits, which they are simply erasures, contribute less 
to article quality and length than other edits. Two other article characteristics controlled for are 
ratio minor and ratio no comment. Ratio minor is calculated as the number of inconsequential 
contributions (such as a formatting change) over the total number of edits during a period, 
represented as a percentage. Minor modifications require significantly less effort and time than 
other changes. Ratio no comment controls for the percentage of edits that have not been 
documented or classified by the editor. The number of experts participating during a time 
interval was also considered as a control when estimating the number of expert contributions in 
the subsequent period, based on the assumption that participation by multiple experts may 
generate additional expert edits as a result of iterative work. 
Time Invariant Control Variables 
Monitoring is an important variable for understanding expert editing patterns. Any 
registered contributor may monitor an article, which means that one is automatically informed 
when that article has been altered. Therefore, the more people monitoring an article, the more 
                                                            
28 Ideally one would control for the period of time that an article was protected, but data limitations only make it 
possible to know whether or not an article had been protected without information about the duration of protection. 
Given that my definition of novices includes registered editors with fewer than 100 edits, semi-protection of an 
article would not have precluded all novices from making contributions to it.  
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likely it is that someone will react to a new contribution by making edits.
29 Age of the article is 
measured as the log-transformed number of days that the article has existed prior to the last day 
in my dataset. The oldest articles tend to mirror topics in a traditional encyclopedia and to be 
longer than average since they have been available to edit for a longer period of time.  
Another important set of article attributes that I control for are labels assigned by editors 
to articles, such as categories. On Wikipedia, categories represent narrow knowledge topics, 
such as “Mount Kilimanjaro” (Mountains of Tanzania) or “Albert Einstein” (Nobel laureates in 
Physics), or administrative categories.
30 The data I have acquired and used in the analysis 
aggregates category information to one of 24 high-level categories such as Business, Science, 
History, or Geography. A related control is projects, which measures the number of projects that 
a page is part of; for example, a page like “Albert Einstein” is part of both the WikiProject 
Germany and the WikiProject History of Science, among several other projects. Membership in 
multiple projects could be a confounding factor in the analyses because an article that touches 
upon multiple knowledge areas may result in more demand, elicit more contributions, and 
eventually lead to a longer article. Importance is a WikiProject rating reflecting the extent to 
which the article is considered central to that topic. It ranges from 1 to 4, where, by definition, 
top importance (“4”) articles are a “must-have” for an encyclopedia, while high importance (“3”) 
articles contribute information central to a knowledge area.
31 Articles labeled as important may 
                                                            
29 Unfortunately, Wikipedia does not make public the names of editors monitoring each article, so I cannot 
distinguish between expert and registered novice editors who monitor an article. 
30 Examples of administrative categories are templates (formatting standards for categories of articles), 
disambiguations (clarifications of different meanings for the same term), and redirects (which redirect readers from 
a page named after a less common term for a concept to the concept’s main page, e.g., the “EU” page is a redirect to 
the “European Union” article). To the extent possible, templates, disambiguations and redirects as well as other 
types of administrative articles such as glossaries, lists, and images have been eliminated from the analyses. 
31 In order to preserve the same number of observations across models, whenever a variable such as quality, length, 
views, importance, monitors, ratio no comments, or ratio minor had missing values or was undefined I create a  
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attract more contributions from participants. In addition, very important articles may be of 
interest to more readers, such that one would expect a higher number of first-time edits to them. 
For this reason, I created a control for first-time edits, or the number of edits coming from 
participants who are contributing to Wikipedia for the first time since their registration.  
To account for variation in the distribution of work by editors on articles, I created 
editor50% to represent the number of contributors to an article ranked by their total edits to the 
article such that the sum of their edits is at least half of the total contributions by editors to that 
article. For example, if out of 100 edits on an article 20 edits come from editor A, 20 from editor 
B, and 17 from editor C, then editor50% would be 3. This variable indicates the extent to which 
the article was created through extensive peer collaboration versus a production process 
spearheaded by one or two editors.  
RESULTS 
Briefly summarized, the proposed mechanism states that increased demand for a good increases 
the likelihood of more consumer contributions, which in turn increase the number of expert 
contributions ultimately affecting the volume and quality of the good produced. The results 
detailed below provide strong support for these hypotheses and hence for the social mechanism 
aligning demand with collective production. The positive correlation between Wikipedia article 
views and quality (0.22) and, respectively, views and article length (0.35), indicate that, 
conditional on consumer participation and expert response, the quality and volume of goods in 
demand are higher than those of goods that are less demanded. 
Effects of demand on novice production. Table 1.4 presents four regression models based 
on equation (2) containing article views, with the number of novice edits to article k during 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
dummy variable to control for these cases. The controls do not affect the final results; the model estimates yield the 
same results without controls, and the estimates are available upon request.   
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period t as a dependent variable. As predicted by the first hypothesis, one unit increase in 
demand for an article, measured as log-transformed article views, results in an increased 
likelihood of novice contributions during the consumption interval. This finding is consistent 
with my qualitative research findings indicating that novices contribute to articles mainly as a 
consequence of consuming them. Models 1 and 2 present the results of the regressions using 
fixed-effects negative binomial estimators.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, I find that the more views the article has, the more likely 
novices are to edit it. A one-point increase in log-transformed article views translates into an 
increase by a factor of 0.21 in the number of novice contributions. Models 3 and 4 show results 
from a random-effects negative binominal analysis using the same specifications as model 1 and, 
respectively, model 2, which allows me to test the robustness of fixed-effects models.
32 I find 
that the effect of consumption in random-effects negative binomial models with the same 
specification is statistically significant and positive, but lower (by a factor of over 0.21 in models 
1 and 2 versus by a factor of 0.46 increase in the number of novice contributions for an increase 
in one unit of log-transformed article views in models 3 and 4, according to the incidence rate 
ratio values).
33 
While these results appear trivial, one could imagine situations where the number of 
novices contributing to an article does not increase when demand for the article increases. For 
example, a new quantum physics theory has been advanced, news of which may elicit higher 
                                                            
32 The robustness of these results is also tested using a Poisson QML estimator; the coefficients on the demand 
variable are statistically significant but stronger than the fixed-effects estimator coefficients and are available upon 
request. 
33 This difference in estimation may originate from the fact that nearly 45% of articles in the dataset have no novice 
contributions, and are therefore not included in the fixed-effects estimation. This omission leads to a stronger 
relationship between demand and novice participation in the fixed-effects estimation compared to the random-
effects estimation, which makes use of the full dataset.  
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Table 1.4. Negative Binomial Panel Estimates Predicting Novice Actors’ Edits to Article k 
during Interval t (Hypothesis 1)
34 
 Novice  contributionsk,t 
Independent  Fixed effects  Random effects 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Viewsk,t  0.192*** 0.194*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cumul. editsk,t-1  -0.278*** -0.264*** 0.269***  0.258*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) 
Protectedk,t   0.030**   -0.004 
   (0.009)  (0.005) 
Ratio no commentk,t-1   -0.031  0.039 
   (0.031)  (0.028) 
Ratio minork,t-1   0.075**   -0.037 
   (0.029)  (0.027) 
No editsk,t-1   0.072***  -0.131*** 
   (0.020)  (0.019) 
Intervalt  No Yes No Yes 
Observations 93,332  93,332  168,739  168,739 
Groups  11,880 11,880 21,986 21,986 
Degrees of freedom  3  14  3  14 
Log likelihood           38,388.43           38,249.89           71,900.93           71,712.99  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001 (two-tailed tests). Constant terms and a 
control for missing views (models 1-4) data were omitted from the table.  
 
 
demand for the article on the theory, yet many novices may not be able to contribute to the 
article describing it. Or, a school assignment to describe a geological phenomenon may elicit 
increased demand, in the form of 30 students looking up the article on Wikipedia, yet none may 
be able to make changes to the article. Also, the more demand for a good there is, the more 
consumers may expect that others (novices or experts) will contribute to it, leading to a free 
rider’s dilemma (Olson 1971): such is for example the case for Mothers against Drunk Driving, 
an organization that clearly has appeal for a wide social group (mothers) yet not very high rates 
                                                            
34 Key estimates in Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 vary across fixed and random effects models because the risk sets are 
different: articles with no novice contributions or, respectively, with no expert contributions (no variation in the 
dependent variable) are eliminated from the analysis in fixed-effects models, resulting in a smaller number of 
observations included in the analysis in the first two models of each table. These results are robust to a wide range of 
specifications.  
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of participation. At the extreme, a collective production process may be such that consumers are 
unable or unwilling to contribute. For example, in a context where deference to authority is high 
or the costs of publicly exposing oneself as a novice are high, consumers may not be willing to 
communicate demand by participating as novice contributors. Therefore, the condition that the 
more demand for a good the more novices are likely to contribute is necessary for the proposed 
alignment mechanism. 
Effects of demand and novice production on expert production. I show tests for Hypotheses 2a 
and 2b in Table 1.5 using four different regression models based on equation (3) with fixed- and 
random-effect negative binomial estimators and equation (3’) with fixed-effects. The dependent 
variable in Table 1.5 is the number of expert editors’ contributions to article k during time (t+1). 
All covariates are lagged by one time period to control for the fact that during the same time 
period when novices made edits, expert editors may have responded by rejecting them, with no 
further contribution to article development.
35 In models 5 and 6, only time-variant controls were 
employed, due to the use of fixed-effects regression estimators. Models 7 and 8 include time-
invariant controls such as the number of projects the article belongs to, article importance, and 
the number of monitors; their interaction with article demand; and article category.  
The results in Table 1.5 confirm that Hypothesis 2a is strongly supported across models 
6 to 8: edits by novice contributors have a statistically significant and positive effect on 
contributions by expert editors, ranging from an increase by a factor of 0.06 in fixed-effects 
negative binomial models to an increase of approximately 0.28 in random-effects models. 
Hypothesis 2b, stating that the direct effect of article consumption on expert editing patterns is 
                                                            
35 Work by the Wikimedia Foundation’s Erik Zachte has documented that more than one in four edits contributed by 
anonymous editors to English Wikipedia articles are erased, often immediately after they occur. Retrieved on 
October 27, 2010 from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Erik_Zachte,_Edit_and_Revert_Trends,_Wikimania_2010.pdf  
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Table 1.5. Negative Binomial Panel Estimates Predicting Expert Actors’ Edits on Article k 
during Interval t+1 (Hypotheses 2a and 2b) 
  Expert contributionsk t+1 
Independent  Fixed effects  Random effects 
Variables  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Novice editsk,t (log)   0.061***  0.244***  0.185*** 
 (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Page viewsk,t 
(Vk,t) 
0.146*** -0.002  0.002  0.004 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cumul. novice editsk,t   0.100*** 0.192*** 0.061*** 0.044*** 
(0.024) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cumul. expert editsk,t  -0.190*** -1.446*** 0.088***  0.063*** 
(0.031) (0.024) (0.004) (0.004) 
Protectedk,t   0.060***   0.004 
   (0.011)  (0.003) 
Ratio minork,t   -0.014   -0.057*** 
   (0.013)  (0.012) 
No editsk,t   0.083***  -0.050*** 
   (0.009)  (0.008) 
Expertsk,t   0.002***  0.002*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Importancek (Ik)     0.040***  0.029*** 
     (0.007)  (0.007) 
Projectsk (Pk)     0.003  0.004 
   (0.003)  (0.003) 
Monitorsk (Mk)     0.032***  0.039*** 
     (0.006)  (0.005) 
Vk,t * Ik (/10)     0.033***  0.024* 
     (0.010)  (0.010) 
Vk,t * Pk (/10)     0.049***  0.017 
     (0.010)  (0.010) 
Vk,t * Mk (/10)     0.071***  0.017* 
     (0.008)  (0.008) 
Categoryk  No No Yes  Yes 
Intervalt  No Yes No Yes 
Observations  86,480 86,480  144,847  144,847 
Groups  10,932 10,932 21,246 21,246 
Degrees of freedom  4 17  37  49 
- Log likelihood  136,028.1 135,159.2 195,578.9 194,320.6 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001. Constant term, controls for 
views, importance, and monitors missing, ratio no comment and first time edits omitted from table. 
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fully mediated by novice contributions, is strongly supported in models 5 and 6. Results 
presented in this table support the theory that experts are unaware of demand but they are 
stimulated to respond to article consumption if consumers signal demand for that particular good 
through their contributions as novice producers.  
Effects of novice and expert production on article quality. Table 1.6, models 9 through 
11, presents the results obtained from the logistic regression estimates of the effect of novice and 
expert contributions and demand for the article on article quality based on equation (4). The 
results confirm that expert contributions have a statistically significant and positive effect on 
article quality (Hypothesis 3a), while novice contributions have a statistically significant and 
negative effect on article quality (Hypothesis 3b). The addition of control variables in models 10 
and 11 slightly reduces the positive effect of expert contributions and the negative effect of 
novice contributions; however, the coefficients of interest remain statistically significant across 
all models. Hence, an increase in the number of expert contributions to the article increases the 
likelihood that the article is high-quality, whereas an increase in the number of novice 
contributions decreases this likelihood. These findings suggest a tradeoff between the fact that 
collective production needs consumers to participate in production to signal interest in a certain 
good, and the fact that too much novice (consumer) participation may decrease the quality of the 
goods. 
Table 1.6 models 12 through 14 reports the results obtained from negative binomial 
estimates of the effect that novice and expert contributions have on the volume of good 
production based on equation (5). These models suggest that both expert and novice 
contributions increase article length. There is, however, a difference in magnitude and the 
disjunctive confidence intervals of the two coefficients: one additional unit in log-transformed  
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expert edits corresponds to a 50% increase in article length compared to a 14-20% increase in 
article length for one unit in log-transformed novice edits. This suggests that expert contributions 
have a significantly stronger impact on article length than novice contributions, possibly because 
experts often contribute additional, substantial information whereas many novices often make 
minor contributions.  
Models 13 and 14 also indicate the effects of control variables on article length. I find 
that importance is positively correlated with length, such that an important article is 18-21% 
longer than a less important one. If we consider that more important articles are by definition 
more central to a knowledge domain, these articles are likely to be longer than less important or 
less sought-after articles. Consistent with the assumption that longer articles contain more 
information and that different people monitoring an article may be interested in different 
sections, I find that the more monitors an article has the longer it is likely to be. Articles that 
belong to more projects are also more likely to be longer; they probably contain information that 
pertains to more fields of knowledge. The number of undos on the article is negatively correlated 
with page length in model 14 – this is unsurprising given that undos often represent deletion of 
material.
36 Overall, results in Table 1.6 support the theory that while both experts and novices 
make positive contributions to article length, only expert contributions have a positive impact on 
article quality, while novice contributions decrease the quality of the article. In this situation, 
novice contribution may result in an expert response but not in an observable improvement of the 
collective good. 
 
                                                            
36 A Poisson QML estimator was used to test the robustness of these findings; the results are statistically significant 
and strongly support the hypotheses. These models indicate a stronger effect of expert contributions and a weaker 
effect of novice contributions on article length; they are available upon request.   
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Table 1.6. Logistic Regression Estimates Predicting the Quality of Article k and Negative 
Binomial Estimates Predicting Article k Length (Hypotheses 3a and 3b) 
Independent  Article qualityk Article  lengthk 
Variables  Model 9  Model 10  Model 11  Model 12  Model 13  Model 14 
Cumul. expertk 1.673*** 1.565*** 1.321*** 0.409*** 0.385*** 0.394*** 
  (0.093) (0.099) (0.143) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) 
Cumul. novicek -0.321*** -0.325***  -0.223*  0.131***  0.124***  0.179*** 
  (0.067) (0.071) (0.096) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) 
Avg.views.k 
(AVk)  -0.004 -0.002 0.079  0.014 0.015*  0.051*** 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.067) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) 
Lengthk     0.587***     
     (0.123)      
Projectsk (Pk)  -0.097 -0.101 -0.135  0.035**  0.023* 0.077* 
  (0.053) (0.052) (0.146) (0.011) (0.011) (0.032) 
Importancek (Ik)   0.393***  0.502**   0.132***  0.190*** 
   (0.080)  (0.169)  (0.025)  (0.042) 
Expertsk     0.006     0.007*** 
     (0.004)    (0.001) 
Editors50%k     -0.023     -0.035*** 
     (0.012)    (0.003) 
Monitorsk(Mk)   0.139  0.366*    0.074***  0.169*** 
   (0.096)  (0.167)  (0.019)  (0.037) 
Undo’sk   -0.003**  -0.007*    0.000  -0.004*** 
   (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Protectedk   0.023  0.048    -0.006  -0.016* 
   (0.043)  (0.062)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
AVk* Mk  (/10)     -0.207     -0.130** 
     (0.171)    (0.047) 
AVk* Pk  (/10)     0.122     -0.073 
     (0.242)    (0.062) 
AVk* Ik  (/10)    -0.194     -0.125* 
     (0.237)    (0.059) 
Categoryk  No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations  12,292 12,292 12,292  8,677  8,677  8,677 
Deg.  Freedom  5 11  36 5 11  38 
-Log (pseudo) 
likelihood  1,205.70 1173.29  765.70 80,519.01  80,416.10  52,308.43 
Notes:  Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,*** p<.001 (two-tailed tests). 
Constant term, article age, and controls for missing data on average views, monitors, importance and article length 
were omitted from the table. 
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While the finding that experts increase article quality is hardly surprising, one could 
imagine situations where experts already made all possible contributions to the collective goods.  
Another situation would be a case where the production of the collective good elicits both 
strong positive and negative externalities, such as for example controversial legislation like 
capital punishment, or controversial organizational policies that differentially affect social 
categories of employees. One can imagine that experts’ advocating for either side, receiving 
input from “novices” regarding these issues may be unable to satisfy “demand” for these 
collective goods because of opposing interests by other experts. However given that the majority 
of articles in Wikipedia and, arguably, of other collective goods such as policies and legislation 
is not of such a controversial nature we would expect that experts are able to improve good 
quality. 
Limitations and Future Work 
This paper’s findings provide evidence that collective production is better at satisfying demand 
when consumers express interest in certain heterogeneous collective goods through novice 
participation in production. I find that an increase in collective good consumption increases the 
likelihood that consumers will contribute to production, and that these contributions result in 
subsequent contributions by expert producers, while consumption itself does not directly affect 
expert producer contributions. Additionally, I show that both novices and experts can increase 
the volume of collective goods produced, but only experts increase the quality of the goods 
(novice contributions decrease quality). This latter finding suggests that the alignment of 
collective production with consumption is subject to a tradeoff between the need for consumer 
participation to signal unsatisfied demand to expert producers, and the danger that consumer 
participation may decrease the quality of most wanted goods.   
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The results I present provide strong support for this theory, but they are not without 
shortcomings. First, I explain how I have addressed potential estimation biases arising from the 
data structure and the choice of methodology. Second, I address concerns regarding the 
variability in types of novice and expert contributions. Although a more precise measure may 
provide a more fine-grained insight into the nature of the theorized mechanism, I argue that 
measuring overall contribution frequencies increases the generalizability of this study by 
distancing it from the particularities of Wikipedia contribution types. Third, I address the 
limitations of considering expert contributions as direct responses to novice editing. Lastly, I 
discuss concerns regarding the generalizability of the theory given the use of Wikipedia as an 
instance of collective action.  
Endogeneity bias. Although the richness of this longitudinal dataset enables strong casual 
inferences, the analysis of article-level data could be subject to estimation biases stemming from 
endogeneity if any of the independent variables are correlated with the unobserved error term. 
There are several possible sources of endogeneity (Wooldridge 2006): the omission of a relevant 
variable, measurement error, or simultaneity bias, if a dependent and an independent variable 
affect each other at the same time. This concern is addressed in three main ways. First, the 
analyses employ a wide variety of potentially relevant variables as controls to capture the 
heterogeneity in article participation patterns and other characteristics, such as the age of the 
article, prior participation by experts and novices, prior participation by first-time editors, and 
prior article protection history. Second, to mitigate for the fact that unobserved article-level 
factors not accounted for statistically may correlate with article views or with expert and novice 
contributions, I use both fixed- and random-effects estimators, as well as Poisson QML 
estimators, all of which yield similar results. Last, I separate articles with strong demand shocks  
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(spikes in page views per period) from articles without demand shocks in order to examine 
whether the relation between novice and expert contributors could be observed because of 
demand shocks. I find that the results for the relationship between novice and expert 
contributions for articles without demand shocks are statistically significant and consistent with 
my theory. 
Wikipedia contribution types. In Wikipedia, as in any type of collective action, producers 
may contribute in different ways. For example, experts can specialize not only in certain 
knowledge domains but also in formatting text, classifying pages, removing malevolent 
contributions, copy-editing, etc. Similarly, novice editors may make different contributions, from 
correcting spelling or punctuation to adding a reference or making a more substantial 
contribution of article content. The type of edit a novice makes may affect expert actions: an 
expert who notices a spelling correction from a novice may interpret this as interest in the article 
and spend more time improving it, while a substantial contribution from a novice may indicate a 
specific manner in which the article can be improved. Conversely, the type of expert observing a 
novice contribution affects whether the contribution is successful at stimulating additional work 
from experts. For example, a copy-editing expert who observes a novice attempt to improve the 
clarity of a paragraph may step in and further improve it, while an expert in classifying pages 
may be less likely to respond. Although I lack detailed level on contribution sizes, in future 
analyses I plan to distinguish between process experts and content experts by mapping expert 
activity on the relational matrix of articles.
37 Based on the data available for this study I am 
unable to distinguish among different contribution types, so I use a rough measure of expert and 
                                                            
37 A preferable approach would be to look at article relationships from the perspective of co-searches. However for 
privacy purposes Wikipedia does not collect individual level search data. Therefore I plan to construct the relational 
article matrix in one of several ways: looking at inter-article links, looking at the overlap among knowledge 
categories across articles, or looking at editor co-participation patterns across articles. NLP algorithms may also be 
used to generate article similarity measures.   
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novice contributions—number of edits—in my estimates. An analysis disentangling the effect of 
different types of novice contributions on the type and number of experts’ response-contributions 
is the focus of a study I am currently developing. 
Expert response. This study does not measure directly the response of expert editors to 
novice contributions. Instead, this response is inferred by examining changes in experts’ editing 
patterns on articles following novices’ contributions. Therefore, it is possible that the connection 
between the two has been misrepresented. To address this shortcoming, I examined expert 
editing in the two-week period following novice contributions, rather than during the same 
period. If the relationship between the two types of edits did not exist, or if it was restricted to 
erasing novice edits, effects two weeks afterwards would not be observed. The existence of a 
positive, lagged effect of novice contributions on expert contributions identified in my 
quantitative analyses together with the reports of experts’ reactions to novice contributions in my 
qualitative data suggest that the response to novice editing persists in the long run. 
Additionally, there is a possibility that novices are more likely to contribute to certain 
articles. For example, interviews suggest that, given demand for an article, novices are more 
likely to make low cost contributions, either copyediting or contributing to articles they are 
familiar with, such as geography, or popular culture. Similarly, experts may be more likely to 
respond to novice contributions on certain articles rather than others. Further research is needed 
to understand how the patterns of novice contribution and expert response vary across article 
attributes. 
In future work I am planning to test the existence of the proposed mechanism using data 
from a natural experiment on a smaller wiki-based site. The owners of the site randomly selected 
a set of articles, and they started emailing contributors information about the weekly demand for  
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articles they were involved in producing. Based on the proposed mechanism, I expect to observe 
a decrease or disappearance of the expert response to novice contributions when demand is 
revealed to experts, and statistically significant and positive expert response to novice 
contributions when demand remains obscured from experts. 
Additionally there is opportunity to examine the extent to which the proposed mechanism 
applies to two other types of public goods. First, it is interesting to explore the extent to which 
experts are likely to respond to novice demand if the goods being produced are not collectively 
produced in the collaborative sense – that is, the novices do not alter the goods that the experts 
are working on. Do experts step in to respond to demand if the goods they are working are not 
altered? Second, one could study the extent to which experts respond to novice contributions 
when they are collaboratively working on producing innovative goods, as opposed to goods such 
as Wikipedia articles that are created through a synthesis of known facts about a knowledge 
domain. 
Generalizability. The results of my analysis provide substantial support for all 
hypotheses. However, one could argue that the theory is limited by particularities such as 
Wikipedia’s online nature or its technology of collaboration, which allows contributors to see the 
participation history of a peer producer and to a particular article. I argue that Wikipedia is not 
different in kind, but only in degree, in the sense that information is more readily available and 
participation records more transparent to contributors than in other settings. Contributors can 
also monitor changes to the volume or quality of collectively produced goods in offline situations 
as well: for example, one might periodically assess the state of the collectively produced good. 
Similarly, the production and consumption of collective goods are more difficult to measure in 
the offline world than in the digital realm, because interactions with the goods cannot be easily  
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tracked. In the last section I discuss the identified social mechanism in relation to other market 
alignment mechanisms proposed in past research, and summarize the implications and theoretical 
contributions of my work. 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This article is based on a simple puzzle: under what conditions do collective producers know 
what goods are needed when they receive no direct information about demand? Given the fact 
that market alignment mechanisms such as prices are missing in the context of collective 
production, I argue that sociologists should pay more attention to the social mechanisms through 
which demand for collective goods is met. Accepting that collective production is fueled by 
intrinsic producer motivations and social incentives from other producers, I propose the 
existence of a social mechanism connecting collective production with consumption. In short, I 
show how contributions to collective goods production by novice producers are made in the 
context of the novices’ consumption, and that these contributions are pivotal in drawing expert 
attention to goods that are in high demand. It is my hope that this paper will stimulate further 
work in examining the role that novice actors play in relation to demand satisfaction. 
This study adopts an “analytical sociology” (Coleman 1986; Hedström and Bearman 
2009) framework by investigating how a micro-level mechanism linking consumers and 
producers is influenced by, and influences macro-structures (here, the market for the collective 
good). My findings expand our understanding of social mechanisms by showing that expert 
contributions to the production of collective goods are most useful when they represent a 
response to consumer demand. These findings are of equal interest to economic sociology, 
through their contributions to understanding alignment mechanisms, and to collective action  
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research, through their suggestion of a possible undersupply in some forms of collective action 
when consumer participation in production is lacking. I elaborate on these contributions below. 
 Economic  sociology. Economic sociology has examined how categories, status, and 
embeddedness affect economic production decisions. To date, analyses of markets have 
highlighted the penalties that result when category signaling to end consumers or to 
intermediaries (such as brokers) is unclear (Zuckerman 1999), and the benefits reaped by firms 
when high-status actors compete for consumers (Podolny 1993). However, little attention 
dedicated to settings where producers are largely unaware of consumer demand due to a lack of 
direct alignment mechanisms. 
Scholars have proposed two classes of incentives which affect production of a certain 
good: price and status-based incentives. In economic and social exchanges, individuals trade 
their time, effort, or resources they possess in exchange for equivalent goods, money, or social 
goods such as status. To the extent that an actor is willing to pay more for a good or service, that 
good or service is more likely to be produced for exchange.
38 Status incentives are important for 
a wider range of social exchanges, including economic ones, because even actors motivated by 
financial gains make production decisions linked to status in their industry (Podolny 1993). In 
enterprises that are less profit-oriented and where the goal is to contribute to collective goods 
such as scientific knowledge, individuals are rewarded not only financially through research 
                                                            
38 Although production by consumers is not unique to collective production, I argue that this action has a different 
importance in economic settings. Researchers have found that “lead users” create markets by innovating and 
surfacing latent demand in areas not served by commercial producers. This economic market dynamic differs from 
collective production by novices because (1) the observed lead users are highly knowledgeable participants and (2) 
commercial enterprises, in this case the “experts,” use lead user contributions to assess the existence of a profitable 
niche market (Franke, Von Hippel, and Schreier 2006; Herstatt and von Hippel 1992; Urban and von Hippel 1988). 
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funds, but also through collegial recognition and reputation which accrues to them for their work 
(Merton 1968; Reskin 1977). 
William Goode’s (1978) work on prestige as a control system suggests that there are 
similarities between economic and prestige markets, but many differences as well. For example, 
prices are an objective, known quantity that the producer or seller can demand in exchange for 
the good. In contrast, one cannot demand prestige or status rewards from others, and cannot 
negotiate in advance how much prestige one will receive for the action.   
Actors receive social rewards when they produce a good that is desirable but costly or 
otherwise difficult for others to produce, and they are more likely to contribute to collective good 
production when they are rewarded with status or prestige for their efforts (Willer 2009). 
Individuals also contribute to collective good production due to social and intrinsic motivations 
such as learning and enjoyment (Lakhani and Wolf 2005) or a need to express identity or beliefs 
(Klandermans 2004). Organizational members have been shown to contribute to collective goods 
to help ease the tasks of others (Grant and Berry 2011), and scientists may take on a research 
question if they are dissatisfied with previous, less expert research or with unsubstantiated claims 
in the media.   
In my work, however, I argue that irrespective of underlying producers’ motivations, 
novices’ contributions to collective good provision help to better allocate expert producers’ 
efforts. I show that consumer contribution to production acts as a signal to expert participants of 
unsatisfied demand for a good. This is a simple mechanism through which the involvement of a 
beneficiary in the production process stimulates production in a manner which does not entail 
prestige or monetary exchanges. Simply allowing or encouraging the production system to be 
open enables feedback between the producers and consumers of collective goods. I suggest that  
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this mechanism applies to a wide variety of sociological phenomena where expert producers of 
heterogeneous collective goods need to make decisions about the volume, quality, or features of 
a good, provided that the goods are collectively produced and that experts can observe novice 
contributions, as is the case with many cultural or information goods. In contexts where novices 
are rarely involved, such as the production of certain civic goods in the United States, there may 
be a risk of producing high-quality collective goods with low societal benefit, while goods in 
higher demand fail to be (Crenson and Ginsberg 2002; Skocpol 1999). 
 Collective  action  theory. Research on collective action has long focused on the central 
concern of free riding. Research on social movements has rarely asked how the demands and 
goals of social movements are crystallized and expressed, or what needs fail to be met when a 
social movement succeeds, although it has been acknowledged that what “comes to be 
[produced] as a collective good is the by-product of individual preferences and patterns of social 
relations” (Baldassarri 2009). 
My study draws attention to the role played by novice participants in the collective 
production of heterogeneous, non-rival collective goods (Marwell and Oliver 1984; Oliver, 
Marwell, and Teixeira 1985). I propose that when experts in collective action are unaware of 
consumer demand, or when consumers fail to voice their needs and desires in a manner that is 
compelling to expert producers, demand for collective goods may remain unmet. I then show that 
when novices attempt to contribute to production, they elicit a response from experts that leads to 
improvements in the quality and volume of goods in higher demand. This mechanism linking 
novices and experts is consistent with descriptions of the professionalization of social 
movements (Staggenborg 1988), descriptions of collective action as characterized by a nucleus 
of highly-involved participants and a more diffuse network of supporters, and with observations  
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that sociological research often originates in responses to popular (novice) beliefs (McGehee 
1982). Examination of the process through which consumers’ engagement in production acts as a 
sign of unmet demand for a good is a useful framework for advancing collective action research 
because it proposes that the success of collective action in producing goods may not result in 
demand being met, and shows that minimal consumer participation may be a solution for this 
deficiency.  
Additionally, the results of this study highlight the existence of a tradeoff between 
consumer participation as novice producers in the collective production process, which is 
important as a sign of demand for goods, and the negative effect of consumer participation on the 
quality of the goods produced. This finding has implications for production systems that lack a 
good pricing mechanism, because it raises questions about whether these systems achieve 
benefits from consumer participation: that is, enough involvement to produce the things that are 
in demand, but not so much that quality is negatively affected. 
In the following two chapters, I examine the social mechanisms through which the 
structure of collective production and the structure of social relationships beyond the collective 
production setting affect norm infringement and enforcement behavior, and, respectively, 
continued participation in collective production. When linking these to the present study that 
highlights the role of expert and novice contributions in collective production work, my overall 
research points to the importance of understanding the dynamics of collective production 
participation for the successful provision of collective goods.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
TESTING COLEMAN’S SOCIAL-NORM ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM: 
 
EVIDENCE FROM WIKIPEDIA
* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Sociologists have long invoked norms to explain social order (Durkheim 1984; Parsons 1953) 
and to account for various aspects of social behavior (Weber 1976). Norms embody a group’s 
social consensus about appropriate behaviors. Some norms prohibit behaviors deemed 
unacceptable and specify punishments for flouting these proscriptions (Homans 1950:123). 
Others prescribe behaviors and reward those who undertake them (Blake and Davis 1964).  
Among the various types of norms, sociologists have taken a particular interest in social 
norms. These norms require that parties personally unaffected by norm violation either punish 
offenders (Coleman 1990), or reward those who conform (Goode 1978). These characteristics of 
social norms raise a fundamental question: why one actor would punish or reward another for 
actions affecting others (Horne 2004). Since these rewards and punishments are costly for those 
who mete them out, but largely benefit others, potential enforcers are likely to have insufficient 
incentives to enforce norms (Olson 1971). In the absence of such enforcement, a second-order 
free rider problem develops and social norms are not observed (Coleman 1990; Oliver 1980).  
Scholars from many disciplines have examined factors that lead people to enforce such 
social norms (e.g. Axelrod 1986; Bendor and Swistak 2001; Ellickson 2001; Fehr and Gächter 
2002; Raub and Weesie 1990). Among these explanations, sociologists have particularly invoked 
                                                            
* Both Mikołaj Jan Piskorski and Andreea Daniela Gorbatai contributed equally to this article. We are grateful to 
Isabel Fernandez-Mateo and Peter Marsden and to participants in the Academy of Management 2009, INSNA 2009, 
and WOM 2008–2009 seminar for their comments on this paper. John Sheridan helped assemble the dataset. The 
Division of Research at Harvard Business School provided financial support. All errors are ours.  
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the role of network density (Burt 1982; Durkheim 1951; Lin 2001; Simmel 1902:170). Coleman 
(1990) formalized the argument, theorizing that high-density networks provide an opportunity 
structure within which third parties can compensate norm enforcers for the expense of chastising 
norm violators. Such payments encourage actors to punish those who violate norms, action 
which in turn reduces the incidence of norm violation.  
Judging by the number of citations, Coleman’s argument is now taken for granted in 
sociology (Horne 2001; Morgan and Sørensen 1999; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). 
There is also ample evidence of a negative correlation between network density and norm 
violations across numerous settings. Researchers have argued, for example, that norms against 
malfeasance among diamond traders and among geographically dispersed medieval Maghribi 
traders were sustained by high-density networks (Coleman 1990; Greif 1989). Similarly, in 
rotating-credit and informal help associations, the ability to sustain the norm of contributing to 
others’ welfare has been shown to be associated with high density among associations’ members 
(Barker 1993; Biggart 2001; Uehara 1990).  
However, there is reason for skepticism that such correlational evidence can be used to 
support a causal link between network density and infrequent norm violations. First, some of the 
studies cited above examine a single social system and make inferences by pointing to the co-
presence of network density and absence of norm violations without showing the counterfactual. 
Other studies that have undertaken comparative design were largely cross-sectional, making it 
difficult to establish causality. Furthermore, existing work provides little evidence to support 
Coleman’s mechanism. This is problematic because simpler explanations can generate the same 
empirical predictions (Elster 2003). Consider, for example, a high-mutual-dependence 
environment in which actors exchange resources they value highly (Molm 1997). It is easy to see  
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that actors in such environments will violate norms infrequently, and that they will also establish 
dense relationships with one another (Horne 2001). In this case the relationship between density 
and norm violations is not causal but arises out of high mutual dependence (Flache and Macy 
1996). 
To provide evidence for Coleman’s mechanism, it is necessary to follow his three-step 
reasoning process, and to provide support for each step using longitudinal data. Specifically, it is 
first necessary to confirm that norm violations decline as network density increases. Second, a 
researcher needs to furnish evidence that higher network density leads to more actions eliciting 
norm compliance (such as punishing norm violations), which then will lead to lower norm 
violations. The third step is to show that higher network density leads to more acts of 
compensating those who elicit norm compliance, which then leads to more acts of eliciting norm 
compliance, which then leads to fewer norm violations. Without supporting all three assertions, it 
is hard to assert that Coleman’s argument has been tested properly. In this paper, we perform all 
three tests.  
We undertake them in the context of the community of editors of Wikipedia, the largest 
user-generated on-line encyclopedia (Anthony, Smith, and Williamson 2009). This setting allows 
us to study norm violations in a naturalistic setting but at the same time to clearly observe (1) 
who violated a norm and who suffered from the violation, (2) who, if anyone, stepped in to 
punish, and (3) whether those who punished norm violators received rewards from the 
community for doing so. Also, because we observe actors over time as they experience 
transitions from a dense network to a sparse one (or vice-versa), we can provide results that are 
subject to fewer alternative interpretations. Finally, the network relationships we study are fairly 
weak, therefore providing very conservative tests of Coleman’s theory.   
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section examines the 
existing literature on norms, with particular emphasis on Coleman’s mechanism, to derive our 
key hypotheses. We next describe our setting and data, and then our results. The final section 
discusses the limitations of our study and its conclusions. 
THEORY 
Step 1: Violating Norms 
A norm is a set of rules specifying appropriate behaviors and backed by social rewards or 
sanctions (Blake and Davis 1964). Norms can be characterized on three dimensions. First, norms 
differ in their valence. Prescriptive norms encourage given actions, such as clapping at the end of 
a performance; proscriptive norms discourage specific actions, such as carrying a loaded gun. 
Second, norms differ in the types of behaviors they seek to regulate. Certain norms, often called 
conventional, seek to make everyone choose a single coordinated form of action that benefits all. 
Driving on the same side of the road is a conventional norm. Other types of norms resolve 
conflicts of interest between individuals and others. Often called essential, these norms mandate 
behavior that is beneficial to others but costly to the individual. Essential norms also prohibit 
behavior harmful to others but gratifying to the individual (Hechter 1987; Hechter and Kanazawa 
1993). The norm not to pollute urban streets, for example, is beneficial to everyone but requires 
individuals to carry their trash rather than disposing of it on the spot.  
It is easier to explain theoretically why actors comply with conventional norms than with 
essential norms. Because conventional norms are in everyone’s interest, and no individual 
benefits arise from violating them, self-interested actors will comply with conventional norms. It 
is harder to understand why such actors comply with essential norms, since they bear the 
individual costs of compliance but appropriate only part of the benefit. This scenario leads to a  
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(first order) free-rider problem whereby every actor prefers not to comply with an essential norm 
but wants everyone else to do so. If all actors reason this way, no one will follow the norm. Thus, 
theoretical formulations of essential norms need to account for why self-interested actors comply 
with such norms.  
Finally, norms also differ with regard to whether those who are expected to comply with 
them benefit from such behavior. Norms that benefit those who adhere to them are often called 
conjoint. A norm restricting use of a single telephone in a dormitory to ten minutes would fall 
into this category. At the other extreme are norms that do not benefit those who adhere to them, 
instead benefitting another group; such norms are usually called disjoint. An example is children 
who are expected to behave appropriately for the benefit of their adult caretakers. Most norms 
fall somewhere between the two ends of this spectrum, benefitting both those who comply with 
the norm and others who are not subject to it. 
The distinction between conjoint and disjoint norms has implications for the free-rider 
problem associated with essential norms. In the case of conjoint norms, those who incur the cost 
of observing the norm are also its beneficiaries. Thus the free-rider problem is present but 
contained to a certain degree by the fact that individuals derive some of the benefits of their own 
normative behaviors. In the case of disjoint norms, those who incur the cost of following a norm 
are not its beneficiaries. Such absence of direct benefits accentuates the free-rider problem. This 
implies that it will be even more important for the beneficiary group to elicit norm compliance 
from the target group.  
Step 2: Eliciting Norm Compliance 
Given the difficulty of eliciting norm compliance, it is important to understand when and how it 
occurs (Bendor and Swistak 2001; Ellickson 1991; Homans 1950:123; Yamagishi and Cook  
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1993). In general, it is costly to elicit norm compliance. Resources used as rewards or 
punishments cannot be used for another purpose, but those who use their resources to elicit 
compliance enjoy only a fraction of its benefits. For most actors, the expected benefit will be too 
small relative to the cost; thus each actor will wait for others to elicit compliance. But if all 
potential actors behave in this way, no one will seek to elicit norm compliance. Coleman (1990) 
called this phenomenon “the second-order free-rider problem” to distinguish it from the first-
order free-rider problem of compliance with norms described in Step 1. 
The severity of the second-order free-rider problem depends on how actors seek to elicit 
norm compliance. Sometimes compliance is elicited with rewards. Goode (1978) argued, for 
example, that status can be used as a payment for complying with norms, particularly 
prescriptive norms. In other cases failure to comply with a norm elicits punishment, such as 
public chastisement. The distinction is important, because rewarding others rarely elicits 
negative reactions, whereas punishing others can easily prompt retaliation by those punished. As 
a consequence, actors are less likely to punish than to reward others (Molm 1997), and so the 
second-order free-rider problem is accentuated when punishment is used to elicit norm 
compliance (Horne 2007). It is thus particularly important to compensate those who punish 
others for failing to observe norms, a topic we will return to in Step 3 later. 
Second, eliciting norm compliance can take the form of group or individual effort. When 
a group seeks to elicit norm compliance, each member can provide a small part of the reward or 
the punishment at a reasonably modest cost. Since the cost of eliciting norm compliance by a 
group is small, the second-order free-rider problem is attenuated (but not eliminated). In contrast, 
when a single individual is entirely responsible for eliciting norm compliance, he bears the entire  
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cost and the second-order free-rider problem is accentuated. Thus, compensating those who 
individually elicit norm compliance is particularly important.  
Finally, norm compliance can be enforced either by those affected or by unaffected third 
parties. In most Western societies, for example, parents alone are expected to punish their 
misbehaving young children. Since those directly affected by the norm have a greater incentive 
to elicit compliance, the second-order free-rider problem is attenuated. For other norms, 
however, parties unaffected by a norm transgression are expected to step in and punish the 
offender. Norms backed by enforcement of this kind are often called social norms. For example, 
publicly disapproving of someone who fails to give up a seat on a bus for an elderly or a 
handicapped person is a social norm; unaffected third parties are expected to chastise someone 
who refuses to do so. Because such third parties bear the entire cost of eliciting norm compliance 
and appropriate none of the benefits, the second-order free-riding problem is quite strong. In 
such situations, compensating third parties for eliciting norm compliance is particularly 
important. 
Step 3: Compensating Those Who Elicit Norm Compliance
39 
Despite the difficulties of eliciting norm compliance, it is possible to compensate those 
who engage in such acts. As before, compensating those who elicit norm compliance is subject 
to another free-rider problem, often called “the third-order free-rider problem” (Elster 2003; 
Horne 2001). The problem arises because such compensation is costly. Thus, each actor waits for 
others to provide compensation so as to appropriate the benefits without incurring the costs. This 
problem is most pronounced when compensation needs to be provided for punishing norm 
                                                            
39 We use the word elicit to designate the act of inducing others to observe a norm, and compensate to designate the 
act of inducing others to elicit norm compliance. Thus, compensating logically precedes eliciting. Both actions can 
take the forms of giving rewards or administering punishments.  
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violators. As suggested above, eliciting norm compliance via punishment is more expensive than 
doing so via rewards, calling for a higher level of compensation. 
A number of theories have sought to solve this third-order free-rider problem of 
compensation for punishing norm violations. Some theories invoked the intrinsic satisfaction 
derived from compensating others for eliciting norm compliance (Knutson 2004). Others 
suggested that bestowing rewards or punishments on those who compensate could solve the 
third-order free-rider problem. But this approach generates a fourth-order free-riding problem, 
leading to an infinite-regress problem (Elster 1989). To avoid this problem, most theories 
focused on solving the third-order free-rider problem directly. Specifically, a broad set of 
theories suggested that the third-order free-rider problem can be overcome when punishments for 
norm violations are compensated with rewards. This line of reasoning has gained substantial 
acceptance in the extensive evolutionary literature on norms, which shows that the rule of 
rewarding those who punish deviance wins in competition with other behavioral rules (Bendor 
and Swistak 2001; Opp 1982; Schotter 1982; Sugden 1986). In the same vein, most experimental 
results show that actors are most likely to observe norms when those who sanction norm 
violators are rewarded (Horne 2001). Finally, Coleman (1990) argued that compensation through 
rewards is less likely to suffer from the third-order free-riding problem, because rewards are 
cheaper to furnish than punishments.
40 Once this third-order free-riding problem is solved this 
way, Coleman argued that it is possible to solve both the second- and first-order problems and 
thus ensure that norms are observed. 
 
                                                            
40 Coleman (1990:283) captured this argument stating: “Where sanctions are applied in support of a proscriptive 
norm and are consequently negative sanctions, the . . . problem of providing positive sanctions for the sanctioner is 
more easily overcome, because positive sanctions incur lower costs than do negative ones.”  
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Coleman’s Solution to the Free-Rider Problems 
To understand Coleman’s argument consider a numerical example with three actors, A, B 
and C. Assume that actor A considers whether to disobey a norm, which would bring personal 
benefits of $30 to A, but would also impose a cost of $30 on actor B and C each. This creates the 
first-order free rider problem, and will lead actor A to violate the norm unless he thinks he might 
be punished. Actor B or C could punish actor A for violating the norm, but assume that each 
would have to incur a cost of $35 to do so. If that’s the case, neither actor B nor actor C will 
punish actor A. This leads to the second-order free rider problem. In principle, one of the 
affected actors, say C, could reward another, say B, for punishing actor A. However, actor B 
would have to receive a reward of, say, $40 to compensate him for the $35 cost to punish actor 
A. If actor C needs to incur substantial cost to provide this reward, say, also $40, he is he is 
unlikely to provide such a reward. He would rather suffer the $30 cost associated with norm 
violation than provide the $40 reward to B. The same logic applies to B rewarding C, leading to 
the third-order free rider problem.  
Coleman argued, however, that there is a class of rewards that are very valuable to actor 
B, but cheap for actor C to furnish, as illustrated in Figure 2.1 below.
41 Suppose that such 
rewards only cost $20 to actor C, but give $40 value to actor B. In this scenario, actor C will be 
willing to incur the cost of $20 to give such a reward, because he can avoid the cost of $30 when 
the norm is violated. This would solve the third-order free-riding problem. If actor B were to 
receive such a $40 reward, he would be happy to punish actor A because doing so only costs 
$35. This would solve the second-order free-riding problem. In anticipation of receiving the $35 
                                                            
41 For simplicity of exposition, the figure only shows costs of norm violation borne by actor C and costs and rewards 
when actor C rewards actor B for punishing actor A. The scenario is symmetric for costs of norm violation borne by 
actor B.   
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punishment from actor B, it is no longer in Actor A’s interest to violate the norm and obtain $30. 
This solves the first-order free-riding problem and leads to the norm being observed.  
Density and the Solution to the Third-Order Free-Rider Problem 
    
Figure 2.1. Solving the Third-Order Free-Riding Problem  
Within this framework, it is easy to understand the role of network structures and in particular 
the role of network density. Specifically, consider what would happen if there was no social 
relationship between B and C, such that C could no longer reward B for the act of punishing A’s 
norm, as shown in Figure 2.2. Put simply, without C being able to compensate B, the second-
order free-rider problem cannot be solved. As a consequence, actor A will not be punished in the 
event of norm violation, which will lead actor A to violate norms. 
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Figure 2.2. Failing to Solve the Third-Order Free-Riding Problem 
This simple reasoning leads us to three pairs of hypotheses, one for each stage of the 
process. We will start with the final outcome of norm violations. Consistent with the discussion 
above, according to which actor A should engage in fewer norm violations in a high-density 
network, we argue that: 
Hypothesis 1a: The higher an actor’s network density, the less likely he or she is to 
violate a norm. 
Since actor A should violate norms less frequently when density is high, actor C should 
experience fewer norm violations too. Hence:  
Hypothesis 1b: The higher an actor’s network density, the less likely he or she is to 
experience a norm violation.  
For norm violations to occur less frequently under conditions of high density, it is 
necessary for those in dense network to punish norm infringements more frequently. In the 
example above, actor B administered such punishments in anticipation of rewards from C. 
A 
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when norm violated  Cost of $35 
to punish  
No incentive 
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Because actor B is more likely to punish violations under conditions of high network density, we 
hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2a: The higher an actor’s network density, the more likely he or she is to 
punish a norm violation. 
If in high-density networks actor B punishes actor A more frequently for inflicting norm 
violations against C, it should also be the case that actor C experiences more of punishments of 
actor A by actor B. Hence:  
Hypothesis 2b: The higher an actor’s network density, the more likely others are to 
punish norm violators on his behalf. 
Finally, for the entire mechanism to function, it should be the case that in high-density 
networks actor C rewards actor B more frequently for punishing actor A. Thus:  
Hypothesis 3a: The higher an actor’s network density, the more likely he or she is to 
reward those who punish norm violations. 
Since actor C is more likely to reward actor B under conditions of high density, it should 
also be the case that actor B obtains more rewards for punishing others under such conditions. 
Hence:  
Hypothesis 3b: The higher an actor’s network density, the more likely he or she is to be 
rewarded for punishing a norm violation.  
Commitment to a Social System 
Thus far we have assumed that actors participate in a social system whether or not norm 
violations occur and whether or not violators are punished. In reality, however, actors can leave 
social systems to join others that will give them greater benefits. Such defections are particularly 
likely when actors are not heavily dependent on the social system and when they have easy  
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access to alternative social systems to meet their exchange needs. We assume that, in 
contemplating such a move, actors compare the utility they derive from the current system to the 
expected utility of joining another one. When actors experience norm violations, particularly 
violations that go unpunished, they experience negative utility. The benefits of staying in the 
current social system thus decline in comparison to the next best alternative, making actors more 
likely to leave. This reasoning leads us to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4a: An actor who experiences a norm violation whose perpetrator is not 
punished is less likely to continue participating in the social system. 
Similar reasoning applies when an actor experiences a norm violation aimed at him or 
her, and chooses to punish the violator personally. Though the punisher may obtain some 
intrinsic benefits from doing so, he or she still incurs the costs of norm violation. As before, the 
benefits of staying in the current social system decline as compared to the next-best alternative, 
and he or she is more likely to leave the current social system. As a consequence, we 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4b: An actor who experiences a targeted norm violation and personally 
punishes the violator is less likely to continue participating in the social system.  
The same reasoning leads us to the opposite prediction when a norm violation is met with 
a third-party punishment. In this case, the target of the norm violation suffers its cost, but that 
cost is then offset by the benefit of seeing the offender punished without having to incur the cost 
of punishment. As a consequence, the target will end up at least as well off as if no norm 
violation had occurred. Furthermore, the target now knows that in this social system similar 
norm violations will meet with third-party punishments in the future. Consequently, when 
comparing the current social system to another social system in which norm violations may or  
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may not meet with punishments, he or she will be more likely to stay put. This reasoning leads us 
to hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4c: An actor who experiences a targeted norm violation that is punished by a 
third party is more likely to continue participating in the social system than if no 
norm violation had occurred. 
THE SETTING OF THE STUDY 
We test our hypotheses in the context of contributions to Wikipedia, the largest on-line user-
contributed encyclopedia. Between its launch in 2001 and the end of 2007, Wikipedia attracted 
over 6 million registered editors; these contributors created over 2 million encyclopedic articles 
in English and over 7 million entries in 253 languages. The site has become the seventh most 
visited website in the world.  
Wikipedia was built on an intuitive on-line platform called wiki software. Anyone with 
internet access could post a draft of an article as long as the topic was deemed suitable for an 
encyclopedia. With the exception of a few protected articles, anyone could also edit any article 
by adding new content or by editing or deleting existing content. When an editor saved such 
changes, the software created a new version of the article for everyone to see. The previous 
version was added to the article history page, together with the Wikipedia username of the editor 
who had saved it and the time and date when the version was saved.
42 
No one could act as the final arbiter of an article’s content; a subsequent editor could edit 
any version further. To manage disagreements over content, Wikipedia asked editors to try to 
                                                            
42 Since Wikipedia did not require editors to register a personal account to make most types of edits, some editors 
made changes anonymously. In these cases, the Internet Protocol address of the computer where the edits originated 
was recorded. Many editors did open accounts, however; doing so allowed them to compile a record of their 
contributions, and provided personal pages where they could introduce themselves and receive feedback from other 
editors.   
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resolve differences of opinion via discussion. To ensure that such discussions did not interfere 
with article content, Wikipedia added a discussion page to each article. Wikipedia urged a focus 
on content and avoidance of ad hominem attacks and asked that editors act in good faith, 
signifying an intention to help the project rather than hurt it, and assume that others act in good 
faith in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary.  
Wikipedia rules required articles to be written from a neutral point of view, which meant 
that they should fairly represent all significant views on the topic that had been published in 
reliable sources. It also required that article content represent and cite publicly available 
research. An editor’s contribution to an article was considered acceptable as long as he could 
furnish reliable sources that readers or other editors could easily check.
43 Despite these rules and 
earnest efforts to reach consensus, editors could not always reach a viable compromise. At that 
point, participants could have recourse to a formal dispute-resolution process.
44 
Many editors were happy with Wikipedia’s editing process. “I don't have a problem with 
people making changes to what I wrote as long as they, you know, have good reasons for making 
those changes,” said one editor we interviewed. “You know, like making the article better.”
45 
                                                            
43 We use ‘he’ rather than ‘he or she’ because most Wikipedia contributors are men (see footnote 56 for details). 
44 The dispute-resolution process began with a “request for comment” from others, which allowed all editors to 
contribute their views on how the dispute should be resolved. Editors could also ask for assistance from a volunteer-
run mediation committee or from volunteer Wikipedia editors who identified themselves as dispute-resolution 
specialists. If these measures proved insufficient, the mediation committee referred the case to the arbitration 
committee, staffed by 12–16 elected volunteers. That committee privately examined the entire record of all parties’ 
conduct, paying particular attention to whether or not they had observed the good-faith rule. The committee then 
issued a public decision, which could ban an individual from engaging in particular behaviors or editing certain 
articles or from participating in Wikipedia in any fashion, either temporarily or permanently. The committee did not, 
however, rule on the “truth” of the underlying disagreement. By the end of 2006, the arbitration committee had ruled 
on over 100 cases. 
45 To collect interview data, we chose a random sample of editors from a list of current and past contributors 
available on Wikipedia. We contacted editors via e-mail and obtained a response rate of approximately 25 percent. 
We detected no response biases; the geographic and demographic profile of the editors we interviewed closely 
mirrors that of the entire Wikipedia population. At the request of editors, most interviews were undertaken via an 
instant-messaging program or free voice-over-IP programs. Interviews were analyzed using inductive methods to  
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Others found the process deeply troubling. “There is no special treatment for experts or any way 
to bar anyone or group from changing the content,” said an editor who had stopped contributing. 
Indeed, Wikipedia’s rules ensured that all editors were considered equal; no one’s contributions 
were privileged by virtue of expertise in the field, advanced degrees or first-hand knowledge of 
the topic.
46 
Norm Violation: Undo 
Wikipedia’s open and democratic editing process made it possible for a kernel of an article to 
evolve very quickly into a full-fledged encyclopedia entry. It did, however, expose Wikipedia 
articles to acts of vandalism. Vandals—often unregistered editors—edited pages to add 
invective, deliberately replaced an entire article with invective or deleted article content 
altogether. To help editors recover valuable content after such acts of vandalism, Wikipedia 
attached an undo link to every version of the article on its history page (see Figure 2.3). By 
clicking that link, editors could swiftly undo the vandalized version of an article and replace it 
with the prior unaffected version. The vandalized version remained, however, in the history of 
article development. With this simple mechanism, Wikipedia editors were able to restore a page 
to its previous status as soon as an act of vandalism was detected.
47 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
derive a theory of editor commitment, described in another paper by one of the authors. Quotes from the interviews 
are used here for illustrative purposes only. 
46 The only editors with special powers were a small group of administrators elected by consensus. These 
administrators were not employees of Wikimedia and did not enjoy special privileges when it came to content 
contributions or deciding on the value of others’ contributions. They were, however, given the power to delete 
Wikipedia pages if the editor community voted to do so, and to block editors whose actions were deemed antisocial.  
47 Wikipedia also allowed registered editors to sign up for a watchlist on any page, which alerted them promptly to 
any changes on pages they were watching.  
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Figure 2.3.   Screenshot of a Sample Article History Page 
The undo link could also be used incorrectly. Although its use was intended solely to 
undo vandalism, some editors found it an easy way to assert their points of view on article 
content. By clicking on the undo link, an editor could remove all changes introduced by the 
previous editor and restore the prior version without bothering to re-edit the content or negotiate 
with the other editor. Use of the undo link in the absence of vandalism constituted one of the 
biggest normative violations on Wikipedia. It flouted the basic tenets of acting in good faith and 
assuming that others do so as well. Many editors we interviewed also described the violation as 
such: “Imagine slogging over an article, trying to get all of the details right of something that 
happened 800 years ago, and then someone comes in and just erases you—no asking, no talking. 
. . . Poof, the content disappears! Can you imagine anything more disrespectful?” Indeed, many 
editors who had left Wikipedia cited instances of their work having been undone as a key reason 
for leaving. One former Wikipedia editor said: “I have a Ph.D. in South Asian musicology, so I 
really care that the Wikipedia entry reflects what we know about the topic. I spend a lot of time  
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documenting everything on the appropriate pages, and then . . . someone comes in and just 
undoes everything I have done. There is this one guy in particular does this all the time. So I try 
to talk some sense into him, but he won’t talk. So I got really upset at all of this, and left.” 
The norm not to use the undo link (except when eradicating vandalism) has two 
characteristics that increase the likelihood that it will not be obeyed. First, as we described in 
Step 1 of the theory, this is an essential norm and therefore subject to first-order free-rider 
problems. All editors would prefer that the undo button not be used incorrectly and editors 
engage in the civil negotiation process over the article content. However, every one of them is 
tempted to use it to cheaply remove the content they disagree with. Second, this norm is at least 
partly disjoint in that those who are supposed to observe the norm (i.e. the editors of Wikipedia) 
are a smaller set than those who are the beneficiaries of norm compliance (e.g. the readers of 
Wikipedia who are not editors). This makes the free-rider problem ever more pronounced and 
again less likely that the norm will be observed. Given these conditions, any evidence of norm 
compliance should be seen as a conservative test of the underlying theory. 
With these considerations in mind, we will treat use of the undo link as a norm violation 
(unless the undo removes profanity or reinstates an article after the bulk of its content has been 
removed). We will treat the editor who clicked the undo link as a norm violator. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 1a we expect that an editor embedded in a dense network will be less likely to undo 
an article version saved by someone else. Furthermore, our discussion indicates that all editors 
are affected by this violation, but the main victim of the violation is the editor whose version was 
undone. After all, he put the effort to contribute the content and it is his content that was 
removed. For this reason we will designate the editor whose version was undone as the main  
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victim of a norm violation. Consistent with Hypothesis 1b we expect that an editor embedded in 
a dense network will be less likely to experience an undo of an edit he saved. 
Norm Punishment: Revert of Undo
48 
Because use of the undo link is readily apparent in an article’s history, the author of an undone 
version and other editors will know that such a norm violation has occurred. Some editors ignore 
the undo and address the offending editor in good faith; others retaliate by clicking on the undo 
link themselves. This action, which undoes the previous undo and restores the prior version of 
the article, is known as reverting the undo. Because it conveys disrespect for the perpetrator of 
the first undo, that editor may respond with another undo, which may in turn be followed by 
another revert. Such skirmishes are known as “revert wars.” To prevent them, Wikipedia has 
instituted a three-revert rule stipulating that no user can undertake more than three reverts on a 
given page within a twenty-four-hour period; violators are barred from making any changes to 
Wikipedia for a specified interval. 
Many editors deal with undo actions on their own, but other editors and administrators 
can also step in to remind the offending editor that his or her actions are inappropriate. These 
reminders can take the form of a chastising note posted on the personal talk page of the editor in 
question; alternatively, a third-party editor can express disapproval more actively by reverting 
the undo. Like the original undo, which sends a public signal of disrespect, a revert of undo by 
an editor who is not the author of the undone version sends a public signal of condemnation of 
the undo act. It signals clearly that a third-party editor, uninvolved in the dispute, believes that 
                                                            
48 On Wikipedia, the terms revert and undo are often used interchangeably. (See, for example, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Reverting#Undo). To prevent confusion, we will refer to the initial act as an undo 
and the act of undoing the undo as a revert of undo.  
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the original undo was unjustified and that its perpetrator violated a social norm and should be 
punished. 
The punishment of an undo of a revert has three characteristics that make it less likely to 
occur. First, as we argued in Step 2 of the theory part of the paper, eliciting norm compliance 
through punishments rather than rewards makes it less likely to occur. Second, the act of a revert 
is individual rather than group effort. Again, as we argued in Step 2, this will make a punishment 
less likely to occur. Finally, using a revert of an undo gives us an opportunity to observe 
punishment of norm violation by an unaffected third party. As we suggested in Step 2 of the 
theory, such third-party punishments are particularly unlikely. Taken together, these three 
conditions imply that punishments through reverts are unlikely to occur, suggesting that we offer 
a conservative test of the theory. 
With these considerations in mind, we will treat a revert of undo as a punishment of a 
norm violation. We will consider the editor who reverted the undo as the punisher, and the editor 
whose version was reverted as the punished actor.
49 Consistent with Hypothesis 2a we expect 
that an editor embedded in a dense network will be more likely to revert an undo of an article 
version saved by another editor. Consistent with Hypothesis 2b we expect that an editor 
embedded in a dense network will be more likely to experience other editors revert an undo of an 
article version saved by that editor.  
Rewards for Punishing Norm Violators 
Our interviews revealed that editors greet reverts with substantial gratitude. One commented:  
                                                            
49 An editor other than the author of the undone version who undertakes a revert of undo may derive direct benefits 
from doing so if he or she cares about the quality of the article. If this is the case, the norm that the editor is 
enforcing is conjoint in nature. In the results part of this paper, we will distinguish between situations in which the 
reverter cares or does not care about the quality of the article and show that our results hold in both situations (see 
footnote 66).   
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People undo my work. It does not happen all that often, but more often than I would like. 
And then before I know it happened, someone will come to my rescue and revert the 
undo without even telling me. It’s only later that I find what happened when I look at the 
article history. It’s sometimes people that worked with me on that article . . . but you 
know what’s most interesting? . . . It’s also people who worked with me on other stuff . . . 
meaning they are kinda looking out for me! I would sometimes shoot them a note to say 
thank you. I would also definitely look out for them in the future to see if someone 
undoes their work and when that happens I would revert that… you know... as a way to 
say thank you for what they did for me. 
 
This comment and others we collected along similar lines suggest that editors who revert 
undos receive rewards from victims of undos. Such rewards can take the form of written 
expressions of thanks or reciprocal reverts of undos. For the purposes of our paper we chose to 
use reciprocal reverts of undos as a measure of rewards for punishing norm violators.
50 We thus 
expect that editors who revert an undo will be rewarded in the future when third parties revert 
undos of their work. Specifically, consistent with Hypothesis 3a we expect that an editor is more 
likely to revert undos of article versions saved by other editors who themselves reverted other 
undos, and this effect is particularly large when the editor is embedded in a dense network. 
Furthermore, consistent with Hypothesis 3b we expect that an editor embedded in dense 
network will be more likely to experience other editors revert an undo of an article version saved 
by that editor if that editor has reverted other undos. We expect this effect to be particularly large 
when the editor is embedded in a dense network.
51 
                                                            
50 Alternatively, we could have used a measure of frequency with which editors are rewarded by obtaining a private 
or public thank you message. We chose not to use this measure, as it is very difficult to collect reliably.  
51 The use of reciprocal reverts of undos as a measure of rewards for punishing norm violators provides us with a 
conservative test of Coleman’s mechanism. As we explained above, the mechanism works most powerfully when 
the reward for punishment is cheaper to supply than the punishment itself. In our case, rewards for punishment are 
captured by reciprocal reverts, and punishments are captured by reverts. Because the cost of undertaking a revert is 
similar to undertaking a reciprocal revert, Coleman’s mechanism is likely to be weak. This makes it harder for us to 
detect evidence in support of that mechanism.   
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DATA  
To test these hypotheses in the context of Wikipedia, we obtained a dataset from the Wikimedia 
Foundation, the parent of Wikipedia, by downloading it from http://download.wikimedia.org. 
The dataset contains every version of every article contributed to the English-language 
Wikipedia site between January 2001 and October 2006.
52 For every article version, the dataset 
provides the time and date it was saved, the Wikipedia username (or Internet Protocol address) of 
the editor who saved it, and the version length in bytes. Having parsed the data, we wrote an 
algorithm in MATLAB, described in Appendix A, to help us identify counter-normative undos 
(i.e. excluding those that undid acts of vandalism) and reverts of undos. 
Having run the algorithm across all articles in the dataset, we compared the resulting 
statistics to Wikipedia statistics and to those reported in other papers that tried to identify acts of 
undo and reverts of undo. The aggregate rates of undo and revert of undo identified by our 
algorithm are very similar to those reported in related work – roughly 7% of edits are undos or 
reverts of undos (Anthony, Smith, and Williamson 2009; Buriol, Castillo, Donato, Leonardi, and 
Millozzi 2006; Kittur, Suh, Pendleton, and Chi 2007). 
Dependent Variables  
Armed with classifications of various sequences of article versions, we constructed the 
dependent variables needed to test our hypotheses. We did so by aggregating the occurrence of 
                                                            
52 The dataset also contains a complete record of discussion and talk pages, articles containing lists of other articles, 
and placeholder articles that merely redirect users to other pages. We exclude these auxiliary pages and analyze only 
the encyclopedia articles. The dataset does not include articles deleted prior to October 2006. This poses a potential 
problem, in that editors could have engaged in undo or revert actions on these articles, but a significant proportion of 
them were deleted because they contained very little content, and by implication generated little editing activity. 
Thus limiting ourselves to surviving articles does not substantially compromise our ability to detect acts of undo and 
revert of undo.  
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various norm violations and punishments over a month-long period (i.e. t = one month).
53 First, 
to capture the extent to which a given editor violated norms on Wikipedia, we constructed a 
variable Number of Times Editor i Undid Othersit equal to the number of instances when editor i 
undid any article version during time t.
 54 We use this dependent variable in tests of Hypothesis 
1a. To capture the extent to which an editor experienced norm violations, we constructed 
Number of Times Editor i Was Undoneit equal to the number of instances when editor i’s article 
edits were undone by other editors during time t.
55 We use this dependent variable in tests of 
Hypothesis 1b. 
To capture the extent to which a given editor punished others for violating the undo 
norm, we constructed two variables. To test Hypothesis 2a, we constructed a variable Number of 
Times Editor i Reverted Othersit equal to the number of instances during time t when editor i 
reverted an undo of a version that another editor j had saved. To test Hypothesis 3a, we 
constructed a variable Number of Times Editor i Reverted Others Who Revertedit equal to the 
number of instances during time t when editor i reverted an undo of a version that another editor 
j had saved, as long as editor j had previously reverted another undo during time period t.  
To capture the extent to which an editor i experienced others’ punishing norm violations, 
we constructed three independent variables: (1) Number of Times Editor i Was Undone Followed 
by No Revertit equal to the number of instances during time t when editor i’s article edits were 
                                                            
53 We also constructed the variables in two-week intervals, which increased the number of observations. Analyses 
using these variables produced equivalent results for the density measure across the models and yielded higher 
statistical significance. We thus report the more conservative results. 
54 We also constructed this measure using (1) the total number of edits, rather than instances, that were undone by 
editor i, and (2) an indicator variable that took the value of 1 if Number of Times Editor i Undid Othersit was greater 
than 0, and zero otherwise. The results are not sensitive to how we calculated this measure.  
55 This count does not include acts of undo by self. We also constructed this measure using (1) the total number of 
edits, rather than instances, by editor i that were undone, (2) an indicator variable that took the value of 1 if Number 
of Times Editor i Was Undoneit was greater than 0, and zero otherwise. The results are not sensitive to how we 
calculated this measure.   
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undone and received no reverts, (2) Number of Times Editor i Was Undone Followed by Editor i 
Reverts Undoit equal to the number of instances during time t when editor i’s article edits were 
undone by others and then reverted by the focal editor i, and (3) Number of Times Editor i Was 
Undone Followed by Another Editor Reverts Undoit equal to the number of instances during time 
t when editor i’s article edits were undone and then reverted by other editors. We use these 
dependent variables to test Hypotheses 2b and 3b. 
Finally, to capture the extent to which editors continue to contribute content to 
Wikipedia, we constructed a variable At Least One Editit equal to 1 if editor i undertook at least 
one edit (excluding acts of undoing others’ edits) during time t and zero otherwise. We use these 
dependent variables to test Hypotheses 4a, 4b and 4c. 
Independent Variables 
Having defined our operationalization of the dependent variable, we now turn to the network of 
interactions among Wikipedia editors.
56 Editors rarely interact face-to-face, and most of their on-
line interactions focus on content, rather than on socializing. As one editor said: “I'm probably 
one of the editors who is more prone than others to behaviors such as engaging people and 
getting consensus for difficult changes that people are struggling over. . . . But even then, I keep 
my engagement focused on factual contributions and not really on on-line socializing.” By 
working together, however, editors developed close social bonds. In the words of one editor: 
“Even though you interact with people through text, it does tend to build community between 
                                                            
56 Editors were volunteers, not employees of Wikipedia, and they did not receive direct monetary compensation for 
their contributions. According to Wikipedia’s own surveys, over 86 percent identified themselves as male, and 70 
percent reported being single. One-quarter were under 18 years old, one-quarter were between 18 and 22, one-
quarter were between 23 and 30 and the remaining 25 percent were between 31 and 85. About one-third named a 
high-school diploma as their highest degree; 30 percent had an undergraduate degree and less than 20 percent had a 
master’s degree or Ph.D. The same survey revealed wide variation in editors’ motivations to contribute. “I liked the 
idea of sharing knowledge and want to contribute to it” and “I saw an error and wanted to fix it” were the two most 
frequently cited reasons for contributing. The least frequently cited reasons for contributing were a desire to make a 
reputation in the Wikipedia community, ambition to make money and fondness for mass collaboration.  
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editors. For example, I'm interested in taxation issues, and there are a lot of us interested in this 
topic. We have a really strong community, and I must say it keeps me coming back. If I was 
writing things completely in a vacuum, I would lose my interest.” Not all editors were equally 
likely to experience such on-line relationships. One explained: “It’s not like there is this one big 
Wikipedia community. There are communities inside the community. Some are strong; some are 
weaker. My personal experience is that most of the time, editing Wikipedia, I am doing it on my 
own and don't often encounter the same editors repeatedly.” 
On the basis of these statements we chose to use prior interactions between editors on the 
same articles as our measure of relationships between editors. To capture these interactions we 
wrote another algorithm which coded editor i and editor j as both contributing to the same article 
a if editor i had contributed at least one edit (excluding undos and reverts) to article a during 
period t, and editor j had contributed to the same article a during the same time period. 
Some articles on Wikipedia, such as those about the World Cup, George W. Bush and 
Jesus, attract as many as 5,000 editors. It is hard to make the case that these editors interact with 
each other on these articles; many edit without being aware of each other’s existence. By 
contrast, contributors to articles with fewer total editors are keenly aware of each other’s 
existence and describe the process of editing as interaction. We thus decided to include only 
articles with fewer than 25 registered editors in our calculation of relationships between editor i 
and editor j.
57 We then used these data to construct a symmetric editor-to-editor matrix Rt, whose 
elements, rijt, consist of the number of articles with fewer than 25 total registered editors during 
                                                            
57 We tested the sensitivity of our results to this restriction and found that coefficient estimates on the variables we 
use to test our hypotheses are still in the expected direction, though the statistical significance of the estimates is 
substantially lower across almost all of the specifications.  
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period t to which editors i and j both contributed during t.
58 On the basis of this matrix, we 
constructed r -ijt equal to 1 if rijt > 0, and zero otherwise. 
Using this definition we constructed a simple measure of density around editor i, we 
calculate the number of relationships between editors with whom editor i has co-edited, as 
represented by r -ijt, and divide it by the number of possible relationships between editors with 
whom editor i has co-edited. Using q as the total number of editors in the dataset at time t, we 
defined this measure as:
 59 
Density    	∑  ∑ r ‐
  
   
   
   
    ∗r ‐
       ∑ r ‐    
         ∗ 	   ∑ r ‐    
        1                         (2.1) 
 
 
                                                            
58 It is also possible to define Rijt as the number of total edits editor i contributed to articles to which editor j also 
contributed. This approach makes Rijt asymmetric, and thus makes the empirical analysis more complicated. It also 
tends to make the relationship of i to j strong if i made numerous edits to a particular article. For this reason, we 
report the simpler analysis. Auxiliary analyses using the simpler approach yielded similar results but with weaker 
statistical significance. 
59 The results we report below are based on density measures using only the existence of a relationship, r -
ijt, rather 
than its strength rijt. In auxiliary analyses, we develop alternative measures using relationship strength and generate 
very similar results. We report results based on simpler variable definitions. We also test for one other specification 
of the density measure to protect ourselves from the following situation: three editors, i, j, and k, work on the same 
article; it is the only article they work on. If this is the case, i and j, j and k and k and i will each have a tie to each 
other and to no one else, and as such i,  j, and k will be surrounded by a perfectly dense network. Such an 
environment would be likely to generate very few undos, and those that occurred would be quickly reverted by one 
of the three highly committed editors. As a consequence, we would observe a relationship among density, a low 
incidence of undos and a high incidence of reverts. This empirical observation would probably be an artifact of 
having three editors deeply committed to the article; it would have little to do with the mechanism we seek to test 
here. To protect ourselves from such a statistical artifact, we calculate another measure of density that excludes 
participation in the same article by j and k when i is present, given by r ~
ijkt. The formula is given by: 
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This is a very conservative estimate of triadic relationship between i, j, and k, because in this specification it is 
possible that editor i has co-edited with j on one article and with k on another article but is unaware that j and k co-
edited another article together. If i is unaware of this relationship, he might fail to act in the manner described by the 
theory. Results for this specification are in the same direction as those for the variable defined in the body of the 
text, but the statistical significance of the results is often weaker. 
  
84 
Control Variables 
Since density measures depend on the number of different articles editor i has edited, as well as 
the number of other editors who co-edited those articles, we include them as controls. First, we 
calculated a measure of Number of Articles Editedit, equal to the number of articles that editor i 
edited during time t. Second, we captured the extent to which editor i edited the same articles 
repeatedly by constructing Percentage of Articles Editor i Edited More than Twiceit, equal to the 
number of articles with two or more edits by editor i during time t by the number of articles 
editor i edited during time t.  
Third, we included Network Sizeit, equal to the log of the total number of editors across all 
of the articles that editor i edited during time t. Fourth, we constructed variables NetworkSize0it 
and NetworkSize1it to reflect the fact that when variable Network Sizeit takes the values of zero 
and one, it is impossible to define measures of density. In such situations, we assigned a value of 
zero to Network Densityit. To differentiate this zero from editors’ actual scores of zero, we 
assigned a value of one to Network Size0it when editor i edited other articles with no other editors 
during time t. Similarly, we assigned a value of one to Network Size1it when editor i edited other 
articles with only one other editor during time t. 
Finally, we included other measures that are not necessarily directly correlated with 
density but that can influence the extent to which editor i experiences norm violations or norm 
restitutions. First, we included Cumulative Editsit, equal to the log of the cumulative number of 
edits by editor i prior to t, as well as the square of that number. Second, we constructed Months 
since Signupit equal to the number of months since editor i first registered on Wikipedia. Finally, 
we constructed month dummy variables, Time Period Dummiest, to control for temporal 
heterogeneity in norm violations, restitutions and project involvements.   
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Risk Set 
It was our intention to examine undo and revert-of-undo actions by all registered editors in our 
dataset.
60 Our preliminary analyses revealed however that although there are over 600,000 
editors in our dataset, almost 125,000 of them contributed only one edit, 50,000 edited only 
twice and roughly another 30,000 contributed no more than three edits. Our interviews revealed 
that such editors are unlikely to be familiar with Wikipedia rules, and are hence more likely to 
commit editing mistakes, e.g., to introduce a controversial point of view to the article without 
checking the article’s talk page, where other editors may already have discussed how to handle 
this point of view. Edits by such inexperienced editors are often undone by existing editors 
without subsequent reverts of undo. 
This dynamic is problematic for our analysis, because inexperienced editors have not had 
an opportunity to develop a dense network. Thus we are more likely to observe a positive 
relationship between low network density, a high incidence of undo and a low incidence of 
reverts of undo. Though this empirical observation is consistent with our predictions, it is not 
generated by the mechanism we want to test. To provide a more conservative test of our 
hypotheses, we chose to include an editor in the risk set only after he had contributed 25 edits, 
thus restricting our sample to 36,194 editors.  
  
                                                            
60 It is possible to contribute to Wikipedia without registration, in which the edit is recorded together with the 
Internet Protocol address of the computer from which the change was made. Since it is possible that many different 
editors used the same computer to make changes (e.g. university library), we chose to exclude edits by unregistered 
editors and only focused on registered ones.   
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Table 2.1.   Descriptive Statistics  
 
  Mean Std. 
Dev. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Network Densityi,t  .12 .26                     
2 Network Sizei,t  2.79 1.94 -.15      
3 Network Size0 i,t  .20 .40 -.27 -.72      
4 Network Size1i,t  .03 .17 -.10 -.19 -.09      
5 Number of Articles Editedi,t  1.60 1.60 -.30 .45 -.59 -.13     
6 Percentage Articles Edited More than Twice,t  .09 .19 .08 .15 -.24 .02  .13   
7 # Editsi,t  1.70 1.69 -.21 -.61 -.32 -.09  .68  .12  
8 Cumulative Editsi,t  3.62 2.12 -.28 -.30 -.27 -.12  .68  .07 .50  
9 Months since Signupi,t  2.05 .95 -.06 .02 .08 -.03  .02  -.17 .01 .44  
10 # of Times Editor i Undid Othersi,t  .35 .80 -.16 .50 -.19 -.06  .56  .07 .71 .49 .07  
11 # of Times Editor i Was Undonei,t   .41 2.67 -.06 .22 -.08 -.03  .26  .04 .24 .21 .02 .28  
12 # of Times Editor i Was Undone Followed by No 
Reverti,t 
.35 2.32 -.06 .21 -.07 -.03  .25  .03 .22 .20 .01 .25 .54  
13 # of Times Editor i Was Undone Followed by Editor i 
Reverts Undoi,t 
.04 .56 -.03 .11 -.04 -.01  .13  .04 .13 .12 .01 .21 .55 .36  
14 # of Times Editor i Was Undone Followed by 
Another Editor Reverts Undoi,t 
.06 .41 -.05 .17 -.06 -.02  .19  .03 .18 .15 .02 .22 .60 .48 .30  
15 # of Times Editor i Reverted Othersi,t  .23 2.66 -.02 .07 -.02 -.01  .07  .00 .08 .07 .02 .10 .03 .03 .01 .02  
16 # of Times Editor i Reverted Others Who Revertedi,t  .14 1.74 -.02 .06 -.02 -.01  .07  .00 .07 .07 .02 .09 .03 .02 .01 .02 .58 
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Though this sample represents only a small subset of all Wikipedia editors, and thus raises issues 
of selection biases, it is reassuring to know that the editors in our sample contributed 70 percent 
of all edits.
61  
We then examined the timing of edits and found that as many as 40 percent of editors 
who edit one year do not do so the next year, suggesting that year-long data panels might be 
sufficient to capture most of the variation. We also found that 2005 was the most prolific 
complete year in our sample. That year alone witnessed the entry of more than 125 percent as 
many editors as there had been between 2001 and 2004. These editors contributed four times as 
many edits as they had between 2001 and 2004. Finally, in 2005, the rate of undos and reverts of 
undos increased more than twofold compared to the period between 2001 and 2004. For these 
reasons, we chose to focus on the time period between January and December 2005. Table 2.2 
provides descriptive statistics for the dataset analyzed.
62 
MODELS 
To test Hypotheses 1–3, we used random-effects negative binomial models, which we 
constructed as follows. Following Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984), we assumed that the 
value of the dependent variable for editor i at time t followed a Poisson distribution. On the basis 
of these assumptions, we construct a basic negative binomial model: 
                                                            
61 In choosing the cutoff point, we considered the following tradeoff. An increase in the cutoff point reduced the 
number of editors in the sample and thus restricted the percentage of all edits under consideration. On the other 
hand, it increased editors’ familiarity with Wikipedia’s norms and made it less likely that we would be unable to 
define our density variables. (This consideration applied in particular to editors who edited articles singlehandedly 
without others’ contributions.) We found that increasing the cutoff point to a minimum ofggg30 edits led to a 
substantial decrease in the percentage of all edits considered but had very little impact on our ability to define the 
density variable. On the other hand, lowering the cutoff point to a minimum of 20 edits had a much smaller effect on 
the percentage of total edits considered but a large effect on our ability to define the density variable. As a 
consequence, we chose 25 as our cutoff point. 
62 To test the robustness of our results, we re-ran our models for editors with more than 25 edits during 2004. The 
coefficient estimates on density variables remain in the predicted direction, but given the smaller frequency of undos 
and reverts, the statistical significance of the results is less robust.   
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    (2.2) 
This model assumes, however, that the dispersion is constant across editors. To derive a 
random-effects negative binomial model, we allow δi to vary randomly across editors and 
assume 1/(1+δi) ~ beta(r,s). Using f for the probability density function of δi we get the joint 
probability of the dependent variable for editor i at time t:
63 
 
    
 
                       (2.3) 
 
RESULTS 
Step 1: Violating Norms 
With this specification, we estimated the likelihood that editor i violates norms on Wikipedia 
during time t by measuring the number of acts of undo undertaken by i against other editors, 
DepVarit = Number of Times Editor i Undid Othersit. It is possible that Number of Times Editor i 
Undid Othersit takes on a value of zero if editor i does not engage in any undo actions, whether 
absent from Wikipedia or fully engaged in the project. In order to focus only on situations when 
editor i performs no undo actions while fully engaged in Wikipedia, we want to control for 
                                                            
63 We also constructed fixed effects negative binomial models as described by Allison and Waterman (2002) to 
remove all types of time invariant unobserved heterogeneity for editor i. Such estimations yield coefficient estimates 
on the main variables of interest that are directionally similar to those of random effects. However, the fixed effects 
estimation procedure assumes that the individual fixed effects is related to the individual dispersion parameter δi 
through a specific functional form, e.g. the fixed effect is the logarithm of the dispersion parameter (Hausman, Hall, 
and Griliches 1984). Guimaraes (2008) developed a method to test this assumption which we undertook on our data. 
We found that the test is not met, implying that the fixed effects negative binomial model might not perform reliably 
here. As a consequence, we prefer to report results from the more reliable random effects negative binomial, taking 
solace in the fact that the results are directionally similar across the two types of models. 
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situations in which he is absent from Wikipedia. We do so in a number of ways. First, we 
eliminate from the risk set for editor i all time periods t during which he did not contribute any 
edits. Second, we retain all time periods but include a dummy that takes the value of one when 
editor  i contributed no edits during time t. Finally, we also use Heckman-like correction 
(Heckman 1979) and estimate the likelihood that editor i will contribute at least one edit during 
time t as a function of zit, given by Editsit =zit + it where zit includes selection-independent 
variables. Logit estimates of this equation are then used to derive the inverse Mills’ ratio, given 
by InverseMillsit = (zit ) / (zit  where  is probability density function,  is the cumulative 
normal density and  is the estimate of  This ratio gives us the probability that editor i 
contributes at least one edit during time t given what we know about his or her characteristics as 
an editor. We include InverseMillsit as an independent variable in the estimations of the Number 
of Times Editor i Undid Othersit model. All three methods yield the same results for the density 
measure, and for brevity we report only the uncorrected results and those with InverseMillsit. 
Table 2.2 reports the results of these estimations. Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, we find 
that editors embedded in dense social networks are less likely to undo other editors’ edits. This 
effect holds across all six models and is therefore robust to various specifications. As for control 
variables, we find that editors of articles that were not edited by anyone else were less likely to 
engage in acts of undo, and that those who co-edited with one other editor were no more likely to 
engage in such acts than those who co-edited with two editors. Beyond that, an increase in the 
number of co-editors led to an increase in the likelihood of performing an undo. Similarly, the 
total number of articles edited by editor i, as well as higher percentage of articles edited more 
than twice led to a higher incidence of engaging in an undo. Editors who had signed up a long 
time earlier were also more likely to perform undos, but that effect was offset by the negative  
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effect of actually contributing edits to a project. Finally, editors who had had their own edits 
undone by others were more likely to undo others’ edits.  
Table 2.2. Negative Binomial Random-Effects Estimates that Editor i Engaged in an Undo 
during Time t (Test of Hypothesis 1a) 
 
 
Number of Times Editor i Undid 
Othersit 
Selection Equation: None 
Number of Times Editor i Undid 
Othersit 
Selection Equation: Editing 
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Network Densityi,t-1  -.42**  -.42** -.37** -.32** -.22** -.21** 
  (.03)  (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Network Sizei,t-1  .24**  .24** .21** .24** .23** .24** 
  (.01)  (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Network Size0i,t-1  -.30**  -.26** -.23**  -.08*  .08*  .07* 
  (.03)  (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Network Size1i,t-1  .02  .02 .02  .09*  .16**  .14** 
  (.05)  (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) 
Number of Articles Editedi,t-1  .14**  .13** .18** .14** .20** .17** 
  (.01)  (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Percentage of Articles Edited More 
than Twicei,t-1  .65**  .63** .62** .55** .61** .59** 
  (.03)  (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Cumulative Editsi,t-1  .07**  .08** .04**  -.01 -.22**  -.14** 
  (.00)  (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Months since Signupi,t-1  ─  -.02* -.07**  ─  .39** .42** 
    (.01) (.01)    (.02) (.02) 
Number of Times Editor i was 
Undonei,t-1   ─  -.01* -.01**  ─  -.01 -.01 
    (.00) (.00)    (.01) (.01) 
Number of Editsi,t x10  .05**  .07** .06** .07** .12** .08** 
  (.01)  (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Inverse Mills Ratioi,t  ─  ─  ─  -.64** -1.57**  -1.33** 
       (.03) (.06) (.05) 
Time Period Dummiest  No  No Yes No No Yes 
         
-Log-Likelihood  206,772  206,562 205,720 206,377 206,139 205,129 
Degrees of Freedom  8  10 21  9  11 22 
Wald χ
2  21,278  21,528 23,316 21,477 21,995 23,509 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Constant was omitted. All χ
2 tests are based on a baseline model 
with no covariates. Results of sensitivity tests using generalized linear models with negative binomial link and 
grouped logits yield equivalent results. Selection equation predicting editing based on previous experience, tenure 
and month dummies was omitted from table. Resulting inverse Mills ratio was used as control in the outcome 
equation, as noted. Editors, i = 30,272; number of periods = 10; total number of observations = 212,317. (Not all 
editors started editing in time period 1.) *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).  
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Table 2.3. Negative Binomial Random-Effects Estimates that Editor i Experienced an Undo 
during Time t (Test of Hypothesis 1b) 
  Number of Times Editor i was Undoneit 
Selection Equation: Edited 
 
Number of Times Editor i was 
Undoneit 
Selection Equation: Experienced undo 
Independent Variables  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9    Model 10  Model 11  Model 12 
Network Densityit-1 -.18***  -.12**  -.27***    -.20***  -.25***  -.18*** 
 (.03)  (.04)  (.04)    (.03)  (.04)  (.04) 
Network Sizeit-1 .61***  .36***  .51***    .61***  .37***  .50*** 
 (.01)  (.01)  (.01)    (.01)  (.01)  (.01) 
Network Size0it-1  ─ -.32*** -.24***    ─ -.58*** -.20*** 
  ─ (.05) (.05)    ─ (.05) (.05) 
Network Size1it-1  ─ .06  .19***   ─ -.03  .25*** 
  ─ (.07) (.07)    ─ (.07) (.07) 
Number of Articles Editedit-1  ─ .23*** .24***    ─ .20*** .21*** 
  ─ (.01) (.01)    ─ (.01) (.01) 
Percentage of Articles Edited 
More than Twiceit-1  1.03*** .96*** .88***    1.07***  .97***  .83*** 
 (.03)  (.03)  (.03)    (.03)  (.03)  (.03) 
Cumulative Editsit-1  ─ -.41*** -.36***    ─ -.51***  -1.60*** 
  ─ (.01) (.02)    ─ (.02) (.05) 
Months since Signupit-1  ─ .37*** .36***    ─ .33***  1.37*** 
  ─ (.02) (.02)    ─ (.02) (.05) 
Number of Times Editor i 
Undid Othersit-1  ─ .42*** .44***    ─ .40*** .44*** 
  ─ (.01) (.01)    ─ (.01) (.01) 
Number of Editsit x10 .30***  .20***  .25***    .29***  .19***  .31*** 
 (.07)  (.09)  (.01)    (.07)  (.09)  (.01) 
Inverse Mills Ratioit -.45***  -1.82***  -1.94***    -.24***  -1.51***  -5.90*** 
 (.03)  (.07)  (.09)    (.02)  (.08)  (.20) 
Time Period Dummiest No  No  Yes   No  No  Yes 
-Log-Likelihood 124,474  121,936  121,554    124,512  122,067  121,825 
Degrees of Freedom  5  11  22    5  11  22 
Wald χ
2 32,186  35,271  38,348    32,678  35,330  39,026 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Constant was omitted. All χ
2 tests are based on a baseline model 
with no covariates. Selection equation predicting editing based on previous experience, tenure and month dummies 
was omitted from table. Resulting inverse Mills ratio was used as control in the outcome equation in Models 7,8, 
and 9 as noted. The second selection equation was used to predict whether editor i experienced an undo during time 
t with the same independent variables. Resulting inverse Mills ratio was used as control in the outcome equation in 
Models 10, 11 and 12 to predict the number of undos conditional on experiencing at least one undo. Results of 
sensitivity tests using generalized linear models with negative binomial link and grouped logits yield equivalent 
results. Editors i = 30,272; periods t = 12; total number of observations = 212,317. (Not all editors started editing in 
time period 1.) *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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To test Hypothesis 1b, we model the likelihood that editor i suffers a norm violation 
during time period t, DepVarit = Number of Times Editor i was Undoneit. Editor i may suffer no 
undos because he does not contribute to Wikipedia, or alternatively because no one undoes his or 
her edits even when they are numerous. In order to focus on the latter scenario, we again control 
for the possibility of the former in the three ways described above. Coefficient estimates on the 
density variable are in the same direction across all three methods, and for brevity we report only 
results using the Heckman-like correction. Table 2.3 reports the results of these estimations. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1b, we find in Models 7-9 that editors embedded in dense social 
networks are less likely to suffer an undo. 
To test the robustness of our results, we checked whether the model can predict the 
number of times editor i was undone during time t, contingent on editor i being undone at least 
once during that period. To do so, we estimated Was Undone at Least Onceit = yit + it where yit 
includes a set of selection-independent variables, and then estimated InverseMillsit = (yit ) / 
(yit  where  is probability density function,  is the cumulative normal density and  is the 
estimate of  We then include that InverseMillsit estimate in the random-effects negative 
binomial regression of Number of Times Editor i Was Undoneit. We report these results in 
Models 10-12 and obtain results directionally similar results to those in Models 7-9.
64 
                                                            
64 We also find that editors of articles edited by no one else were less likely to suffer an undo, and that those who co-
edited with one other editor were no more likely to engage in undos than those who co-edited with two editors (once 
the number of articles was controlled for; see Models 9 and 12). Beyond that, an increase in the number of co-
editors led to an increase in the likelihood of experiencing an undo. Likewise, the total number of articles edited by 
editor i, as well as his or her focus on a small number of articles, led to a higher incidence experiencing an undo. 
Editors who had signed up a long time earlier were more likely to experience undos, but that effect was offset by the 
negative effect of actually contributing edits to the project. Finally, editors who undid the edits of others were more 
likely to experience undos themselves.   
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Steps 2 and 3: Eliciting Norm Compliance and Compensating Those Who Elicit Compliance 
To test Hypotheses 2a and 3a, we modeled the likelihood that editor i reverts an undo during 
time period t. We distinguish between two types of reverts of undo: (1) editor i steps in to revert 
the undo of an article version saved by another editor, as captured by DepVarit = Number of 
Times Editor i Reverted Othersit, and (2) editor i steps in to revert an undo of an article version 
saved by another editor j who has at least once reverted an undo of another editor’s work during 
(t-1), as captured by DepVarit = Number of Times Editor i Reverted Others Who Revertedit. 
Table 2.4 reports the results of our estimations. In 13, 14, and 15 we examine the 
conditions under which, when another editor’s article version is undone, editor i steps in to revert 
the undo. Across the three models, we find that editors embedded in high-density networks are 
not more likely to revert undos of another editor’s work. This is inconsistent with Hypothesis 
2a. In Models 16, 17 and 18, we examine the conditions under which editor i steps in to revert an 
undo of an article version saved by another editor j who had previously reverted an undo of 
another editor’s work during (t-1), as captured by Number of Times Editor i Reverted Others 
Who Revertedit. Across the three models, we find that editors embedded in high-density networks 
are more likely to engage in such behaviors and to reward those who had reverted others’ work 
by reverting undos that affected them. This pattern of results supports Hypothesis 3a. Overall, 
this pattern of results suggests that Wikipedia editors in dense social networks do not blindly 
revert undos suffered by other editors. They only do that as a reward to others who engage in 
reverting undos for others. 
To test Hypotheses 2b and 3b, we modeled the likelihood that editor i variables: (i) 
DepVarit = Number of Times Editor i Was Undone Followed by No Revertit, (ii) DepVarit = 
Number of Times Editor i Was Undone Followed by Editor i Reverts Undoit, and (iii) DepVarit =  
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Number of Times Editor i Was Undone Followed by Another Editor Reverts Undoit.
65 Editor i 
may of course experience no reverts simply because he did not suffer any undos, or because he 
suffered undos but no one reverted them. As before, we control for the former possibility in three 
ways. First, we exclude time periods t when editor i does not suffer any undos. Second, we 
include a dummy variable equal to one when editor i suffered any undos. Finally, we use 
Heckman-like correction, estimating the likelihood that editor i will suffer at least one undo 
during time t. The specification for this function was given in model 9. Coefficient estimates on 
the density variable are in the same direction across all three methods, and for brevity we only 
report results using the Heckman-like correction.  
Table 2.5 reports the results of our estimations. In Models 19 and 20 we examine the 
conditions under which an article version saved by editor i was undone and followed by no 
revert. Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, we find that editors embedded in high-density networks 
are less likely to suffer an undo that is not followed by a revert. Consistent with Hypothesis 3b, 
we find that editors who have reverted undos of other editors’ work are less likely to suffer an 
undo that is not followed by a revert and this effect is particularly strong if editor i is embedded 
in high-density network.  
In Models 21 and 22, we examine the conditions under which an article version saved by 
editor i was undone and editor i personally reverted the undo. Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, 
across both models we find that editors embedded in high-density networks are less likely to 
revert an undo of their own work. Consistent with Hypothesis 3b, across the two models we find 
that editors who have reverted undos for other editors are less likely to revert an undo of their 
own work and this effect is particularly strong if editor i is embedded in a high-density network.  
                                                            
65 Number of Times Editor i Was Undone Followed by Editor i Reverts Undoit excludes situations in which editor i 
undid his own version and then reverted the undo.  
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Table 2.4. Negative Binomial Random-Effects Estimates that Editor i Reverted an Undo at Time 
t (Test of Hypotheses 2a and 3a) 
 
 
Number of Times Editor i Reverted 
Othersit 
  Number of Times Editor i Reverted 
Others Who Revertedit 
Independent Variables  Model 13  Model 14  Model 15    Model 16  Model 17  Model 18 
Network Densityit-1  -.09  -.11  -.05   .15*  .16*  .17* 
  (.09)  (.09)  (.09)   (.07)  (.07)  (.07) 
Network Sizeit-1  .09***  .02  .09***   .07***  .08***  .08*** 
  (.02)  (.02)  (.02)   (.02)  (.02)  (.02) 
Network Size0it-1  .28***  .47***  .34***   -.09  -.19  -.04 
  (.09)  (.18)  (.12)   (.20)  (.17)  (.20) 
Network Size1it-1 
 
.32*  .07  .28*   .27  .26*  .33* 
(.13)  (.13)  (.13)   (.15)  (.12)  (.15) 
Percentage of Articles 
Edited More than Twiceit-1 
-.17  -.08  -.34***   -.11  -.06  -.11 
(.10)  (.11)  (.10)   (.11)  (.11)  (.11) 
Cumulative Editsit-1  ─  .11***  .19***   ─ .02  .05 
    (.02)  (.02)     (.11)  (.11) 
Months since Signupit-1  ─  -.56***  -.37***   ─ .08  -.03 
    (.12)  (.11)     (.09)  (.09) 
Number of Editsit x10  .01***  .01***  -.01***   .47*  .47**  .37 
  (.003)  (.003)  (.003)   (.19)  (.16)  (.19) 
Time Period Dummiest  No  No  Yes   No  No  Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratioit  No  No  Yes   No  No  Yes 
-Log-Likelihood  25,731  25,401  24,943   20,394  20,073  19,994 
Degrees of Freedom  6  8  20   6  8  20 
Wald χ
2  12,365  12,466  12,598   12,336  12,367  12,659 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Constant was omitted. All χ
2 tests are based on a baseline 
model with no covariates. Selection equation predicting an undo of a version last saved by editor i based on 
previous experience, tenure and month dummies was omitted. Resulting Inverse Mills ratio was used as 
control in the outcome equation, as noted. Results of sensitivity tests using generalized linear models with 
negative binomial link and grouped logits yield equivalent results. Editors i = 30,272; periods t = 12; total 
number of observations = 212,317 (not all editors started editing in time period 1). As before, results are 
stable with respect to risk set. *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).  
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Table 2.5. Negative Binomial Random-Effects Estimates that Editor i Experienced a Revert of 
an Undo at Time t (Test of Hypotheses 2b and 3b) 
 
Number of Times 
Editor i Undone 
Followed by No 
Revertit 
Number of Times 
Editor i Was Undone 
Followed by Editor i 
Reverts Undoit 
Number of Times 
Editor i Was Undone 
Followed by Another 
Editor Reverts Undoit 
Independent Variables  Model  
19  Model 20  Model 21  Model  
22  Model 23  Model 24 
Network Densityit-1  .28***  -.17*** -.34** -.93*** .31**  .19** 
  (.04)  (.04) (.14) (.14) (.08) (.08) 
Number of Times Editor i 
Reverted Othersit-1  -.12***  -.12*** -.22**  -.27**  .18**  .14** 
  (.02)  (.02) (.05) (.05) (.04) (.04) 
Number of Times Editor i 
Reverted Othersit-1 *  
Network Densityit-1 
-.02**  -.02** -.06** -.05** .11**  .12** 
  (.01)  (.01) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.03) 
Network Sizeit-1  .44***  .35*** .93*** .47*** .72*** .59*** 
  (.01)  (.01) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) 
Network Size0it-1  .26***  -.50*** -1.49*  -1.80***  .55***  .11 
  (.05)  (.05) (.22) (.22) (.10) (.09) 
Network Size1it-1 
 
.46***  -.02 -.62  -.95**  .75***  .30* 
(.07)  (.07) (.32) (.32) (.15) (.15) 
Cumulative Editsit-1  -1.35***  -.46***  -.90*** -.21** -.66***  -.80*** 
  (.05)  (.02) (.17) (.07) (.10) (.04) 
Months since Signupit-1  1.16***  .28*** .77***  .40**  .62*** .70*** 
  (.05)  (.02) (.16) (.06) (.09) (.04) 
Number of Times Editor i Was 
Undone Followed by No 
Revertit 
─  ─  .04*** .03*** .04*** .04*** 
  ─  ─  (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Number of Times Editor i Was 
Undone Followed by Editor i 
Reverts Undoit 
.04***  .03***  ─  ─ .03***  .00 
  (.00)  (.00)  ─  ─ (.00)  (.00) 
Number of Times Editor i Was 
Undone Followed by Another 
Editor Reverts Undoit 
.07***  .06*** .11*** .05***  ─  ─ 
  (.00)  (.00) (.01) (.01)  ─  ─ 
Number of Times Editor i 
Undid Othersit-1  ─  .31***  ─ 1.16*** ─ .42*** 
  ─  (.01)  ─ (.02) ─ (.01) 
Editsit x10  .27*  .15**  .23 .19 .37 .18 
  (.10)  (.10) (.33) (.56) (.32) (.32) 
Time Period Dummiest  No  Yes No Yes No Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratioit  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
-Log-Likelihood  110,547  109,923  20,211 18,384 36,409 36,153 
Degrees of Freedom  14  26 14 26 14 26 
Wald χ
2  32,173  32,880 6,454 11,157  10,332  11,802 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Constant, number of articles, and percentage of articles edited 
more than twice were omitted. All χ
2 tests are based on a baseline model with no covariates. Selection equation  
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predicting undos of version saved by that editor was based on previous experience, tenure and month dummies was 
omitted from table. Resulting Inverse Mills ratio was used as control in the outcome equation, as noted. Results of 
sensitivity tests using generalized linear models with negative binomial link, and grouped logits yield equivalent 
results. Editors i = 30,272; periods t = 12; total number of observations = 212,317. (Not all editors started editing in 
time period 1.) *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests). 
 
Finally, in Models 23 and 24, we examine the conditions under which an article version 
saved by editor i was undone and then reverted by another editor. Consistent with Hypothesis 
2b, across the two models we find that editors embedded in high-density networks are much 
more likely to experience an undo followed by a revert by another editor.
66 Consistent with 
Hypothesis 3b, we find that editors who have reverted undos for other editors are more likely to 
experience an undo followed by a third-party revert and this effect is particularly strong when 
editor i is embedded in a high-density network.  
Continued Participation 
To test Hypotheses 4a, 4b and 4c, which pertain to continued editor participation, we modeled 
the likelihood that editor i contributes at least one edit during time t. The dependent variable was 
coded one if the editor has contributed at least once during time t and zero otherwise. To estimate 
this model, we used a fixed-effects panel logistic, with joint probability function given by:  
         (2.4) 
Table 2.6 presents the results of Models 25, 26 and 27. Consistent with our expectations, 
we find across the three models that editors surrounded by dense network structures are more 
likely to continue contributing content to Wikipedia. In Model 25 we find that having one’s 
contribution undone has on average no effect on the likelihood of continuing to write for 
                                                            
66 We have also run auxiliary models in which we took the dependent variable from Models 19 and 20 and split it in 
two. First, we examine the conditions under which an article version saved by editor i was undone and then reverted 
by an editor with whom editor i has previously worked. Second, we examine the conditions under which an article 
version saved by editor i was undone and then reverted by another editor with whom editor i has not previously 
worked. Consistent with our expectations, the effect of density on the likelihood of a revert by another editor is 
higher if that editor has previously worked with editor i. 
it 
1
1 e
xit 
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Wikipedia. Model 26 however, reveals a great deal of variation in the effect of an undo on the 
likelihood of continued participation, depending on whether the undo was reverted and, if so, 
how. In contrast to the predictions of Hypothesis 4a, the results indicate that an undo left 
unreverted has no effect on the likelihood of continuing to contribute to Wikipedia.
67 Consistent 
with Hypothesis 4b, however, the results indicate that an undo personally reverted by the editor 
whose work was undone makes him or her less likely to continue contributing. Furthermore, 
consistent with Hypothesis 4c, the results indicate that an undo reverted by a third party makes 
the editor whose work was undone more likely to continue to contribute.  
For completeness, in Model 27 we also interact with the three variables associated with the three 
hypotheses with a measure of density around actor i at time t. We find that when editor i is 
surrounded by a dense network, the effect of unreverted undos remains the same. However, 
when editor i is surrounded by a dense network, the effect of undos of editor i’s work 
subsequently reverted by editor i is even more negative. This should not be surprising. An editor 
surrounded by a dense network is likely to expect that the network will revert the undo on his or 
her behalf. Failure of the network to do so, requiring the editor to step in and personally revert 
the undo, makes him or her more disappointed with the network and thus more likely to leave.  
In contrast, when editor i is surrounded by a dense network, the effect of undos of editor 
i’s work reverted by another editor is even greater. This too should not be surprising. An editor 
surrounded by a dense network is apt to expect the network to revert the undo on his or her 
behalf. The expectation that the network surrounding him will continue to do that in the future 
makes the editor less likely to leave. 
 
                                                            
67 We suspect that the lack of statistical significance occurs because some reverts go unnoticed by the editor, and 
thus are unlikely to have an effect on the editor’s editing pattern.   
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Table 2.6. Fixed-Effects Logistic Estimates that Editor i Makes at least One Edit during Time t 
(Test of Hypotheses 4a-c) 
Independent Variable  Model 25  Model 26  Model 27 
Network Densityit-1  .08*  .08* .07* 
  (.04)  (.04) (.03) 
Number of Times Editor i Was Undoneit-1   .00    
(.01)    
Number of Times Editor i Was Undone Followed by No 
Revertit-1     .02 .01 
    (.01) (.01) 
Number of Times Editor i Was Undone Followed by Editor i 
Reverts Undoit-1    -.10*** -.07** 
    (.02) (.02) 
Number of Times Editor i Was Undone Followed by Another 
Editor Reverts Undoit-1    .08** .04** 
    (.03) (.01) 
Number of Times Editor i Was Undone Followed by Undo 
Followed by no Revertit-1*Densityit-1      .08 
      (.05) 
Number of Times Editor i Was Undone Followed by Editor i 
Enforces Reverts Undoit-1*Densityit-1 
 
    -.66** 
   (.23) 
Number of Times Editor i Was Undone Followed by Another 
Editor Reverts Undoit-1 * Densityit-1      .33* 
      (.16) 
Number of Times Editor i Undid Othersit-1  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Percentage of Articles Editor i Edited More than Twiceit-1  Yes  Yes Yes 
Network Sizeit-1, Network Size0it-1 and Network Size1it-1  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Articles Editedit-1  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Editsit-1*10  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cumulative Editsit-1  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Months since Signupit-1  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Periods since Last Editit-1  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Period Dummiest  Yes  Yes Yes 
-Log-Likelihood  52,421  52,311  51,403 
Degrees of Freedom  23  25  28 
Wald χ
2  24,188  24,209  24,226 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Constant was omitted from table. All χ
2 tests are based on a 
baseline model with no covariates. Editors i = 19,290; number of periods = 12; total number of observations = 
153,582. (Not all editors started editing in time period 1.) The number of editors is smaller than in previous tables 
because fixed-effects estimation removes all editors who always edited or never edited from the risk set. *p < .05 
**p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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LIMITATIONS 
The results we present provide overall support for our hypotheses, but they have some 
shortcomings. First, we do not directly measure relationships between individuals, such as social 
exchanges of messages between editors. Instead, we infer the existence of relationships by 
identifying who worked with whom on a given article. We believe, however, that this 
shortcoming does not undermine our results, and indeed that it makes our results conservative. 
Consider what would happen if we erroneously assumed that relationships exist when they do 
not—in other words, that a network of editors is dense when in reality it is not. We would expect 
these editors to behave in the manner described by the theory, but because there is no density 
between them they would not do so. As a consequence, we would be less likely to obtain the 
results we do. Conversely, we may have mistakenly assumed that relationships do not exist when 
in reality they do. In this scenario, we would be underestimating the extent of density between 
editors—in other words, we would not expect these editors to behave as described by the theory, 
though in fact they do. This scenario too would make it less likely that we will find the results we 
do. Both of these measurement errors suggest that our results are fairly conservative estimates.  
We also labor under the disadvantage of being unable to measure all types of norm 
violations. This would be a problem if, for example, editors in dense networks were less likely to 
undo edits, but more likely to violate norms on, say, the talk pages where editors discuss how an 
article should evolve. If this were the case, however, we would expect extensive spillovers, such 
that editors who violate norms on, say, talk pages would be more likely to experience retribution 
in the form of undos of their article versions. This scenario should lead to a positive relationship 
between density and the likelihood of experiencing undos, making it less likely that we will  
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observe a negative relationship between the two. Thus the negative relationship we document 
should be seen as a conservative estimate.
68  
We are also unable to capture all types of punishment of norm violations. For example, 
some editors who undid articles might have been punished via private e-mails. This scenario 
could present a problem for interpretation of our results in the following way. Suppose no real 
relationship exists between density and reverts of undos, but editors do tend to chastise other 
editors embedded in sparse networks via private communication, and those embedded in dense 
networks via public reverts of their undos. If this differential treatment existed, we would 
observe a relationship between density and reverts of undos even if it did not exist. It is very 
unlikely, however, that this scenario actually prevails. If anything, we would expect editors 
embedded in dense networks to be less likely than those with sparse networks to have their undos 
reverted (for fear of retaliation, say). Thus this potential bias makes the results we observe less 
rather than more likely. Finally, it is unlikely that we capture all types of rewards for those who 
punish norm violations. Such rewards can take the form of private thank-you e-mails, public 
thank-you entries on editors’ private pages, and other expressions of gratitude. Once again, to the 
extent that such rewards are substitutes for reverts of undos, we should be less likely to observe 
the results we do.  
Finally, there remain the issues of reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity. With 
respect to reverse causality, it is possible for an individual editor to create a high-density network 
around himself or herself by introducing acquaintances to each other. In gratitude for such 
introductions, the acquaintances may in turn refrain from violating norms against the editor, or 
                                                            
68 Similar logic could be applied to an unobserved propensity of editors in high-density networks to experience norm 
violations on, say, talk pages. Again, to the extent that editors penalize such behavior via undos, we should observe 
a positive rather than negative association between density and undos.  
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may punish those who do so. Though this scenario could occur, we have undertaken a number of 
steps to exclude it from the data. Suppose editor i works with editor j on article A, and with 
editor k on article B. Editor i may tell editor k about his work with editor j and invite him to join 
the two of them in working on article A, which editor k does. Because our definition of network 
density around editor i explicitly requires editors j and k to work together on a different article in 
which i does not participate, those two editors would then have to start editing another article, C. 
They would also have to attribute this new undertaking to editor i’s introduction, and in gratitude 
perform fewer undos or revert more undos affecting editor i. We doubt that such joint editing 
activity on article C would be attributed to editor i, and thus we do not believe that reverse 
causality is responsible for our results. 
Concerns about unobserved heterogeneity can also lead one to argue that editors 
engaging in or suffering from fewer norm violations; engaging in or witnessing more 
punishments of norm violators; and rewarding those who punish norm violations, as well as 
getting rewarded for such acts, find themselves in this situation not because of density, but 
because of their unobserved personal characteristics. A critic can then argue that these 
unobserved characteristics are correlated with editor’s proclivity to form dense networks, which 
results in the empirical association between density and the six types of behaviors described 
above. We believe that these concerns are attenuated by the fact that auxiliary analyses we ran 
using fixed effects models (see footnote 63 and examine estimation procedure for models 25-27) 
generate similar pattern of results, imply that the time invariant unobserved characteristics 
cannot be held responsible for generating the results. The unobserved heterogeneity explanation 
of our results is thus limited to only the time-varying unobserved effects. 
CONCLUSIONS  
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Since the inception of the discipline, sociologists have examined the role of dense social 
relationships in various social phenomena. People surrounded by friends who are also each 
other’s friends are thought to enjoy more social and economic support (Durkheim 1951; Uehara 
1990). They are also believed to be less likely to commit or suffer norm violations. Coleman 
(1990) formalized this intuition and argued that high-density networks enable third parties to 
compensate norm enforcers for the expense of chastising norm violators. Such payments 
encourage actors to punish those who violate norms, in turn reducing the incidence of norm 
violation. Despite ubiquitous citations of Coleman’s explanation, little empirical work has tested 
it convincingly. This is problematic; we do not know whether the mechanism is borne out in 
reality. If not, we may erroneously recommend that a network be made denser even if doing so 
will not improve norm enforcement. Our paper endeavors to address this issue by testing 
Coleman’s mechanism in detail. We find substantial support for it, suggesting that increasing 
network density to elicit norm compliance is justified. Support for Coleman’s mechanism alerts 
us to the importance of punishments for norm violations and rewards for such punishments, and 
thus helps us design social systems in which norms are observed. 
 The fact that we found supporting evidence in the Wikipedia context highlights a number 
of conditions that promote the operation of Coleman’s mechanism. Ln Wikipedia, for example, 
norm violations, punishments of norm violations and as rewards for punishing norm violators are 
all highly visible. Replicating these conditions in the design of a social system is critical; 
otherwise norm violations will remain undetected and therefore unpunished. Wikipedia’s norms 
are also clearly articulated, making it easy to detect a violation and fairly difficult to claim that a 
norm violation occurred when it did not. It is also reasonably clear how to punish violators in 
ways that will elicit rewards from others. Without such clear specification of appropriate  
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punishment, some actors may be afraid to administer it for fear of committing a violation 
themselves. 
Understanding such conditions has important implications for related streams of the 
literature, such as the effort to link network density to performance. On the one hand, higher 
network density is believed to constrain the novelty and creativity of new ideas and solutions, 
and thus individual and collective performance (Burt 2005). On the other hand, higher network 
density is thought to enhance performance via a higher rate of norm compliance (Uzzi 1999). 
Numerous papers seek to address this tradeoff by pointing to sets of conditions under which one 
or the other effect is likely to be stronger, suggesting for example that performance will be 
higher in dense networks when tasks are collective and require everyone’s cooperation (Ahuja 
2000). Our results indicate that this positive association will hold only when mechanisms for 
punishment and reward of punishment are in place. Otherwise, dense networks will suffer all the 
shortcomings of constrained creativity without enjoying any of the benefits of higher norm 
compliance.  
The theory and results we present here also inform our understanding of what makes 
social systems survive. Specifically, they underscore a tradeoff in designing a social system 
between maximum norm compliance and maximum longevity. Our results indicate that norm 
violations followed by punishments make people more committed to a social system than they 
would be if they had never experienced a norm violation. To the extent that very dense networks 
discourage norm violations, they also prevent actors from learning just how strong the 
community is. Even a small decrease in network density will increase the rate of norm violation, 
whose punishment will in turn promote greater commitment to the social system. These 
conclusions are similar in nature to those of Uzzi (1999), who found that intermediate levels of  
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density promote the highest performance. Whereas Uzzi’s quantitative findings pertain to 
performance, our paper quantitatively estimates commitment to a social system.  
We hope that our paper will stimulate further research. We see substantial opportunities 
for further tests of Coleman’s mechanism. Specifically, it would be helpful to document the 
conditions under which network density has no effect on norm enforcement. If Coleman’s theory 
is correct, for example, it should be the case that when norm violations, punishments and rewards 
for norm punishments are hard to observe, density will have limited effect on these phenomena. 
Density should also have no effect on populations of individuals who derive sufficient intrinsic 
rewards for punishing those who violate norms. Furthermore, density will not lead to norm 
observance when rewards for punishment are very expensive to provide, such that a third-order 
free riding problem occurs. Finally, further opportunities exist to show that density may actually 
reduce the incidence of norm observance. This mechanism would be most likely if punishing 
friends who are also each other’s friends were particularly costly. Demonstrating that the 
relationship between density and norm observance critically depends on such factors would 
further lend credence to Coleman’s theory.  
  We hope that future research will take advantage of the vast amounts of data on social 
interactions on the internet. This unprecedented opportunity for insight into human interactions 
makes it possible to offer unequivocal empirical support for many theories central to sociology. 
For example, a string of papers using e-mail data has convincingly shown that homophily, as 
distinct from other mechanisms, does indeed explain why actors with similar characteristics are 
more likely to form relationships with each other (Kossinets and Watts 2009; Menchik and Tian 
2008). This paper too provides empirical support for a widely accepted mechanism. It is to be 
hoped that future papers will furnish unambiguous evidence for other widely cited social  
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theories. We hope too that a new set of papers will take advantage of the fact that on-line 
environments make certain social mechanisms more salient, allowing for development of new 
theories. For example, Piskorski (2010) has shown that on-line social networks allow people to 
create an illusion of constant sociability, which they can then use to engage in other, often 
illegitimate, activities. Similarly, one can argue that such social platforms make others’ patterns 
of social relationships public information, in turn illuminating opportunities for individuals to act 
as social brokers. Viewed as such, on-line environments can help us further our theories of 
brokerage. Other theory-development opportunities abound. 
In the next chapter, I examine the processes through which individuals become involved 
in, contribute, and leave Wikipedia, with particular attention to the relationship between turnover 
and the social structure of online participation in the context of individuals’ overall social 
networks. This question is addressed using data from in-depth interviews with thirty-five current 
and former Wikipedia contributors, coupled with a brief quantitative analysis of reported offline 
social networks and socio-demographic characteristics and publicly available Wikipedia 
contribution characteristics. While the present study suggests that dense online social networks 
are beneficial because they reduce the likelihood that individuals are affected by norm 
infringement and increase the likelihood that their contributions are defended, the findings from 
the last chapter suggest that forging social connections with online collaborators to the detriment 
of real-life involvement can be detrimental to long-term participation in Wikipedia collective 
production.  
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CHAPTER 3 
WHEN COLLEAGUES COUNT, BUT NOT TOO MUCH: 
 
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND TURNOVER MECHANISMS IN WIKIPEDIA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Why do some individuals continue contributing to joint work on projects while others slack or 
give up despite dealing with the same environment? Why is it that, given the same organizational 
environment, some individuals seek to manage the expectations and pressures of collaborating, 
and remain committed to the organization while others fail to do so and exit the organization? 
Organizational scholars have considered the question of motivation for participating in various 
collaborative settings, and of satisfaction with one’s participation, but overall our ability to 
explain variation in levels of organizational commitment remains rather limited (Randall 1988). 
Many studies measuring organizational commitment as result of individual motivation rely on 
one-time individual level survey data and interviews with participants, in which intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations are reported as reasons for engaging in collaborative work (Deci and Ryan 
2000). Few studies recognize that motivations may, and often do, change during participation on 
a project and therefore they are not a reliable predictor of individual’s satisfaction or turnover 
patterns (Freeman 2007).  
Two main sources of work satisfaction and antecedents of commitment in collaborative 
work are one’s task-related activities and one’s interactions with other organizational members 
(Leiter and Maslach 1988). Researchers have shown that interaction patterns and interpersonal 
conflicts are predictors of organizational commitment but did not extensively specify the 
underlying dynamics of these processes (Morris and Sherman 1981; Eisenberg, Monge et al. 
1983). Similarly, little attention has been paid to the processes through which the characteristics  
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of individuals’ overall social networks affect their capacity to commit to an organization they 
participate in.  
This study juxtaposes research on social networks and power-dependence theory to 
examine individual commitment as reflected by turnover decisions, and proposes that high 
embeddedness
69 in social networks of collaboration is detrimental to individual commitment 
under conditions of high dependence on these networks. Predicated on the belief that individual 
turnover decision can be understood through one’s narrative of participation, I use semi-
structured interviews based on Atkinson’s “life story” interview method (1998) to elicit 
information about contributors’
70 trajectories of participation in the writing of English Wikipedia 
articles, with particular attention to interpersonal dynamics and social networks of article 
contributors. I then analyze the retrospective accounts of participation and triangulate them with 
objective participation information retrieved from archival data in order to ascertain the existence 
of a relationship between the network of co-participation and the place of this network in the 
individual’s overall social network, and the turnover decision.  
The type of setting chosen for this study, a novel form of online volunteer work which 
emerged as a result of technological support for collective action behavior (Benkler 2006) is 
crucial in identifying the link between social networks and participant turnover. Because 
collective production of Wikipedia articles is asynchronous and involves remote collaboration 
with other contributors, interviewees’ narratives of volunteer “careers” are unencumbered by the 
                                                            
69 In this study, embeddedness is used to define an individual position in the structure of production where the 
individual has multiple ties to the same group of which he or she is a member. Thus, an individual within a dense 
network of coworkers who has multiplex ties (such as work, advice, friendship) to several coworkers would be 
considered embedded, while someone in a dense work network whose social ties are situated outside the network 
would not be classified as embedded. 
 
70 Throughout this study I use “participant”, “editor” and “contributor” interchangeably to refer to individuals 
involved in the process of writing Wikipedia articles.  
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complex embedded “web of relationships” (Simmel 1964) that characterizes everyday life and by 
the complex rewards associated with workplace settings. This aspect allows me to explore how 
individuals’ own choices of allocating time and effort to online article contributions and to 
relationships with other contributors affect their commitment to Wikipedia and their likelihood 
of turnover. In the following section, I briefly review research on social networks, conflict and 
turnover in collaborative production settings as a source of research questions and comparisons 
prior to data analysis (Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1998). 
Social Networks and Turnover  
Social networks represent relationships arising among a given set of individuals as a result of 
personal interactions and co-memberships. Social networks facilitate advice (Sparrowe, Liden, 
Wayne and Kraimer 2001) and sharing of information (Burt 2000) but also serve as identity 
referents for individuals to learn about participation in an organization (Bolino, Turnley, and 
Bloodgood 2002). For example, individuals can learn through their social networks the social 
norms surrounding contribution and collaboration, as well as the performance criteria and 
expectations associated with their organizational role (Mossholder, Settoon, and Henagan 2005).  
Individual outcomes such as promotions (Burt 1992) and turnover (Krackhardt and Porter 
1985) are influenced by positions within social networks. More recently, researchers such as 
Kahn (1998) and Burt (2001) have identified mechanisms through which employee ties may 
affect their attachment to an organization. Kahn (1998) has argued that lack of ties with other 
employees may lead to turnover due to lack of emotional engagement. From a structural 
perspective, Burt (2001) has found that more embedded participants have higher organizational 
attachment than individuals who are less embedded in an organization, a finding consistent with  
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the fact that individuals with more ties within an organization are those least likely to exit it 
(McPherson, Popielarz, and Drobnic 1992).  
While research has examined the relationship between individual networks within the 
organization and turnover, less concern has been granted to the size and structure of one’s 
organizational social network relative to one’s overall social network with the exception of 
work-family (or, work-life) research. In the next section I summarize research work-family 
balance as it pertains to the topic of social networks and turnover, before presenting my research 
setting and data collection effort. 
Social Networks within Organizations in the Context of One’s Overall Social Network 
Organizational membership represents a fundamental aspect of everyday life, and hence a large 
majority of organizational research on social networks has concerned itself with social networks 
within organizational boundaries. At the same time, the organizations we work for are only one 
of many social settings in which we interact with each other and form relationships. However 
given the preponderance of dual-career families and increase in average times spent at work 
(Ilies et al. 2007), organizational researchers have become increasingly concerned with questions 
regarding the balance between social networks and roles at the workplace and in personal life.  
“Attention to the balancing of work and family roles has traditionally focused on conflict 
or interference between these roles (Eby et al. 2005). Work-family conflict occurs when 
pressures from the work and family domains are mutually incompatible” such as when time, 
strain, or specific behaviors associated with one domain hinder individual performance in the 
other (Illies et al. 2007: 1368). While research has not directly linked role conflict with turnover, 
meta-analyses of work-family conflict indicate that individuals in this situation are likely to have  
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lower organizational attachment and commitment (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran 2005) than 
other employees which suggests a higher likelihood of organizational turnover. 
At the same time, “positive spillovers [between work and family domains] have 
traditionally been neglected” in the literature (Ilies et al. 2007). While the psychological 
literature offers a statistical examination of positive affect spillovers between work and family 
(Ilies et al. 2007), this study proposes a qualitative analysis of a volunteer collective production 
setting to identify a social mechanism through which personal networks can play a positive role 
in reducing organizational turnover. 
RESEARCH SITE 
This study relies on data from the online encyclopedia Wikipedia, a free online encyclopedia 
collaboratively created by people around the world. Because anyone may contribute to 
Wikipedia, and contributions are not screened or censored before becoming part of the 
encyclopedia,
71 Wikipedia has attracted to date over six million registered contributors who 
created over 3.5 million articles in English, and a total of over 16 million articles in over 250 
languages. Due to its broad coverage of knowledge Wikipedia is ranked as the 6
th most visited 
website in the world, according to Alexa Traffic Rank 2012.
72 
The success of collective article writing in Wikipedia relies on a technology named wiki 
software, which enables people to interact with formerly static website pages. Individuals can 
modify any existing page, for everyone else to see, while previous versions of the page remain 
                                                            
71 Before late 2008, according to information retrieved on December 21, 2010 from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Flagged_protection_and_patrolled_revisions, in Wikipedia: The Free 
Encyclopedia, Wikimedia Foundation Inc. [Encyclopedia on-line].  
72 Data retrieved on January 25, 2012 from http://www.alexa.com/topsites.  
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accessible through a history page.
73 Participants disagreeing with page changes may alter or 
erase these changes in response. Wiki software represents a radical change in collective 
production philosophy compared against the classical idea of bulletin boards where people may 
contribute only by accretion and existing text cannot be eliminated by peer participants.
74On 
Wikipedia contributors thus forsake ownership and control over their work, trading off 
individual visibility for collective work, and risking that their contribution is modified or 
eliminated by peers. In this sense, Wikipedia article writing is similar to commonly used forms 
of offline collective production of a presentation or a scientific research project, except that the 
main contributors are ordinarily listed as such in the latter.  
  Wikipedia is structured as a website, with new pages being continually added and linked 
into the existing structure. Every Wikipedia article consists of a set of three interrelated pages: 
Article page, Discussion page, and History page. The Article page displays the contents of the 
most recent version of that respective entry. To make changes to this entry, contributors may 
click on an “Edit Page” button, which presents them with an editable version of the contents of 
the article page. This allows any reader interested in contributing to modify the content in 
various ways - such as making large contributions, copy-editing text, or adding references and 
photographs to improve an article. Wikipedia’s software platform provides a complete history of 
any given article. Anyone may find summary information
75 about a contributor’s edits or about 
                                                            
73 The description of wiki software here closely matches its implementation by the Wikimedia Foundation, the non-
profit legal entity behind Wikipedia. Various Wikimedia software implementations vary in their feature set. 
74 It is technically possible to erase comments but the deletion action is very rare on Wikipedia, and it takes place 
only when exposure of sensitive personal information such as phone numbers, or social security numbers is at stake. 
The action of locking article pages is slightly more frequent, but it took place for less than 0.05% of articles in my 
dataset. 
75 This summary information contains the time and date of edit, user name/ IP address, as well as a link to the 
former’s talk page, to a list of the registered user’s contributions, the size of the edit, and a brief note regarding the 
nature of the edit provided by the editor or generated automatically by a Wikipedia script.  
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the history of any given article by accessing the History page, and examine the difference 
between two versions of the same page. In addition to the article pages, Wikipedia contains 
several types of infrastructure pages such as community rules, manuals of editing and writing 
style, pages listing articles organized within various WikiProjects (e.g., History of France, 
Physics), and statistics about Wikipedia. The Wikipedia page space is tightly linked to the Help, 
Special (pages), and Template spaces, which contain tools facilitating socialization within the 
project, administration and format standardization of project pages. User (contributor) pages are 
personal spaces for registered editors’ self-expression, containing free-format information about 
the interests, opinions, identity, or activities that the owner wants to share with the community.  
Discussion pages are never independent of other pages but always attached to other pages 
such as articles or user pages. Discussion pages offer space for discussing and debating the 
content of the primary page, asking for information, or leaving messages for other contributors. 
Discussion pages are also used for talking about the evolution of Wikipedia and for proposing 
various changes in the structure, style or norms applied to the editing process. Formal Wikipedia 
contribution and collaboration norms have gradually crystallized as a result of such public 
discussions. 
The first formally recorded Wikipedia rule, Neutral Point of View emerged during 2001, 
and was later acknowledged as the foundational principle of the Wikipedia community.
76 More 
rules and guidelines followed soon after, and now Wikipedia policies are targeted towards two 
main facets of article production: writing criteria and collaboration rules. The former clarify the 
                                                            
76 "Wikipedia Timeline," in Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, Wikimedia Foundation Inc. [Encyclopedia on-line]. 
Available from http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia_timeline; retrieved January 2, 2008, and Wales, James. 
"Statement of Principles" in Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, Wikimedia Foundation Inc. [Encyclopedia on-line]. 
Retrieved on December 21, 2010 from 
http://nostalgia.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Jimbo_Wales/Statement_of_principles&oldid=75340   
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purpose of Wikipedia as a repository of unbiased, accurate and verifiable synthesis of expert 
knowledge, while the latter set the code of conduct and social rules governing the behavior of 
contributors to the project. On Wikipedia, contributing in “good faith” and assuming good faith 
on behalf of others, as well as fostering an environment of open and enthusiastic contribution and 
benevolence are upheld against making ‘perfect contributions’. One is required to recognize the 
equality of contribution rights and to expect contributions to be altered in the interest of article 
improvement.  
In addition to collaboration norms, Wikipedia participants have set up guidelines and 
institutions such as mediating committees to ensure contributions are evaluated fairly and 
without personal bias. The concepts of community and collaboration norms are at the core of my 
interview data collection. In the next section I explain my data collection efforts, including my 
participation to Wikipedia and the steps I have undertaken in designing an interview protocol, 
selecting participants, and conducting the interviews. 
DATA COLLECTION 
My interaction with Wikipedia extended over a period of five years between 2006 and 2011 
during which I observed contributor behavior and interactions, participated in article writing, and 
had formal and informal conversations with participants to the English Wikipedia. In order to 
understand the relationship between social networks and participation in this setting I have relied 
primarily on data from thirty-five semi-structured interviews in which English Wikipedia former 
or current participants who have narrated the history of their contributions to the free online 
encyclopedia. Although the interviews themselves offered a detailed picture of the social 
processes at play in participation to Wikipedia, I have also spent time as participant observer in 
the Wikipedia environment in order to gain a fuller understanding of the participation narratives.  
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Additionally I have engaged in archival research to retrieve objective data on interviewees’ 
Wikipedia contributions in order to mitigate potential interviewee recall biases regarding 
information such as the date when they started contributing, or the frequency of their 
contributions. 
The semi-structured interview schedule included in Appendix B touches upon four broad 
areas of interviewees’ participation story in such an order that disruptions to conversation flow 
and interviewees’ frame of mind are minimized (Weiss 1994). The interviewees were 
encouraged to follow a loose chronological progression: they were asked about the 
circumstances of their first contributions, and then about strategies they employ during article 
writing, about interactions with other participants, positive and negative experiences, and sense 
of community. In the end, participants were asked to report socio-demographic characteristics, 
educational background, and occupation, as well as a description of their personal social 
networks.  
Thirty of these interviews were collected by the author, with the help of two additional 
researchers, between July and December 2008; five more interviews were collected during the 
spring of 2011. Eighteen interviews were conducted on the phone and lasted between 55 and 90 
minutes; thirteen were conducted via email correspondence, and four via instant messenger, 
online real-time text-based discussion. Interviewees were a rather diverse set of individuals, 
ranging from high-school students to retired professionals, from individuals working towards 
their GED to individuals with several graduate degrees, and from Americans to individuals living 
in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Serbia, Singapore or Australia.
77 
                                                            
77 Interviewees had much less gender diversity: only one of the interviewees was female, and another one refused to 
specify a gender.  
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The interviewees were selected through theoretical sampling from a list of contributors 
with over one hundred article contributions, where the main sampling category was based on the 
outcome of interest: continued participation versus turnover. A total of one hundred and forty-
nine participants were randomly contacted using lists available on the Wikipedia site. 
Information about their total number of contributions and total number of articles they 
contributed to, and whether they are still contributing or have exited was collected from archival 
sources. In order to account for the possibility that individuals who belong to different cultures or 
cohorts of contributors (based on their starting dates) might have different participation “careers” 
I collected data to account for these variations as well. I started analyzing the data as the 
interviews were unfolding, and I expanded the sample during the data analysis stage until it 
reached theoretical saturation. The final sample consisted in approximately equal numbers of 
interviewees who are active, who have decreased the intensity of their participation, and who 
have ceased participating in Wikipedia work. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
As soon as the process of interviewing participants was under way, I proceeded by coding 
transcripts and by iteratively revising the interviewee sampling, the interview schedule, and the 
coding scheme. In doing so I have followed Strauss’ four basic guidelines: asking the data a 
specific and consistent set of questions regarding individual process of participation in 
Wikipedia, analyzing the data carefully in order to ground my theory, writing notes and memos 
pertaining to my findings, and avoiding assumptions regarding certain patterns of participation 
until they emerged from the data (1987). These four main activities of grounded analysis – data-
collection, note-taking, coding and memo’ing – were conducted simultaneously. The open 
coding process was done using both in-vivo concepts that emerged from participants’ own  
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stories and concepts based on analytic categories induced by the semi-structured interview 
topics. After open-coding the first half-dozen interviews, three core code categories have started 
to emerge. These categories refer to online participation (including interactions and relationships 
with other participants, and contributor activities and one’s role on the project), satisfaction / 
dissatisfaction with Wikipedia and decision to stop contributing, and interviewee’s offline social 
network and context (see Table 3.1 for a hierarchy of codes). I encouraged interviewees to speak 
about the relevance that these emerging themes and coding categories have for their commitment 
to Wikipedia. While doing so, I also used the initial coding as a ‘springboard’ to speculate about 
patterns and explore the interview data instead of staying bound to my initial findings (Strauss 
1987).  
I subsequently started using the initial categories as coding frames to successively sort 
cases into various classes. Since the initial question centered on commitment to participating on 
Wikipedia, a first subdivision classified participants as highly-active (coded S for stayers), 
occasional participants (coded P for peripheral), and departed (coded L for leavers). The next 
subdivisions emerged as a result of axial or intensive, focused coding around the categories of 
interest (Strauss 1987). Axial coding is a procedure which allows for increasing specification of 
conditions, consequences, interactions and strategies associated with a phenomenon of interest, 
committed participation, and for relationships among codes to emerge (Strauss 1987). In this 
case, each of the three initial categories of participants was divided into two classes, highly 
embedded and low social participation to the project. An additional attribute allowed me to 
separate interviewees by type of offline environment into socially and professionally active 
people versus under-involved interviewees.  
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The last coding stage consisted of a selective coding process whereby subordinate codes 
were consolidated, eliminated or linked to the main categories in order to shape the theory. This 
process resulted into clusters of codes focused on online tasks, perceptions of online 
relationships, existence and enforcement of norms, and offline relationships, all of which were 
then related to the core code of participation. 
Table 3.1. Code Hierarchy 
Code families  # Codes         Code categories 
Online embeddedness: relationships 
and roles  
36  Existence and enforcement of norms (21) 
Rewards and status (2) 
Time spent (5) 
Perceptions of online relationships (8) 
    
Offline relationships and context   26  Talking with friends about Wikipedia (3) 
Education (3) 
Job (6) 
Friendships (8) 
Family status (4) 
Location (2) 
 
Satisfaction/ turnover  43  Wikipedia as community (6) 
Wikipedia bureaucracy (5) 
Opinion about Wikipedia (8) 
Would change Wikipedia (9) 
Circumstances / reasons for leaving (15) 
 
Following this phase I started to think of ways to interpret patterns of participation in 
light of my interview data and of relevant sociological literature, by tying together existing and 
emerging theories (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1998). Theoretical questions led 
me to refine the contributor role category into two different types of participation, topic-focused 
and broad participation. This latter differentiation emerged as participants suggested that social 
closure effects are manifest in situations of repeated collaboration (Coleman 1990). Last, the 
final coding categories expanded over two main levels, attending to individual agency  
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(individuals’ acts and relationships), and structural context for the interviewees’ actions and 
interactions.  
This latter classification builds on both Hackman’s and Strauss and Corbin’s observations 
that multiple levels are necessary and interdependent in the quest for sociological explanations 
(Hackman 2003; Strauss and Corbin 1998), because minimizing or leaving out socio-structural 
conditions in which actions and interactions take place deprives the explanation of its contextual 
complexity and risks to oversimplify mechanisms. In attending to both levels, my analysis 
attempts to consider the effects of both structural conditions and individual agency on the 
phenomenon of interest. As further discussed in this study, these levels interact and mutually 
influence each other: participants shape the interaction environment while their environment 
shapes their actions and interactions.  
By analyzing the relationship between individuals’ structural position measured as 
dependence on their social network and their participation patterns, I propose a social mechanism 
which may account for the observed turnover patterns. This mechanism showcases a process 
through which embeddedness in collaborative work, under conditions of high dependence, can 
have a negative impact on individual commitment. In the next section I characterize the turnover 
patterns observed in the data and examine their relation to initial participation, intensity of past 
participation, choice of role in Wikipedia collaboration work, and social networks of co-
contributors and non-contributors (offline relationships). 
FINDINGS 
In this section I first describe the study findings in terms of variation in interviewees’ 
decision to leave Wikipedia as a function of their task-related activities and social relationships 
in order to identify the antecedents of turnover in Wikipedia. I then delve deeper into the  
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identified factors to unveil the social mechanism underlying the link from the antecedents to the 
turnover decision.  
Since the outcome of interest is organizational commitment, measured as continued 
participation in Wikipedia, I start by identifying the three main categories of respondents: 
stayers, peripherals, and leavers (see Table 3.2). While peripheral contributors clearly differed in 
contribution patterns from highly active contributors, I consider them together as “stayers” in the 
analyses given that “peripherals” have suggested that their reduction in the frequency of 
contributions to Wikipedia was temporary and exogenous to their relationships and activities 
online. 
Table 3.2.   Dependent Variable Description 
Contributor participation   # Interviewees  Description 
Highly active (stayers, S)  13  Continues to contribute almost daily 
Expresses desire to continue contributing 
Occasional (peripherals, P)  11  Contributes less than he used to 
Expresses desire to continue contributing but 
cites exogenous causes why contributes less 
Departed (leavers, L)  11  Unequivocally left Wikipedia 
States no intention to contribute again / return 
 
At the onset of this study I considered the possibility that stayers and leavers may differ 
in their initial entry in the Wikipedia environment, in the extent to which they have engaged in 
contributions at the peak of their participation, in the extent to which they have experienced 
disappointment with regards to collaboration norms, in the types of tasks and participation roles 
that they self-select into, or in the importance or structural characteristics of their online and 
offline networks. In the following sections I compare and contrast qualitative evidence from 
interviews with stayers and peripherals with information from leavers, in order to identify the 
antecedents of turnover in collaborative production.  
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Initial Involvement 
I started by examining stayers’ and leavers’ initial participation patterns, in order to observe 
whether there were differences in their starting motivation for Wikipedia contributions. Most 
interviewees have shared that they have started participating in Wikipedia article writing 
gradually, by first making minor corrections or low-cost contributions to articles related to their 
hometown, occupation (L5, P8 and P9)
78 or hobbies (L6 and S8). Most interviewees described 
the editing process as easy to learn and engaging: 
I got onto one article [where] I knew the subject matter quite well and I saw an error. So I 
clicked on the ‘Edit’ tab and [discovered that] it was remarkably easy to make changes. 
(S3) 
I edited an existing article and … after spending a couple of days … following what 
changes people made to it, [I started] editing other articles and following changes to them 
as well. (P7) 
My first contributions were copy-edits to articles that were marked in need of copy-edits. 
I found it pretty simple to contribute to, and I became more involved soon afterwards. 
(L2) 
I started with small edits, expanding topics that I knew something about from personal 
experience. But then I moved to rewrite all the articles on the video game industry. (L6) 
Since the initial conditions of participation by stayers and leavers were similar, I turned 
to examining the difference in their subsequent participation patterns.  
Intensity of Past Involvement  
Wikipedia contributors interviewed spent anywhere from a few minutes to a few hours a week 
making changes to articles and engaging in conversations with other contributors. For example 
L7 had periods when he was contributing about nine hours a day, while S8 continues to 
contribute about 20-25 hours a week. Most interviewees suggested that way Wikipedia is 
                                                            
78 From this point on, I will be referring to the interviewees using designation of category (stayer, peripheral or 
leaver) and the number of the interviewee in my records, such as S5, P4, or L5.  
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organized makes it easy to discover new opportunities to contribute and to enter conversations 
with other contributors and to stay engaged: 
Wikipedia is so easy to fall into because it's so useful. Suppose I'm reading a [news] 
article and I come across words I don't know [so] I might look them up on Wikipedia. 
And because there are so many links on the article I will start tumbling through the world 
of Wikipedia. Everything is so deeply interconnected that it's just very easy to wander 
through ... I'm reading [an article] and … I don't know what that [term means], and I'll 
click another link and it'll take me to a new page with new ideas, people …it’s a virtuous 
or vicious circle depending on your point of view. (P1) 
As the quote above suggests, editing on a variety of topics with other contributors is draw 
for participants. Individuals learn new information by exploring Wikipedia, and gradually 
discover more articles of interest and potential collaborators. Contributing to article writing is 
not, however, without pitfalls. Given how the wiki platform is set up, there is in fact an 
unavoidable trade-off between individual and collective benefits from contributions. I turn to 
examine whether leavers were individuals particularly disappointed with Wikipedia 
collaboration norms and their enforcement. 
The Social Structure of Collaboration 
The trade-off between individual and collective benefits from one's contributions is inherent to 
collaborative work. On one hand, the collective clearly benefits from including only the best of 
work in the common product. On the other hand, individual contributors may get upset if they 
feel their efforts are underappreciated, or rejected for unsubstantiated reasons. The decision of 
rejecting some contributions is therefore fraught with social costs. For the contributor whose 
effort is being judged, high costs are incurred if he feels wronged, especially regarding a 
substantial contribution. For the norm enforcer, costs come from disapproval by the sanctioned 
member or by third parties if the norm or evaluation is not shared. For this reason, many  
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participants may prefer benefiting from norms without contributing to their enforcement (Baron, 
Kerr, and Miller 1992; Coleman 1990), which could lead to loss of article quality.  
Wikipedia is a place where this trade-off is particularly acute for two reasons. First, 
contributions are asynchronous, in the sense that contributors make article changes and their co-
participants react to these. Hence contributions may be rejected after participants have put in 
substantial effort, so they see not only their ideas but also the value of their work rebuffed. One 
contributor (L11) explained: “I did my graduate work on Asian music and have written 
[Wikipedia] articles on traditional musical instruments from Korea. I put a complete list of these 
instruments on Wikipedia, but this Korean-American high-school kid has been introducing 
incorrect information to the page. I pointed this out about a hundred times on the discussion 
page, but this person keeps getting other [editors] to overrule me. [Sometimes]… on Wikipedia, 
it's not always the most informed person that wins, but it's the most persistent.” Second, those 
whose contributions are rejected are a higher risk of misinterpreting this rejection in absence of a 
rich communication medium. If the rejecting party does not clearly and respectfully 
communicate the reasons for rejecting a contribution to the affected party, the affected party may 
fail to learn how to improve on his work and may feel that his contributions are not useful or 
appreciated. It is important that individuals who are motivated to invest effort in contributing are 
assured that their edits are fairly judged and stand a chance to become part of the article. 
Otherwise, they may leave because they feel their work is not sufficiently appreciated or 
respected, or because they are tired of frequent conflicts with other editors over the merits of 
their work. 
If interviewees were to systematically differ in terms of articles they are contributing to, 
we may expect that those contributing to highly controversial articles to leave Wikipedia faster  
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than those participating in the writing of less controversial articles. However in my interviews I 
found that respondents described a similar range of situations encountered, and that all of them 
had enough knowledge about Wikipedia as a body of articles such that they could potentially 
self-select into a type of collaborative environment that they were comfortable with. This finding 
may be attributable to the fact that most respondents had large numbers of annual contributions 
to Wikipedia, varying from about 110 (P5) to 32 thousand (S7), with a mean of about five 
thousand contributions and a standard deviation of about 6,250 edits. All interviewees had 
similar opportunities to socialize into Wikipedia, understand its norms and interact with other 
contributors. Many of them have noted that they experienced both productive collaboration and 
disagreements with fellow contributors, and that sometimes they had to negotiate compromises 
which led to article changes away from their original intent. However, some interviewees left 
and others continued contributing as a response to similar situations. This brings us back to the 
central puzzle of this study: what is different about individuals who remain committed to the 
organization and continue contributing despite encountering similar conflicts and norm 
infringements?  
In my analysis I found that a good understanding of contribution norms and collaboration 
guidelines is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for editors to remain committed to 
participating in Wikipedia. Both stayers and leavers listed similar shortcomings of Wikipedia. 
For example, both interviewee L1 and S8 complained about edits by anonymous contributors and 
suggested that registration should be mandatory for everyone who contributes, presumably 
because the intentions, skills and reputation of a registered contributor can be more readily 
assessed from contribution history, whereas one cannot retrieve a track record for anonymous 
contributors.   
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Contributor Roles 
The concept of contributor roles has emerged naturally from stories about participation patterns. 
Several interviewees suggested that establishing one’s domain of competence and building a 
reputation for a specific type of contributions such as copy-editing or vandalism removal, or on a 
narrow knowledge topic raises the odds that one’s work will survive collaborative editing. For 
example, contributor P11 shared: “[Another editor] knows how to make diagrams for chemical 
structures. Sometimes I see an article on a chemical compound that does not have a molecular 
diagram, so then I send him a quick message, and usually within 24 hours there it is.” S5 
explained: “My articles focus on articles about culture, musicians and music education in Serbia. 
Our musicians deserve to be remembered, and currently you can only read about them [only 
offline]. I got into Wikipedia by starting my own articles and then improving them. This is by 
and large the only thing I do on Wikipedia.” P8 shared: “I started with the harbor of [N] page, 
and spent a lot of time on that page, because of my business, [N] Harbor Tours. But from there 
I've expanded and I've worked on many different pages; things relating to other parts of [N] and 
then moved to other things.” A similar strategy is echoed in S3’s story: 
The interesting thing about Wikipedia is that people can check you out very easily, very 
quickly, and find out some basic information about you and what you've done on 
Wikipedia. So you have a certain status … that people [can] recognize… 
 
Very early on I developed kind of my own approach to articles. And it sort of played to 
my own field and strengths. I've worked as an editor for publications [offline]. So it was 
natural for me to do a certain kind of editing. So I found my [place] in the Wikipedia 
community. If I copy-edit an article, it's not likely to get [undone]. Nobody is going to 
come on and [argue]. I think they have a certain level of respect for what I do. (S3) 
 
Interviewee P5 adopted a similar strategy, because it was aligned with his offline 
commitment: “I felt I could correct things that weren't right ... Part of my experience includes  
126 
 
work as a tutor, [and my participation is] an extension of that.” Both P5 and S3 adopted a 
strategy of specialization in their edit types. One major difference between their participation 
patterns however turned out to be that S3 deliberately selected specific topics to contribute to: 
I'm Canadian, so I looked at several Canadian articles and I saw systemic biases in them. 
They were written obviously by white, techno-literate young males mostly…So I set as 
my goal to start working on Canadian articles that input those groups. So for the next 
several months I just worked quietly. (S3) 
In contrast to S3, who as of January 1, 2009 made about 30 contributions per day in the 
previous month, interviewee P5 had made only five edits during the previous two months. He 
shared that he had applied his skills to a broad range of topics and was disappointed with most 
subject-specific participation: “There's a 'ruling clique' … in most subject areas. They have their 
status quo and are loathe to embrace anything [else] …I don't like the community there, it's a 
'survival of the most persistent' where factual accuracy is usually but not always the victor.” 
While some contributors adopted the broad contribution strategy, the topic-focused approach has 
been adopted by interviewees who specialized in articles on (usually) one specific subject, such 
as music and musicians (S5 and S7), biology (P8 and P9), tropical cyclones (L4), weapons (L6) 
or comic-books (L3). This pattern of contribution has the advantage that one may edit more 
frequently together with a core group of recurrent contributors, which provides social closure, a 
structural property that facilitates norm enforcement and social rewards provision to participants 
(Coleman 1990).  
While several interviewees have expressed disappointment similar to P5, stating that 
broad contributions exposed one to the risk of being under-valued in topic-centric discussions, I 
found that this dimension was inconclusive in predicting the likelihood of contributor turnover. 
In order to assess the benefits of social rewards from co-participants I turn to examining the issue 
of social interactions in Wikipedia collaboration structures.   
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Social Networks with Co-Contributors 
In Wikipedia, frequent participants are referred to as ‘Wikipedians.’ Surprisingly, I found that 
despite the high levels of participation of interviewees, many explicitly reject the idea of self-
identifying as ‘Wikipedians’. P1 explained: “I don't think I've ever quite fully identified with the 
project. I joined it, but I could see that there were other people who were more obsessed with it 
that I was. … I [don’t] see myself as a Wikipedian”. S5, a participant with about 2,000 
contributions, confessed a similar feeling, indicating that he welcomes communication with 
fellow contributors but does not think of the participants engaged in collective production on 
Wikipedia as community: “I communicate with [other editors] occasionally, but, generally, I 
don't feel a sense of community between Wikipedia editors. I prefer a sense of community 
between people in the real world.” Leavers (departed contributors) expressed similar reluctance 
to identify as Wikipedians, but they were more likely to state that they felt allegiance towards 
particular individuals or Wikipedia subgroups such as the group of contributors writing about 
comic books, warfare or tropical cyclones.  
My analysis revealed that not only do the stayers and peripherals reject identification 
with the community at large, but they also tend to form weak ties with other contributors 
(Granovetter 1973) and restrict communication with others to task-oriented communication, 
related to the article or topic they are working on. This pattern largely manifested by stayer and 
peripheral participants was coded as a low social participation: 
I've only had one conversation on Wikipedia, and that was when I was very concerned 
about what they call neutral point of view. And someone had listed one of my favorite 
publications, The New York Times, as a liberal publication. And it dawned on me that … 
the world liberal was far too vague and The New York Times far too complex ...So I 
thought … I'll remove it. And I came back the next day and it was back. [So we started 
changing the article back and forth which was annoying to both of us.] And I decided this 
wasn't a good idea and that I would actually talk this through. (P1)   
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The low social participation of stayers and peripherals is not due to their lacking 
information about all the ways in which they could connect with other participants. As P1 above 
illustrates, they would talk to others if there is a need for communication, to clarify a 
misunderstanding or sort out a disagreement regarding an article. As S3 states below, stayers and 
peripherals may even acknowledge that it may be important for others to get to know their co-
participants better, or “face-to-face,” but they generally focus on “factual contributions” rather 
than social interactions: 
There are a lot of [contributor] meet-ups and they're big events... There was one recently 
for people in British Columbia… and I was tempted to go to that, because there are some 
interesting people that I've dealt with [on the project], but in the end I didn't. It's 
important, I would say, for many people within the Wikipedia community to get to know, 
face-to-face, their collaborators. It hasn't been that way for me… my contribution is more 
focused around factual contributions and not so much the interaction with others. (S3) 
In contrast, leavers have a history of being socially involved with other participants. One 
leaver has shared the story of collaborating with others in articles on his topics or interest: 
A few people, notably John, and Terry, as well as James
79 were quite helpful in the areas 
I was contributing to - Hawaii, military stuff, and firearms. [W]e were able to accomplish 
a great deal of work by combining and distributing workloads. (L6) 
 
The leavers reported not only more engagement in coordinating contributions with others, 
but also social interactions with fellow contributors, which suggests that they developed 
multiplex relationships with Wikipedia co-participants. One leaver (L5) reports asking for “help 
on non-related personal matters”, and another (L1) reports that she frequently chatted with other 
Wikipedia participants and even met her “best friend” in this setting:
80 
                                                            
79 Contributor names were altered for privacy reasons. 
80 Typically, multiplex relationships have a tendency to be strong ties (Brass, Butterfield and Skaggs 1998).  
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I would occasionally use the talk page function a bit like an internet chat, and in addition 
used the e-mail function to get help on non-related personal matters such as travel advice 
or similar, based on knowledge obtained or inferred through interaction with other 
wikipedians or from personal information placed on individual user pages by the users 
themselves. (L5) 
 
I use IRC and chat with some editors on Yahoo messenger. I've made some amazing 
friends, including the one I refer to above as my best friend... I got to know some editors 
from interacting with them on Wikipedia and becoming friends with them through off-
wiki chat. [I met my best friend through policy discussions, and then] we joked around on 
our talk pages. Eventually, a mutual friend shared our Yahoo IDs, and we ended up 
talking in Yahoo. Craziness ensued. Haha. I met an amazing person who is so much like 
me... We had a rollercoaster of a friendship, wrote an article together, created a project 
together, [and] caused some drama together. (L1) 
 
  My analysis suggests that, contrary to the expectation that social embeddedness benefits 
participants through higher emotional engagement in the organization (Kahn 1998), highly 
embedded participants like L1 and L5 are the ones least likely to remain engaged.
81 Even more 
significantly, contributors whose social networks with other contributors are of multiplex nature 
(Burt 1983; Verbrugge 1979) whereby the focal actor uses the relationships not only for task-
related purposes but also for friendship and advice are the ones most likely to leave Wikipedia. 
This is contrary to what we would expect based on an escalation of commitment logic: the more 
socially embedded contributors are, the more we would expect them to be led towards persistent 
commitment by psychological and social forces (Staw and Ross 1989). To explain this 
paradoxical finding I turn to examining the importance of social networks in Wikipedia relative 
to other social ties in interviewees’ lives. 
 
                                                            
81 In order to address concerns that the quality of stayers’ contributions may be different (substantially higher) than 
that of leavers’ contributions, I examined the likelihood that each experiences erased contributions (reverts). I found 
no clear-cut evidence of a difference between the two. Examining the survival times of leavers’ and stayers’ 
contributions would be a more effective measure of work quality, but this measure cannot be obtained since my 
quantitative Wikipedia datasets to not include the actual contribution texts.  
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Social Networks with Non-Contributors 
The data suggests that the collaboration structures on Wikipedia cannot be evaluated without a 
proper understanding of their relative importance to the focal actor. I find that contributors 
whose real life social alternatives are limited or otherwise unsatisfactory place a much higher 
weight on receiving intrinsic and social rewards when contributing on Wikipedia. If individuals 
have little minimal offline social networks or other social involvement (are under-involved 
offline), and if the value of their Wikipedia contributions is questioned, their disappointment is 
more salient than editors’ who can turn to offline social alternatives for support and rewards. 
When these former editors’ expectation of social rewards from collaborators is not met, or when 
conflict arises, they are more likely to abandon the project because they fail to distance 
themselves from that event. 
In the analysis I estimated interviewee’s offline social involvement and networks from 
information that interviewees provided about their education level, occupation, marital status, 
and friendship networks. Responses varied from the under-involved former contributor L1 to the 
socially active S8. The former explained that her real life does not provide much social support 
and intellectual satisfaction:  
I am a waitress. I am married but with established plans to separate and divorce …I do 
talk [with my friends] about [Wikipedia], but they do not contribute. I told one [about my 
contributions], and she responded, ‘Is that the book that tells you the definition of 
words?’ Sometimes I think it's best they don't contribute. (L1) 
 
In contrast, S8, a California engineer who contributed over ten thousand edits, explained 
his real life social network as follows: 
I probably have 200 friends of various kinds… I have a few that are so close [that] I 
would take a bullet for them or something… maybe six, and then so many more that I 
enjoy talking with. [Some] have different career connections with me, some have no 
career connections with me, but a lot of my current friends are ones that I've met while I  
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was working, and very few are from before I was working. [V]ery few are from school, 
but some are… I'm certainly no hermit. (S8) 
S8’s intrinsic motivations to contribute may be similar to everyone else's, but when his 
edits are rejected or altered, he sees this interaction as inherent in Wikipedia’s collaboration 
format and looks at Wikipedia from the perspective of its mission to provide knowledge to the 
world. Nevertheless, S8 voluntarily mentions his difficulty in collaborating with some editors 
who are inflexible in their Wikipedia actions and lack a sense of perspective regarding their 
contributions:  
Some people have nothing but Wikipedia in their lives, and … maybe … almost no social 
interaction, almost no family interaction. … A few are so tied to the rules of Wikipedia 
that they don't see how the common sense of an information source like Wikipedia would 
best be served. (S8) 
 
Up to this point, the analysis suggests that participants with strong offline social 
networks, whose family and friends provide social rewards and an alternative to Wikipedia 
participation, are more likely to continue contributing compared against contributors who are 
more dependent on Wikipedia for social relationships and rewards. As S7’s story below portrays, 
stayers and peripherals are able to distance themselves from conflict and accept it as inherent 
part of collaborative work, and, in general, social interaction: 
[Wikipedia is] just like any small group or large system. It has the same dynamics. 
[Discussions are] very heated, a lot of backstabbing, people trying to get their friends to 
get involved. … [Sometimes] you can't get any justice. In a way it's like society at large. 
When you appeal to a higher authority, sometimes you get ignored. [It can be irritating 
but] I don't think it's a flaw of [Wikipedia], it's just a flaw of social systems that shows up 
on Wikipedia just like it might show up [anywhere else] in society. (S7) 
In a nutshell, S7 recognizes that social interaction on Wikipedia is similar to any other 
social system, and is not upset over Wikipedia conflicts and “backstabbing” he perceives as 
inherent to collective production. S7 is an American male graduate student, with a small but  
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dense personal network offline: “Out of those six close friends that I have, four of them are 
friends amongst themselves, and the fifth one knows them but is not as close to the others. And 
the other one is my good friend from college back home, and I don't see him that often.” Like 
many other interviewees, he doesn’t often mention his work on Wikipedia to his offline social 
network. Some of his close friends may know he is contributing, but “Certain people I withhold 
information from, I don't want them to know that I do it. So for example, my dissertation advisor 
doesn't know...I hope… [If I tell people that I contributed over 1,000 edits] instead of saying, 
‘wow, that's great’, [I get] a quizzical reaction. Like, why would you devote yourself to doing 
something that's wasting your time like that … you're not getting paid. [O]ftentimes people are 
half-impressed but also a little weirded out.”  
Although substantial, S7’s Wikipedia involvement described above represents only a 
small portion of his overall identity and social interactions. S7 is a fairly representative case: 
stayers and peripherals are characterized by the lower social participation in Wikipedia and high 
social involvement in their offline lives. Table 3.3 presents a summary of interviewee attributes 
as they pertain to social participation online and offline, year when the interviewee started 
contributing, percentage of contributions deleted, number of average contributions per day, age 
of the interviewee (at the time of the interview), and highest educational level attained or in 
progress. In this table, a relationship (marriage, partnership) and/or offline friends was coded as 
‘1’ and none of the two -‘0’; having Wikipedia friends one engaged in social exchanges with was 
coded as ‘1’, and not having such friends as ‘0’; and a high school education or equivalent was 
coded as ‘0’, college education as ‘1’ and graduate level education as ‘2.’
82  
                                                            
82 The offline social network variable was dichotomized because interviewees provided several types of committed 
relationships as response, and because several declined to answer the question, while providing a wide range of 
offline network estimates as well, from “about 200 people I am in contact with on a regular basis” to “six people that 
I would take a bullet for” which made it difficult to normalize the size of the networks across the sample. Most  
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Table 3.3.  Summary of Relevant Interviewee Characteristics (N=35) 
Participation Education   Age  Year  Start Edits / Day  Deleted%  Soc. Offline  Soc. online 
Stayer 2  27  2006  1.8  4.85 0 0 
Stayer 2  37  2005  89.2  1.69 1 0 
Stayer 0  50  2001  5.8  1.99 1 0 
Stayer 1  26  2001  36  8.84 1 0 
Stayer 2  54  2003  8.4  1.96 1 0 
Stayer 1  21  2007  24.7  14.29 1 1 
Stayer 1  22  2005  16.8  2.63 1 1 
Stayer 1  16  2008  0.5  8.34 1 0 
Stayer 2  69  2006  8.1  1.87 1 0 
Stayer 1  .  2006  17.6  6.96 1 1 
Stayer 0  29  2003  1.8  5.53 1 0 
Stayer 1  70  2007  1.4  2.25 1 0 
Stayer 1  .  2007  44.7  1.04 1 0 
Peripheral 2  41  2006 1.7  3.93  0  0 
Peripheral 1  23  2007 13  3.25  1  1 
Peripheral 2  47  2008  8  5.7  1  0 
Peripheral 2  33  2002 1.8  3.32  1  0 
Peripheral 1  40  2001 0.3  2.26  1  0 
Peripheral 2  27  2005 4.6  13.25  1  0 
Peripheral 1  40  2002  15.7  2.74  1  0 
Peripheral 1  19  2006 0.2  4  1  0 
Peripheral 1  35  2004 9.8  4.94  1  1 
Peripheral 2  32  2002  3  2.68  1  0 
Peripheral 1  21  2004 2.1  4.42  1  0 
Leaver 2  27  2005  9.8 8.61  0 0 
Leaver 2  50  2005  11 5.11  0 0 
Leaver 0  26  2006  22.5  10.55 0 1 
Leaver 1  .  2004  17.8  43.07 0 1 
Leaver 0  19  2005  31.3  6.43  1 1 
Leaver 0  18  2005  4.5 4.31  1 1 
Leaver 0  30  2004  2.6  16.99 1 1 
Leaver 1  23  2004  14.7  9.16  1 1 
Leaver 2  31  2005  11.3  1.27  1 0 
Leaver 1  52  2005  12.5  13.52 0 1 
Leaver 1  .  2005  31.4  3.61  1 1 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
interviewees provided no / tentative estimates of their social network density – this lead to dropping this variable 
from the analysis. In terms of Wikipedia-based relationships, many interviewees proceeded to list people or describe 
events related to interactions with online friends; for analysis purposes I coded mentions of such social interactions 
(beyond pure coordination in article writing) as “1” and explicit denial of online friendships as “0.”  
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A brief ordinal logit regression of the data
83 in Table 3.3 using participation as dependent 
variable provides support for the qualitative findings.
84 Out of eight variables included in the 
specification, only social participation online and social participation offline attained statistical 
significance, indicating that for a one unit increase in one’s offline social network we expect a 
2.03 increase in the log-odds of continuing to participate (90% confidence level) while for a one-
unit increase in one’s online social participation to Wikipedia we expect a 2.59 decrease in the 
log-odds of continuing to participate to Wikipedia (95% confidence level).  
In short, the quantitative analysis described provides support for the assertion that 
individuals who are highly dependent on Wikipedia collaborators for their social interactions are 
the more likely to exit, compared against individuals whose offline social networks provide a 
buffer against inherent disappointments and conflict associated with collective production. If, 
following Emerson (1962) we relationally define dyadic dependence as “of actor A upon actor B 
as (1) directly proportional to A's motivational investment in goals mediated by B, and (2) 
inversely proportional to the availability of those goals to A outside of the A-B relation,” we can 
see that stayer and peripheral dependence on Wikipedia is low, whereas leavers’ stories hint to a 
high dependence on their Wikipedia network.  
DISCUSSION  
Linking Power-Dependence to Turnover 
                                                            
83 Interviewee identification codes were excluded to preserve the confidentiality of information, since one may be 
able to identify individuals by triangulating interview and table data. 
 
84 The results of this ordinal regression are available upon request. For analysis purposes, education was coded as 
separate dummies for college and graduate level (with baseline = high school education). Out of all interviewees, 10 
were students, 20 fully employed, one unemployed and 3 retired (one declined to answer). The ‘work status’ 
variable was not included because student / employed status was not significantly correlated with participation. The 
adjusted R-squared value suggests that this specification explains 23.25 percent of the variation in participation 
patterns; a simple regression with 2 degrees of freedom including only social participation online and offline 
explains approximately 15.5 of the variation in participation patterns. The Brant test for the proportional odds 
assumption confirms that the parallel regression assumption was not violated.  
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Initial Involvement & 
Participation Intensity
Multiplex Relationships w/
High Dependence
High Turnover
Task-Oriented Relationships w/
Low Dependence
Low Turnover
Due to their low dependence on their Wikipedia social network, stayers and peripherals 
perceptions of self-efficacy and their engagement in Wikipedia are not affected by the conflicts 
inherent in collective article writing. Conversely, leavers were highly dependent on their group 
of Wikipedia collaborators both with regards to task-related outcomes and personal outcomes 
such as receiving status, advice or even friendship from others. In his theory of conflict, Simmel 
(1964:44-45) suggests that this high dependence can engender pernicious conflicts because “a 
quarrel arises between persons in [an important] relationship, it is often so passionately 
expansive [because we invested] with the totality of [our] being and feeling” in that relationship.  
Consistent with Emerson’s (1962) power-dependence theory we therefore observe that 
contributors highly dependent on Wikipedia engage in balancing operations, “structural changes 
in power-dependence relations which tend to reduce power advantage.” In this case, we observe 
actors choosing withdrawal; “the denial of dependency involved in this balancing operation will 
have the effect of moving actors away from relations which are unbalanced to their 
disadvantage” which effectively leads to turnover in the context of participation to Wikipedia.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Participation Patterns and Turnover Process 
The findings in this study point towards a divergent process model (Van de Ven 1992) 
whereby individuals undergo a developmental sequence, from becoming involved and socialized 
in a similar manner in collaborative production settings, to choosing different roles and strategies  
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for building relationships within the organization, and to divergent outcomes in terms of 
commitment to the organization (see Figure 3.1 above). 
Patterns of the Departed  
In my analysis I identified a difference in the social structures of contributors who are still 
committed to editing Wikipedia and those who explicitly abandoned the project. There are many 
reasons why people would stop editing online. Exogenous factors such as a more consuming job, 
family demands, or traveling impinge upon online participation. Several peripheral interviewees 
offered such reasons for their reduced edit volume. However, there were some who stood out: 
those who departed bitterly, after a conflict or major disappointment. For example, L5, a former 
contributor who focused on cartography articles “would occasionally use the talk page function a 
bit like an internet chat … to get help on non-related personal matters such as travel advice or 
similar, based on knowledge” from interaction with other contributors. His edits evolved from 
work on cartography topics to talk page discussions and socializing with other contributors. He 
eventually stopped editing completely stating that he “came to view the editing process as 
arbitrary and random” (L5) and that he was disappointed that people he collaborated with did not 
respect his work.  
Instead of building a task-related network of collaboration, L5 shifted towards more 
intensive socializing, forsaking the social closure and capital generated in the act of actively 
collaborating with enthusiastic others on a shared goal. Another departed editor (L1) shared a 
similar story: she developed a close friendship while contributing and, when her friend ended up 
being banned from the project for disrespectful behavior, she ceased editing; her motivation to 
participate was dramatically affected when he left. This decision was not necessarily caused by a 
socio-emotional orientation to the project – in contrast to stayers’ and peripherals’ more  
137 
 
instrumental one; as suggested by the analysis, neither group identified extensively with 
Wikipedia. The difference in participation behavior can be instead traced back to the formation 
of different types of ties with other contributors. 
These findings are consistent with research examining the relationship between coworker 
support and voluntary turnover. Despite the fact that the organizational support theory literature 
(Rhoades and Eisenberger 2002) has proposed that perceived support in the organizational 
environment is associated with a reduced likelihood of turnover, studies investigating the 
relationship between perceived coworker support and turnover failed to find evidence of this 
effect (Iverson 1999; Iverson and Pullman 2000). In a similar vein, network theorists have 
pointed out that there is a downside to high embeddedness. A qualitative study of work relations 
in a garment district exposed a “paradox of embeddedness” of inter-firm ties in social relations: 
in highly embedded networks, feelings of obligation, friendship, or betrayal in interpersonal 
relations may be so intense that emotions override task-oriented imperatives (Uzzi 1997). Work 
by Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) indicates that a similar phenomenon occurs in ethnic 
enclaves, where immigrant businesses are highly dependent on co-nationals both for clientele 
and labor market supply. 
Patterns of the Stayers 
In contrast to editors who have departed, interviewees who are still participating to the project 
told a story of respectful task-oriented interaction with fellow contributors. For example, in the 
quote below S11 explains that he has minimal information about the identity of fellow co-editors 
but is familiar with their skills and areas of knowledge. S11 openly engages potential 
collaborators in discussions relevant to the task, and is respectful of their expertise but does not 
attempt to socialize with co-contributors:  
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Out of the ten editors whose collaboration and expertise I really value, I don't really know 
much about any... I don't know where they live, I don't know their ages. I may know 
something about their cultural backgrounds. For example.., I think this guy lives in 
Canada somewhere and he's like a Chinese-Canadian. And he's really knowledgeable 
about Chinese esoteric ingredients, particularly … sauces and things…so if I'm interested 
in something and I don't know about it, he can read Chinese, so then I'll say… ‘I'm 
working on this article - can you look [something] up?’ (S11) 
S8 developed a pro-active strategy of collective production: to let people express 
objections before he puts too much effort into editing, he preemptively announces his planned 
contributions and stays open to fine-tuning details of his work: “I said, "Here's what I planned," 
and they said, ‘Good. If you need any help …put another message here’ … I didn't feel like I was 
a part of their project [but] I was doing stuff that affected their project. [M]ost of my [effort] 
goes to articles,” not social interactions. When contradicted, S8 considers the context of the 
argument and other parties’ credentials, and accepts compromise as inherent in collaborative 
work. 
In brief, the interview data suggest that stayers and peripherals are highly active in their 
offline lives, and walk a narrow line between socializing too much and too little on Wikipedia. 
Peripherals often contribute less because of exogenous reasons - as S4 explained: “I was going to 
do my master’s immediately after a college, but I found that I was learning more in university 
libraries writing Wikipedia articles than when I was a student. So I spent the next full year 
contributing on a full-time basis, working at libraries, researching things, introducing new 
pages…When I got my first job, I kept editing a fair bit... Nowadays I spend a little bit of time 
each day on Wikipedia, probably less than an hour.” S1 explained his fluctuating participation: 
“Now I'm roughly around like 1,100 edits a month. Last month I was a little bit lower and that 
was because I had more work for my classes and I was concentrating on finding a new apartment  
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and I was doing my application for study abroad. Basically just real-life concerns. Real-life 
things will obviously take up time from Wikipedia.” 
Too much socializing, as in the case of L1 and L5, leads to losing focus on the article 
writing task, and to lost motivation to participate when friends are not around to socialize with. 
Stayers’ social participation and identification with Wikipedia are minimal, but they are open 
and focused on communicating about their topics of interest which leads them to be recognized 
as experts in their particular areas. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study proposes a social mechanism through which individuals' commitment to participation 
in an organization is affected by the social structure around their collaborative work and by their 
social involvement with others outside the organization. Qualitative research based on archival 
data and interviews with participants to Wikipedia suggested that individuals who restrict their 
social participation to weak ties with collaborators are likelier to continue participating. 
Additionally, participants whose social networks outside the collaborative production setting 
provide social rewards are less likely to stop contributing because their dependence on the social 
network of collaboration is low. 
  The analysis of online and offline social networks, and, even more generally, of the 
connection between the relative importance of organizational networks in the structure of an 
individual’s social life and conflict among organizational members represents a novel area of 
exploration for the field of organizational behavior because it integrates and extends the 
sociological literatures on conflict, social networks, and power-dependence. Additionally, the 
finding that over-involvement in social interactions within organizations exposes individuals to 
higher risk of turnover and distracts from task-oriented interactions suggests that organizations  
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should consider the cost of drawbacks of fostering strong ties among members at the expense of 
life-work balance.  
This exploratory analysis of turnover in an online voluntary project work opens the door 
for a wider array of social studies looking at the mechanisms through which social structures 
affect participant commitment. Several limitations of the current study recommend this area as a 
fertile ground for research. First, this research is largely based on interview data from an online 
volunteer setting. While one would expect that findings from this setting are not directly 
applicable to work in traditional workplaces, I argue that role conflicts may even be less salient 
in volunteer settings since participants in volunteer work are known to have more children, be 
more socially active and be more engaged in religious activity than non-participants (Wilson and 
Musick 1997). Another limitation is that lack of individual commitment in the workplace may 
not immediately translate in turnover, due to the structure of rewards in these settings. Therefore 
examining the relationship between turnover and individual dependence on the organizational 
social network in a traditional workplace setting, under conditions of collaboration similar to 
those in Wikipedia would be a fruitful next step to extend this research. 
Second, this qualitative analysis fosters theory generation in linking organizational 
network dependence and turnover; further research is needed to test its applicability. The purpose 
of this paper is to identify a social mechanism responsible for individual turnover in 
collaborative production settings. Examining this mechanism in the context of other volunteer 
and non-volunteer settings, and identifying the necessary conditions for this process to take place 
are important next steps for generalizing the mechanism. 
Workplace engagement and organizational embeddedness are regarded as desirable in 
contemporary organizations, for their presumably positive effect on individual commitment to  
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the organization and on reducing turnover. Network structures in the workplace may facilitate 
provision of social support, thus indirectly moderating individual reactions to negative events 
such as norm infringement and conflict (Coleman 1990). In an examination of structural, 
attitudinal, and behavioral predictors of turnover, workplace network centrality, perceived 
coworker support, and felt obligation have similarly been identified in organizational behavior 
research as determinants of lower turnover likelihood (Mossholder, Settoon, and Henagan 2005). 
This latter research has however been largely agnostic to the nature of network ties at work, 
relying on the assumptions that social embeddedness at work has a positive effect on continued 
participation, and assuming that there is no interaction between these relationships and 
participants’ overall social network size or structure.  
Although “it is frequently recognized that a person's work life needs to be viewed in the 
context of family and personal concerns” (Kopelman, Greenhaus, and Connolly 1983), rarely did 
organizational research aside from work-family studies (Bielby and Bielby 1989; Greenhaus and 
Beutell 1985) integrate these findings in examinations of social network participation at work, or 
in studies of organizational exit decisions.
85 Managers often assume that multiple commitments 
and roles are antecedents of turnover because roles expand one’s repertoire of behaviors and set 
of obligations, which may lead to conflicts (Goffman 1959), and therefore foster relationship 
formation in organizations without regard, or even to the detriment, of other relationships. The 
present study suggests that without robust evidence to support these assumptions these practices 
may lead to dependence on social networks within the organization and ultimately result in 
individual turnover. 
                                                            
85 Organizational commitment has been “generally overlooked as a variable of interest in work-nonwork research” 
(Lounsbury and Hoopes 1986) as well, which points to the need for research on the relative importance of 
organizational networks in the context of individuals’ social life for turnover decisions.   
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APPENDIX A. VANDALISM, UNDO, AND REVERT OF UNDO EXPLAINED. 
Vandalism 
We first sought to discriminate undos of vandalism, which are legitimate actions, from undos of 
good edits, which are counternormative. To identify undos of vandalism, our sorted all the 
versions of a given article chronologically and analyzed each version starting with the oldest (see 
Table A.1 below for a sample article). The algorithm relied on the fact that an undo of vandalism 
creates a version of an article identical to a previous version. Because it would be too time-
consuming to compare each version to all previous versions, we relied on the simple shortcut of 
comparing the lengths of successive versions.
86 That is, if no prior version of identical length 
existed, we concluded that the version in question could not be an undo of vandalism.
87 But if the 
algorithm found a previous version of the same article with an identical length, it examined all 
versions between the one in question and the previous version of the same length.
88 The 
algorithm then tested whether intermediate versions by the same editor were less than 10 percent 
of the size of the version in question. If so, we recoded all intervening edits as acts of vandalism 
and coded the version in question as an undo of vandalism.
89 In examining version 263 in Table 
                                                            
86 Another option would be to identify an undo of vandalism by examining the short notes that editors sometimes 
append when undoing an article version. But these notes are optional, and therefore unreliable.  
87 In some cases acts of vandalism take the form of very small changes to an article, such as inserting a vulgarity into 
the text. When the next editor undoes such an addition, this is technically an undo of vandalism. But because our 
algorithm identifies only large changes to articles as vandalism, such an act will be coded as an undone edit 
followed by an undo. The algorithm will thus underestimate the rate of vandalism and overestimate the rate of 
undone edits. 
88 If many versions of the same length were found, the algorithm would select only the most recent. For example, if 
the algorithm was currently analyzing version 263, both versions 242 and 261 would be identified as the same length 
as 263. The algorithm would then select version 261. 
89 It is conceivable that an act of vandalism that removed more than 90 percent of an article’s content was followed 
by one or more versions and then by an undo that restored the article to its original state. To take this possibility into 
account, we assumed that the currently analyzed version was an undo of vandalism even if only one version existed 
with less than 90 percent of its content. We also tried coding the original edit that had removed 90 percent of article 
content as vandalism, the subsequent versions as regular edits, and the undo as an undo of vandalism. Given the 
rarity of such editing patterns, all coding schemes resulted in the same pattern of results.   
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2.7, for example, the algorithm would discover that version 261 was the same length, and that 
version 262 was less than 90 percent as long. We would then code version 262 as vandalism and 
version 263 as an undo of vandalism. 
Table A.1. Sample Article History 
  Version  Date and time  Editor or IP  Text 
length  
in bytes 
Final designation of 
edit type
90 
By 
… …  …  …  …   
242     94,399    Regular  edit   
… …  …  …  …   
261  Feb 4, 2005, 23:20  AndrewP 94,399  Regular  edit   
262  Feb 4, 2005, 23:25  PettyCrime  10  Vandalism   
263  Feb 4, 2005, 23:27  DogEatDog  94,399  Undo of vandalism   
264  Feb 4, 2005, 23:15  DannyP  94,134  Regular edit   
265  Feb 5, 2005, 12:15  Angela  94,576  Undone edit  Other 
266  Feb 5, 2005, 12:15  128.100.91.5 95,333 Undone  edit  Other 
267  Feb 5, 2005, 12:17  ZZTop  95,134  Undo  Other 
268  Feb 4, 2005, 23:16  BriteLite 94,433  Undone  edit    Self 
269  Feb 4, 2005, 23:19  BriteLite 94,512  Undone  edit    Self 
270  Feb 5, 2005, 12:10  BriteLite  95,134  Undo   Self 
271  Feb 5, 2005, 12:30  ZZTop  95,211  Regular edit   
272  Feb 5, 2005, 1:07  Angela 95,279  Undone  edit Other 
273  Feb 5, 2005, 1:09  BlueHawk  95,211  Undo   Other 
274  Feb 5, 2005, 1:10  DogEatDog  95,279  Revert of undo  Other 
275  Feb 5, 2005, 1:12  Charlie  96,501  Regular edit   
276  Feb 5, 2005, 1:20  MustBeSerious 96,650  Undone  edit  Other 
277  Feb 5, 2005, 1:25  BlueHawk  96,501  Undo   Other 
278  Feb 5, 2005, 1:27  MustBeSerious  96,650  Revert of undo  Self 
 
Undo 
We relied on the same logic to identify instances of an undo of a regular edit, which is 
normatively prohibited. This action creates a new version identical to a prior version but with no 
intervening vandalism edits.
91 If the algorithm detected such a pattern, the version in question 
                                                            
90 Because our algorithm moves forward in time, and we change designations by looking backward, acts initially 
coded in a particular way may be recoded when subsequent versions of the article are analyzed. Hence, we refer to it 
as the “final designation” 
91 Our algorithm works only for the original implementation of the undo link, which restored a particular version of 
an article and removed all intermediate versions between it and the current version. For example, if the current 
version was 266 and an editor clicked the undo link next to version 264, the platform would create version 267 an 
exact replica of 264, and discard all changes introduced in versions 265 and 266. In late 2006, Wikipedia changed its 
software to allow editors to undo changes introduced in only one version while leaving others intact. Thus, in  
144 
 
was categorized as an undo and those between it and the prior version of the same length were 
designated undone edits.
92 This pattern can be seen in edits 264–267 in Table 2.7; version 267 is 
designated an undo and versions 265 and 266 are both categorized as undone edit. 
The algorithm then sought to distinguish between a norm-violating undo and an 
acceptable one in which an editor created a new version of an article and then, dissatisfied with 
it, undid his own changes. To do so, the algorithm examined all intermediate versions between 
the version in question and the previous version of identical length. If all had been by the same 
editor, it qualified the undo as undo by self and undone edits as undone edits by self. This pattern 
can be seen in versions 267–270 in Table 2.7. If however the intermediate versions were saved 
by different editors, all acts of undo and all undone edits were coded as undertaken by other (see 
versions 264–267).
93 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
response to clicking the undo link next to version 264, the software would try to create a version 267 identical to 
version 266 but without changes introduced in version 264. This method retained the changes introduced in version 
265. As a consequence, the resulting version was apt to differ in length from the undone version 264, and our 
algorithm would not work. As a consequence, we limited our analysis to the time period when the original undo 
regime was in operation. 
92 At this point, it would be possible to compare the texts of the two versions to ascertain that they are actually 
identical. However, such an exercise would require several terabytes of computer storage capacity and would 
lengthen the data analysis by many months. We thus use this speedier algorithm. Its biggest shortcoming is that it 
will assume that two versions are identical when they are merely of identical length, leading us to overstate the 
frequency of undo and revert-of-undo actions. To test the extent to which this is a problem, we chose 2,000 articles 
at random and identified every instance when our algorithm found two versions of equal length. We then wrote a 
short script to test whether the versions tagged as identical were in fact textually identical. Of pairs tagged as 
identical, 99.7 percent were found to be in fact identical. Such a high rate of correspondence makes us confident that 
our faster algorithm is relatively error-free. 
93 This algorithm assumed that all undone versions were undone by other, even if some of the intermediate versions 
were by the same editor who later undid the changes. To verify the robustness of our results, we re-ran the algorithm 
assuming that every undone version saved by the same editor who later undertook an undo was marked as undone 
by self and every undone version saved by a different editor was marked as undone by other. Designating undone 
edits by self and undone edits by other led to coefficient estimates that are in the same direction as those resulting 
from the algorithm in the main text. We report those from the main text.  
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Reverts of Undo 
Finally, we used similar logic one more time to identify reverts of undo. For a revert of undo to 
take place, an editor must first undo a prior version of the article, thus making that version an 
undone edit; another editor then reverts that undo and creates a new version identical to the 
version marked as undone edit. Thus we can identify a revert of undo by finding that a previous 
version of the same length has already been marked as an undone edit. If the algorithm found 
such a pattern, it would mark the currently analyzed version as a revert of undo and introduce no 
other changes. This pattern of edits can be seen in the sequence of versions 271–274 in Table 
2.7. Version 271 was a regular edit, followed by edit 272, which was subsequently undone in 
version 273. Version 274, which reverted the undo in version 273, was identical to version 272. 
We will therefore code version 274 as a revert of undo.  
Finally, the algorithm identified whether the revert of undo was undertaken by the same 
person who had authored the undone edit or by someone else. To do so, the algorithm compared 
the usernames of the editor who reverted the undo and the editor who saved the undone edit. If 
the names differed, as in the case of versions 272 and 274, the algorithm would tag the revert of 
undo as undertaken by other. If the two names were identical, as in versions 276 and 278, the 
algorithm would tag the revert of undo as undertaken by self. 
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APPENDIX  B. INTERVIEW SCHEDULE. 
Starting point 
  How long were you a contributor to Wikipedia? 
  When did you begin contributing? 
  What form did your first contributions take (edits, new articles, etc)? What was the first 
article you edited about? 
  Why did you start editing? What was your primary motivation? 
 
Contribution patterns 
  How did your contribution pattern evolved over time? Did you edit more later or when 
you first started?  
  How much time did you put into editing Wikipedia articles?  
  Did Wikipedia play a part in your daily life? How and for how long? 
 
Likes / dislike / departure from Wikipedia 
  What, if anything, do you appreciate / like regarding Wikipedia? 
  What, if anything, would you most like to change about Wikipedia? 
  Why did you withdraw from Wikipedia? (if applicable) 
  What, if anything, could make you return? (if applicable) 
 
Community 
  Did you feel a sense of community within Wikipedia? If so, please elaborate. 
  Did you talk with other users on Wikipedia?  
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  Do you or did you talk to your ‘real life’ friends about Wikipedia? Do they contribute as 
well? 
 
Offline life 
  Finally, if you wouldn’t mind telling me a little bit about yourself… What is your 
educational background?  
  What is your employment status?  
  What is your marital status?  
  What are your primary hobbies and interests?  
  I’d also like to hear a bit about your social identity. What are your friends like?  
  What do you like to do with them?  
  Are they similar or dissimilar to you?  
  Are they a close-knit circle or a collection of dispersed individuals?  
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